| | The [[War of Attrition]] is over. [[Kill Zone]] operations ([[escalation]]) are underway. [[Trump]] greenlighted the go-ahead to [[Putin]] at the [[Alaska Summit]] to finish off [[Ukraine]] on the battlefield. This means a move through the [[Zaporozhye]] line-of-contact. taking the cities of [[Nikolaev]] & finally [[Odessa]], making what remains of the Ukrainian rump state landlocked, dependent on its neighbors, [[Russia]], [[Poland]] & [[Lithuania]], for imports and exports (see also [[tariff]]s for info about [[trade]] crossing borders. Russia has more to offer in the form of [[energy]], oil & gas then [[Western]] neighbors. Ukraine should have took the deals at [[Minsk Accords|Minsk]] or [[Istanbul I]] rather than listen to its [[American]] and Western [[suicide]] enablers.). [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''Zelensky Must Go!'']]</sup> 15:04, August 29, 2025 (EDT) | | The [[War of Attrition]] is over. [[Kill Zone]] operations ([[escalation]]) are underway. [[Trump]] greenlighted the go-ahead to [[Putin]] at the [[Alaska Summit]] to finish off [[Ukraine]] on the battlefield. This means a move through the [[Zaporozhye]] line-of-contact. taking the cities of [[Nikolaev]] & finally [[Odessa]], making what remains of the Ukrainian rump state landlocked, dependent on its neighbors, [[Russia]], [[Poland]] & [[Lithuania]], for imports and exports (see also [[tariff]]s for info about [[trade]] crossing borders. Russia has more to offer in the form of [[energy]], oil & gas then [[Western]] neighbors. Ukraine should have took the deals at [[Minsk Accords|Minsk]] or [[Istanbul I]] rather than listen to its [[American]] and Western [[suicide]] enablers.). [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''Zelensky Must Go!'']]</sup> 15:04, August 29, 2025 (EDT) |
| − | '''Update on casualties for 2025:''' The numbers [[Trump]] gives are totally off base. For most of 2025, id Ukraine holds it casualties to 600 peer day, that is a good day. Russian casualties up to August - if they ''exceeded'' 23 casualties per day, that was a bad day. Many days were even in single digits. Yes, there were days where casualties exceeded 100. Since August however, if casualties exceed 112, that's big offensive day. On the Ukrainian side since August, it's not uncommon to lose 1,400 to 2,000 daily. If casualties are under 1,000, that's a good day. | + | '''Update on casualties for 2025:''' The numbers [[Trump]] gives are totally off base. For most of 2025, if Ukraine holds it casualties to 600 peer day, that is a good day. Russian casualties up to August - if they ''exceeded'' 23 casualties per day, that was a bad day. Many days were even in single digits. Yes, there were days when Russian casualties exceeded 100. Since August however, if casualties exceed 112, that's big offensive day. On the Ukrainian side since August, it's not uncommon to lose 1,400 to 2,000 daily. If casualties are under 1,000, that's a good day. |
| | [[TCC]] kidnappings off the street are not supplying half the monthly losses. What people survive just after 3 weeks after being kidnapped and bussed off to the [[meatgrinder]] insures a steady decline in quality. | | [[TCC]] kidnappings off the street are not supplying half the monthly losses. What people survive just after 3 weeks after being kidnapped and bussed off to the [[meatgrinder]] insures a steady decline in quality. |