Changes

:*[https://tomdispatch.com/reining-in-the-pentagon-2/ Reining in the Pentagon]. ''Can the [[MIC|Military-Industrial]] Beast Be Tamed?''

:*[https://tomdispatch.com/reining-in-the-pentagon-2/ Reining in the Pentagon]. ''Can the [[MIC|Military-Industrial]] Beast Be Tamed?''

*[https://glenndiesen.substack.com/p/iran-and-russia-find-common-cause Iran & Russia Find Common Cause Against US Aggression], [[George Galloway]] & [[Prof. Glenn Diesen]].

*[https://glenndiesen.substack.com/p/iran-and-russia-find-common-cause Iran & Russia Find Common Cause Against US Aggression], [[George Galloway]] & [[Prof. Glenn Diesen]].

*[[Conflicts Forum]]: [https://conflictsforum.substack.com/p/ways-of-war-are-in-metamorphosis‘Ways of War’ are in metamorphosis -- Lessons from the Iran War].

*[[Conflicts Forum]]: [https://conflictsforum.substack.com/p/ways-of-war-are-in-metamorphosis ‘Ways of War’ are in metamorphosis -- Lessons from the Iran War].

:"The post-war western approach (especially in the [[Cold War]] context) relied on the ability to outspend any military adversary through the acquisition of high-end, over-engineered and costly manned [[aircraft]] and [[ammunition|munition]]s. Dominance of airspace and heavy reliance on aerial bombardment, i.e. air-war, was the doctrinal end. The expenditure overmatch (as well as an imputed [[technical]] innovation) was viewed as the crucial element in the confrontation with the [[USSR]]. Similarly, the impulse in [[naval]] [[war]]fare was toward investment in ever bigger carriers and their associated tiers of naval support vessels. In ground warfare, the weighting in the [[Iraq War]]’s ‘[[Desert Storm]]’ was on tanks ‘punching’ and thrusting through the adversaries’ defence lines -- though this approach was dropped by [[the West]] in [[Ukraine]] following the turn to 21st century [[drone]]-led ‘trench warfare’ on the front line. The high-end outspend-approach both favoured the US’ [[Military Industrial Complex]], and together with [[US]] [[dollar]] [[hegemony]], provided [[America]] with the unique advantage of allowing the US effectively to ‘print’ those high-end overmatch supplementary expenses. Then came the [[Iran war]] of 2026, whose [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] model upended conventional doctrines...."

:"The post-war western approach (especially in the [[Cold War]] context) relied on the ability to outspend any military adversary through the acquisition of high-end, over-engineered and costly manned [[aircraft]] and [[ammunition|munition]]s. Dominance of airspace and heavy reliance on aerial bombardment, i.e. air-war, was the doctrinal end. The expenditure overmatch (as well as an imputed [[technical]] innovation) was viewed as the crucial element in the confrontation with the [[USSR]]. Similarly, the impulse in [[naval]] [[war]]fare was toward investment in ever bigger carriers and their associated tiers of naval support vessels. In ground warfare, the weighting in the [[Iraq War]]’s ‘[[Desert Storm]]’ was on tanks ‘punching’ and thrusting through the adversaries’ defence lines -- though this approach was dropped by [[the West]] in [[Ukraine]] following the turn to 21st century [[drone]]-led ‘trench warfare’ on the front line. The high-end outspend-approach both favoured the US’ [[Military Industrial Complex]], and together with [[US]] [[dollar]] [[hegemony]], provided [[America]] with the unique advantage of allowing the US effectively to ‘print’ those high-end overmatch supplementary expenses. Then came the [[Iran war]] of 2026, whose [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] model upended conventional doctrines...."