Changes

:"The post-war western approach (especially in the [[Cold War]] context) relied on the ability to outspend any military adversary through the acquisition of high-end, over-engineered and costly manned [[aircraft]] and [[ammunition|munition]]s. Dominance of airspace and heavy reliance on aerial bombardment, i.e. air-war, was the doctrinal end. The expenditure overmatch (as well as an imputed [[technical]] innovation) was viewed as the crucial element in the confrontation with the [[USSR]]. Similarly, the impulse in [[naval]] [[war]]fare was toward investment in ever bigger carriers and their associated tiers of naval support vessels. In ground warfare, the weighting in the [[Iraq War]]’s ‘[[Desert Storm]]’ was on tanks ‘punching’ and thrusting through the adversaries’ defence lines -- though this approach was dropped by [[the West]] in [[Ukraine]] following the turn to 21st century [[drone]]-led ‘trench warfare’ on the front line. The high-end outspend-approach both favoured the US’ [[Military Industrial Complex]], and together with [[US]] [[dollar]] [[hegemony]], provided [[America]] with the unique advantage of allowing the US effectively to ‘print’ those high-end overmatch supplementary expenses. Then came the [[Iran war]] of 2026, whose [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] model upended conventional doctrines...."

:"The post-war western approach (especially in the [[Cold War]] context) relied on the ability to outspend any military adversary through the acquisition of high-end, over-engineered and costly manned [[aircraft]] and [[ammunition|munition]]s. Dominance of airspace and heavy reliance on aerial bombardment, i.e. air-war, was the doctrinal end. The expenditure overmatch (as well as an imputed [[technical]] innovation) was viewed as the crucial element in the confrontation with the [[USSR]]. Similarly, the impulse in [[naval]] [[war]]fare was toward investment in ever bigger carriers and their associated tiers of naval support vessels. In ground warfare, the weighting in the [[Iraq War]]’s ‘[[Desert Storm]]’ was on tanks ‘punching’ and thrusting through the adversaries’ defence lines -- though this approach was dropped by [[the West]] in [[Ukraine]] following the turn to 21st century [[drone]]-led ‘trench warfare’ on the front line. The high-end outspend-approach both favoured the US’ [[Military Industrial Complex]], and together with [[US]] [[dollar]] [[hegemony]], provided [[America]] with the unique advantage of allowing the US effectively to ‘print’ those high-end overmatch supplementary expenses. Then came the [[Iran war]] of 2026, whose [[asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] model upended conventional doctrines...."

:*[[Mark Sleboda]]: [https://youtu.be/t1gGHsx9Rbc "The Nature Of War Has Changed"]

:*[[Mark Sleboda]]: [https://youtu.be/t1gGHsx9Rbc "The Nature Of War Has Changed"]

[[File:Word-image-70913-5.png|center|650px|thumb|Classic [[military]] [[Keynesianism]]. See also: [[Stagflation]].]]

[[File:Word-image-70913-5.png|center|650px|thumb|Classic [[military]] [[Keynesianism]]. See also: [[Stagflation]].]]

*''[[The American Conservative]]'': [https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-trillion-dollar-illusion/ The Trillion-Dollar Illusion]. ''We spend all that [[money]] and are still unable to defend our [[Persian Gulf]] bases.''

*''[[The American Conservative]]'': [https://www.theamericanconservative.com/the-trillion-dollar-illusion/ The Trillion-Dollar Illusion]. ''We spend all that [[money]] and are still unable to defend our [[Persian Gulf]] bases.''