Changes

::“The US has lost its naval presence and military bases in the Persian Gulf region; its entire inventory of stand-off munitions has been nearly exhausted, along with its air defences, which have been proven woefully ineffective”.

::“The US has lost its naval presence and military bases in the Persian Gulf region; its entire inventory of stand-off munitions has been nearly exhausted, along with its air defences, which have been proven woefully ineffective”.

::“This is what decisive strategic defeat looks like”.

::“This is what decisive strategic defeat looks like”.

As [[Ben Rhodes]], former US Deputy National Security Advisor, put it:

:"As [[Ben Rhodes]], former US Deputy National Security Advisor, put it:

::“It’s hard to lose a war this short: this comprehensively”.

::“It’s hard to lose a war this short: this comprehensively”.

:"What took [[Trump]] from a Tuesday night posting that “a whole [[civilization]] will die tonight”, to acquiesce a few hours later to [[negotiation]]s on the basis of [[Iran]]’s 10-point plan, is for conjecture. But perhaps the juxtaposed images of the crashed [[helicopter]] from [[President Carter]]’s ill-fated attempt to rescue [[Iranian hostage crisis|US hostages from Iran in 1980]], together with the wreckage of US aircraft near [[Isfahan]] from the abandoned Saturday (4 April) attempt to seize enriched [[uranium]] from a tunnel at Isfahan, tells its story.

:"What took [[Trump]] from a Tuesday night posting that “a whole [[civilization]] will die tonight”, to acquiesce a few hours later to [[negotiation]]s on the basis of [[Iran]]’s 10-point plan, is for conjecture. But perhaps the juxtaposed images of the crashed [[helicopter]] from [[President Carter]]’s ill-fated attempt to rescue [[Iranian hostage crisis|US hostages from Iran in 1980]], together with the wreckage of US aircraft near [[Isfahan]] from the abandoned Saturday (4 April) attempt to seize enriched [[uranium]] from a tunnel at Isfahan, tells its story.

:"As one commentator notes, the only thing missing from the later 1980 scene is the presence of the assassinated Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

:"As one commentator notes, the only thing missing from the later 1980 scene is the presence of the assassinated Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei.

:"President Carter, of course, became the political casualty from that event.

:"President Carter, of course, became the political casualty from that event.

:"Let us recall too, that this current war was launched by a snap strike to kill the Supreme Leader, [[Ali Khamanei]] – and was expected to be a short war of days’ duration only. The [[NY Times]] report of the 11 February 2026 meeting at which [[Netanyahu]] persuaded Trump to join with an assault on Iran confirms that “the President appeared to think it would be a very quick war … (and) at no point during the deliberations did the Chairman [General Caine] directly tell the President that [[Epic Fury|war with Iran]] was a terrible idea … [General Caine] would constantly ask, “And then what? But Mr. Trump would often seem to hear only what he wanted to hear”.

:"Let us recall too, that this current war was launched by a snap strike to kill the Supreme Leader, [[Ali Khamanei]] – and was expected to be a short war of days’ duration only. The [[NY Times]] report of the 11 February 2026 meeting at which [[Netanyahu]] persuaded Trump to join with an assault on Iran confirms that “the President appeared to think it would be a very quick war … (and) at no point during the deliberations did the Chairman [General Caine] directly tell the President that [[Epic Fury|war with Iran]] was a terrible idea … [General Caine] would constantly ask, “And then what? But Mr. Trump would often seem to hear only what he wanted to hear”.

:"And what Trump chose to hear at the 11 February briefing dovetailed closely with Netanyahu’s own deep longings: “Iran stood apart” for Trump, as for Netanyahu. “He [Trump] regarded Iran as a uniquely dangerous adversary and was willing to take great risks to [fulfil] his desire to dismantle the Iranian [[theocracy]]”, the NY Times reported.

:"And what Trump chose to hear at the 11 February briefing dovetailed closely with Netanyahu’s own deep longings: “Iran stood apart” for Trump, as for Netanyahu. “He [Trump] regarded Iran as a uniquely dangerous adversary and was willing to take great risks to [fulfil] his desire to dismantle the Iranian [[theocracy]]”, the NY Times reported.

:"It is no surprise then, that Trump should now be desperately seeking an exit from the [[Israel]]i débacle that was set for him. Like Carter, he is on the rocks [[political]]ly, as well as [[militarily]]. But any meaningful off-ramp will require of him to make major concessions — concessions that will grate painfully with his rancorous feelings toward Iran and Iranians.

:"It is no surprise then, that Trump should now be desperately seeking an exit from the [[Israel]]i débacle that was set for him. Like Carter, he is on the rocks [[political]]ly, as well as [[militarily]]. But any meaningful off-ramp will require of him to make major concessions — concessions that will grate painfully with his rancorous feelings toward Iran and Iranians.

:"Neither Trump nor Netanyahu — despite the three-hour official briefing on 11 February — at all anticipated the strong Iranian response of immediate attacks on US bases in the Gulf that swiftly ensued upon the killing of the Supreme Leader, though this prospect had been clearly prefigured in earlier Iranian warnings.

:"Neither Trump nor Netanyahu — despite the three-hour official briefing on 11 February — at all anticipated the strong Iranian response of immediate attacks on US bases in the Gulf that swiftly ensued upon the killing of the Supreme Leader, though this prospect had been clearly prefigured in earlier Iranian warnings.

:"The entire 11 February strike plan that was green-lighted in the [[White House]] Situation Room meeting hinged on decapitation strikes, stand-off air bombardment, and a visceral (rather than evidence-based) conviction that an internal uprising surely would follow — one that would topple the [[state]].

:"The entire 11 February strike plan that was green-lighted in the [[White House]] Situation Room meeting hinged on decapitation strikes, stand-off air bombardment, and a visceral (rather than evidence-based) conviction that an internal uprising surely would follow — one that would topple the [[state]].

:"It seems likely that if [[negotiation]]s do proceed, they will not produce an agreement. Iran is engaged in exploding a 70 year-old paradigm through forcing — by threat of [[economic]] and [[market]] pain — a US acquiesce to Iran’s ‘release’ from the panopticon of US and Israeli repression. Will this involve more [[pain]] and [[death]] (more [[war]]), or less? That is the question."

:"It seems likely that if [[negotiation]]s do proceed, they will not produce an agreement. Iran is engaged in exploding a 70 year-old paradigm through forcing — by threat of [[economic]] and [[market]] pain — a US acquiesce to Iran’s ‘release’ from the panopticon of US and Israeli repression. Will this involve more [[pain]] and [[death]] (more [[war]]), or less? That is the question."