Changes

==Unipolarity vs. multipolarity==

==Unipolarity vs. multipolarity==

{{See also|Charter of the United Nations}}

{{See also|Charter of the United Nations}}

[[File:Reserve_currency.png|right|300px|thumb|]]

[[File:Reserve_currency.png|right|300px|thumb]]

With the demise of the [[Soviet Union]], [[Francis Fukuyama]] declared the "end of history."  The "unipolar moment" had arrived, with the [[United States]] being the "only [[Superpower]]". The United States spoke of a "rules based order", which it empowered itself to enforce while freely violating those same "rules" that it imposed upon others, in order to benefit itself.  With the U.S. dollar as a "global [[reserve currency]]" and the [[SWIFT]] network monitoring and carrying out international banking transactions, and a free-wheeling Congress willing to print and issue more dollars in circulation globally through [[deficit spending]] and debt financing, the United States was able to persuade, coerce, and blackmail nations with promises of aid and loans, or the threat to withhold funding.

With the demise of the [[Soviet Union]], [[Francis Fukuyama]] declared the "end of history."  The "unipolar moment" had arrived, with the [[United States]] being the "only [[Superpower]]". The United States spoke of a "rules based order", which it empowered itself to enforce while freely violating those same "rules" that it imposed upon others, in order to benefit itself.  With the U.S. dollar as a "global [[reserve currency]]" and the [[SWIFT]] network monitoring and carrying out international banking transactions, and a free-wheeling Congress willing to print and issue more dollars in circulation globally through [[deficit spending]] and debt financing, the United States was able to persuade, coerce, and blackmail nations with promises of aid and loans, or the threat to withhold funding.

Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]], in a television interview in February 2023 said that the [[NATO proxy war in Ukraine]] is part of the New Cold War between the competing forces over the direction of the global systemic transition, which [[Moscow]] wants to lead towards multipolarity while [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] wants to retain as much of its fading unipolar [[hegemony]] as possible.<ref>[https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/24/our_elites_need_to_recognize_that_americas_unipolar_moment_is_over_823466.html Our Elites Need to Recognize that America’s ‘Unipolar Moment’ is Over], By Francis P. Sempa, RealClearDefense, March 24, 2022. realcleardefense.com<br>*[https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-gaza-pier-project/ The unipolar moment is over. When will the US get it?], SAMUEL GARDNER-BIRD, ''[[Responsible Statecraft]]'', NOV 16, 2022. responsiblestatecraft.org</ref> The outcome of this struggle will literally determine the future of [[International Relations]], which will in turn enhance or erode every country's sovereignty, which is why it's of concern to everyone in the world.<ref>[https://korybko.substack.com/p/putin-made-five-very-important-points Putin Made Five Very Important Points During His Latest TV Interview], [[Andrew Korybko]], February 27, 2023.</ref>

Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]], in a television interview in February 2023 said that the [[NATO proxy war in Ukraine]] is part of the New Cold War between the competing forces over the direction of the global systemic transition, which [[Moscow]] wants to lead towards multipolarity while [[Washington, D.C.|Washington]] wants to retain as much of its fading unipolar [[hegemony]] as possible.<ref>[https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2022/03/24/our_elites_need_to_recognize_that_americas_unipolar_moment_is_over_823466.html Our Elites Need to Recognize that America’s ‘Unipolar Moment’ is Over], By Francis P. Sempa, RealClearDefense, March 24, 2022. realcleardefense.com<br>*[https://responsiblestatecraft.org/military-gaza-pier-project/ The unipolar moment is over. When will the US get it?], SAMUEL GARDNER-BIRD, ''[[Responsible Statecraft]]'', NOV 16, 2022. responsiblestatecraft.org</ref> The outcome of this struggle will literally determine the future of [[International Relations]], which will in turn enhance or erode every country's sovereignty, which is why it's of concern to everyone in the world.<ref>[https://korybko.substack.com/p/putin-made-five-very-important-points Putin Made Five Very Important Points During His Latest TV Interview], [[Andrew Korybko]], February 27, 2023.</ref>

