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==War propaganda==

==War propaganda==

{{See also|War propaganda}}

{{See also|War propaganda}}

[[File:Ukraine Army with Nazi Wolsfangel.PNG|right|250px|thumb|Officially approved for distribution in English propaganda poster by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Thank You Ukrainian Army” with the Nazi Wolfsengel patch, a [[hate]] symbol,<ref>https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/wolfsangel</ref> emblazoned on the sleeve.<ref>https://reportingradicalism.org/en/hate-symbols/movements/nazi-symbols/wolfsangel</ref>]]

[[File:Guardian reports on Nazi defeat.PNG|right|250px|thumb|''[[The Guardian]]'' report on the defeat of [[Nazi]]s in [[Azovstal]].<ref>https://www.theguardian.com/world/gallery/2022/may/17/evacuation-of-azovstal-plant-in-mariupol-in-pictures</ref>]]

War propaganda is used as a means of influencing both sides of the military conflict.  An example from the [[Russia-Ukraine war]] is the recruitment of foreign [[mercenaries]] by the government of [[Ukraine]].  Mercenaries do not enjoy the status and protection of [[prisoners of war]] under the [[Geneva Convention]], can be executed on the spot as paid killers for profit under international law, and most governments have laws in place prohibiting their citizens from engaging in mercenary activity. Three [[UK]] citizens were captured by the Russians, and two faced [[criminal]] charges and the [[death penalty]].  The third, Aiden Aslin, was somewhat of [[social media]] star with a large number of subscribers on [[Twitter]] and [[Instagram]] following his tales of adventure. In captivity, Aslin was allowed to create a [[YouTube]] channel to interact with the global public,<ref>https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCFNB2gdTvzAXW9LQ1GS5wfg/videos</ref> and dissuade people from responding to Ukrainian and Western media solicitations to join Ukraine's mercenary force.

War propaganda is used as a means of influencing both sides of the military conflict.  An example from the [[Russia-Ukraine war]] is the recruitment of foreign [[mercenaries]] by the government of [[Ukraine]].  Mercenaries do not enjoy the status and protection of [[prisoners of war]] under the [[Geneva Convention]], can be executed on the spot as paid killers for profit under international law, and most governments have laws in place prohibiting their citizens from engaging in mercenary activity. Three [[UK]] citizens were captured by the Russians, and two faced [[criminal]] charges and the [[death penalty]].  The third, Aiden Aslin, was somewhat of [[social media]] star with a large number of subscribers on [[Twitter]] and [[Instagram]] following his tales of adventure. In captivity, Aslin was allowed to create a [[YouTube]] channel to interact with the global public,<ref>https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCFNB2gdTvzAXW9LQ1GS5wfg/videos</ref> and dissuade people from responding to Ukrainian and Western media solicitations to join Ukraine's mercenary force.

Propaganda in times of war or other kinds of military operations. It can be divided into the following types:  

Propaganda in times of war or other kinds of military operations. It can be divided into the following types:  

 

'''Propaganda of captivity.''' One of the most popular and effective types of military propaganda in the framework of [[psychological warfare]]. It includes providing information about prisoners of war, their normal existence, lack of bullying and serious difficulties. Implementing the idea that surrender is a completely normal solution that will help you return home alive.  

'''Propaganda of captivity.''' One of the most popular and effective types of military propaganda in the framework of [[psychological warfare]]. It includes providing information about prisoners of war, their normal existence, lack of bullying and serious difficulties. Implementing the idea that surrender is a completely normal solution that will help you return home alive.  

'''Propaganda by instilling fear of defeat.''' Such propaganda can set up the army for the most decisive actions, since "there is nowhere to retreat." It can acquire a different character - instilling fear due to the consequences of the offensive. Such an approach can cause confusion in the army and society of the attacking side. Other ways of exposure.  

'''Propaganda by instilling fear of defeat.''' Such propaganda can set up the army for the most decisive actions, since "there is nowhere to retreat." It can acquire a different character - instilling fear due to the consequences of the offensive. Such an approach can cause confusion in the army and society of the attacking side. Other ways of exposure.  

 

===NATO war in Ukraine===

===NATO war in Ukraine===

{{See also|Ukraine propaganda war}}

{{See also|Ukraine propaganda war}}

[[File:Time fake news Denisova.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Ukraine Human Rights Ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova was actually fired in an unprecedented move for manufacturing fake news reports about alleged Russian [[rape]]s and bringing disrepute on the Ukrainian regime.<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 June 2022 |title='This will not help us defeat the enemy' A new report looks at Ukrainian Ombudsman Lyudmyla Denisova, who was fired after officials couldn't confirm her stories of rape committed by Russian soldiers |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/28/we-work-on-the-information-front |access-date= |website=Meduza |language=en}}</ref>]]

[[File:Time fake news Denisova.jpg|right|250px|thumb|Ukraine Human Rights Ombudsman Lyudmila Denisova was actually fired in an unprecedented move for manufacturing fake news reports about alleged Russian [[rape]]s and bringing disrepute on the Ukrainian regime.<ref>{{Cite web |date=28 June 2022 |title='This will not help us defeat the enemy' A new report looks at Ukrainian Ombudsman Lyudmyla Denisova, who was fired after officials couldn't confirm her stories of rape committed by Russian soldiers |url=https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/06/28/we-work-on-the-information-front |access-date= |website=Meduza |language=en}}</ref>]]

From the earliest days of the conflict, the [[Kyiv regime]] focused on winning a global information and propaganda war rather than a military conflict.  Researchers at the University of Adelaide in Australia published a landmark paper on August 20, 2022 on the activities of bot accounts on [[Twitter]] related to the conflict. The Australian findings were staggering – of 5.2 million tweets on the [[social media]] network from February 23 to March 8, 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict, between 60 to 80% were shared by fake accounts.<ref>https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.07038.pdf</ref>

From the earliest days of the conflict, the [[Kyiv regime]] focused on winning a global information and propaganda war rather than a military conflict.  Researchers at the University of Adelaide in Australia published a landmark paper on August 20, 2022 on the activities of bot accounts on [[Twitter]] related to the conflict. The Australian findings were staggering – of 5.2 million tweets on the [[social media]] network from February 23 to March 8, 2022 at the outbreak of the conflict, between 60 to 80% were shared by fake accounts.<ref>https://arxiv.org/pdf/2208.07038.pdf</ref>