In the occasion of President Putin's first foreign visit to [[Beijing]] after his swearing in for a 5th term, Russian foreign minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] stated that Russia won’t view [[Western Europe]]an countries as partners again for “at least one generation."<ref>[https://www.rt.com/russia/597827-lavrov-europe-no-partner-for-generation/ Russia ‘done’ with Western Europe ‘for at least a generation’ – Lavrov], ''[[RT]]'', 18 May, 2024. rt.com</ref>

In the occasion of President Putin's first foreign visit to [[Beijing]] after his swearing in for a 5th term, Russian foreign minister [[Sergey Lavrov]] stated that Russia won't view [[Western Europe]]an countries as partners again for “at least one generation."<ref>[https://www.rt.com/russia/597827-lavrov-europe-no-partner-for-generation/ Russia ‘done’ with Western Europe ‘for at least a generation’ – Lavrov], ''[[RT]]'', 18 May 2024. rt.com</ref>

==The BRICS challenge==

==The BRICS challenge==

The new Cold War strategic landscape is characterized by significant modernization programs, with the [[United States]] pursuing a [[policy]] of direct replacement for its aging [[nuclear triad]]. In contrast, other nations have undertaken comprehensive modernization and expansion of their strategic forces.

The new Cold War strategic landscape is characterized by significant modernization programs, with the [[United States]] pursuing a [[policy]] of direct replacement for its aging [[nuclear triad]]. In contrast, other nations have undertaken comprehensive modernization and expansion of their strategic forces.

Based on available reports from defense ministries, industry announcements, and analyses (e.g., SIPRI, IISS, and OSINT), [[NATO]] members collectively produced an estimated 50,000–100,000 [[military]] [[drone]]s in 2024. This includes tactical FPV/reconnaissance models, loitering munitions, and larger [[ISR]]/strike systems. [[Russia]], in sharp contrast, in 2024 produced an estimated 1.5–1.8 million drones, encompassing tactical FPV (first-person view) models, long-range strike drones (e.g., Shahed/[[Geran]]-136), reconnaissance types (e.g., Orlan-10), and loitering munitions (e.g., Lancet). This marks a 5–10x increase from 2022–2023 levels, with [[FPV drone]]s comprising the bulk (~80–90%) due to their low cost (~$300–$500/unit) and high attrition rate. Production was decentralized across ~30 federal subjects, with key facilities like Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan scaling up Shahed output using imported [[labor]] and parts.

Based on available reports from defense ministries, industry announcements, and analyses (e.g., SIPRI, IISS, and OSINT), [[NATO]] members collectively produced an estimated 50,000–100,000 [[military]] [[drone]]s in 2024. This includes tactical FPV/reconnaissance models, loitering munitions, and larger [[ISR]]/strike systems. [[Russia]], in sharp contrast, in 2024 produced an estimated 1.5–1.8 million drones, encompassing tactical FPV (first-person view) models, long-range strike drones (e.g., Shahed/[[Geran]]-136), reconnaissance types (e.g., Orlan-10), and loitering munitions (e.g., Lancet). This marks a 5–10x increase from 2022 to 2023 levels, with [[FPV drone]]s comprising the bulk (~80–90%) due to their low cost (~$300–$500/unit) and high attrition rate. Production was decentralized across ~30 federal subjects, with key facilities like Alabuga SEZ in Tatarstan scaling up Shahed output using imported [[labor]] and parts.

The same can said for [[artillery]] shells. In 2024, NATO (primarily the [[U.S.]] and [[European]] allies) focused on ramping up production of 155mm shells—the NATO standard—to support the [[Kyiv regime]] and replenish depleted stocks, while Russia emphasized 152mm shells (its primary caliber) for sustained frontline use. NATO's output lagged significantly behind Russia's, with estimates showing a 1:3 to 1:4 ratio, highlighting Russia’s wartime [[industrial]] mobilization versus NATO's peacetime constraints and [[supply chain]] challenges.

The same can said for [[artillery]] shells. In 2024, NATO (primarily the [[U.S.]] and [[European]] allies) focused on ramping up production of 155mm shells—the NATO standard—to support the [[Kyiv regime]] and replenish depleted stocks, while Russia emphasized 152mm shells (its primary caliber) for sustained frontline use. NATO's output lagged significantly behind Russia's, with estimates showing a 1:3 to 1:4 ratio, highlighting Russia’s wartime [[industrial]] mobilization versus NATO's peacetime constraints and [[supply chain]] challenges.