Changes

===Economic crisis and food shortages===

===Economic crisis and food shortages===

[[File:Line to get food during Salvador Allende's Socialist Regime in Chile.jpg|300px|thumbnail|Line to get food during Salvador Allende's Socialist Regime in Chile]]

[[File:Line to get food during Salvador Allende's Socialist Regime in Chile.jpg|300px|thumbnail|Line to get food during Salvador Allende's Socialist Regime in Chile]]

Salvador Allende froze the prices of all goods and services and raised the wages by 10% within a few months of these economic policies happening the hyperinflation of the Escudo which was the the currency at the time. The Escudo started to lose value rapidly, it started to disintegrate as a currency, the only thing propping it up were the foreign currency reserves of Chile because in 1970 Chile was a fairly prosperous country and all of the successive governments had been very careful to maintain the positive balance of trade and to never ever run any kind of fiscal deficit so Chile had a very large supply of hard foreign currencies: Dollars, Pounds. Financially Chile was in very good shape when this new agenda came in with his policies that started costing all kinds of money.<ref name=Lira>{{cite web|url=https://youtu.be/GBQiic6vH4Y|author=[[Gonzalo Lira]]|title=Salvador Allende|date=2017|publisher=YouTube}}</ref>

Salvador Allende froze the prices of all goods and services and raised the wages by 10% within a few months of these economic policies happening the hyperinflation of the Escudo which was the currency at the time. The Escudo started to lose value rapidly, it started to disintegrate as a currency, the only thing propping it up were the foreign currency reserves of Chile because in 1970 Chile was a fairly prosperous country and all of the successive governments had been very careful to maintain the positive balance of trade and to never ever run any kind of fiscal deficit so Chile had a very large supply of hard foreign currencies: Dollars, Pounds. Financially Chile was in very good shape when this new agenda came in with his policies that started costing all kinds of money.<ref name=Lira>{{cite web|url=https://youtu.be/GBQiic6vH4Y|author=[[Gonzalo Lira]]|title=Salvador Allende|date=2017|publisher=YouTube}}</ref>

The entrepreneurs couldn't raise the prices with the frozen prices and now they had to pay more to employees starting to lose money and closing they businesses and factories causing mass unemployment and shortages. The response of the government was to seize the companies and accuse them of conspiring and being financial speculators.

The entrepreneurs couldn't raise the prices with the frozen prices and now they had to pay more to employees starting to lose money and closing they businesses and factories causing mass unemployment and shortages. The response of the government was to seize the companies and accuse them of conspiring and being financial speculators.

Chileans started to make huge lines to get basic goods such as toilet paper, toothpaste and food. The black market flourished which only accepted U.S. Dollars. People started selling everything that they had in order to get dollars to buy the basics. The Government created the Committees for Popular Supply (''Juntas de Abastecimiento Popular, JAP'') rationing a country that had been previously prosperous.  

Chileans started to make huge lines to get basic goods such as toilet paper, toothpaste and food. The black market flourished which only accepted U.S. Dollars. People started selling everything that they had in order to get dollars to buy the basics. The Government created the Committees for Popular Supply (''Juntas de Abastecimiento Popular, JAP'') rationing a country that had been previously prosperous.  

[[File:0718-5049-izquierdas-41-00224-gch2.jpg|250px|thumbnail|left|A bussiness closed by the Committee for Popular Supply (''JAP'') acussing it of being financial speculators.]]

[[File:0718-5049-izquierdas-41-00224-gch2.jpg|250px|thumbnail|left|A business closed by the Committee for Popular Supply (''JAP'') accusing it of being financial speculators.]]

A ration card was implemented, and it was only with the ration card that the people could get the basics like rice, potatoes and cooking oil, the ration card was needed to feed your family. The ''JAPs'' were in every neighborhood where the ration card was stamped by the head of the ''JAP'' who was a member of the Popular Unity leftist parties. This was used to excluse political opponents and the government accussed those people of being "an oligarch" or "an enemy of the people". Food became politicized the situation in Chile was just just deteriorating on daily basis.<ref name=Lira/>

A ration card was implemented, and it was only with the ration card that the people could get the basics like rice, potatoes and cooking oil, the ration card was needed to feed your family. The ''JAPs'' were in every neighborhood where the ration card was stamped by the head of the ''JAP'' who was a member of the Popular Unity leftist parties. This was used to excluse political opponents and the government accused those people of being "an oligarch" or "an enemy of the people". Food became politicized the situation in Chile was just just deteriorating on daily basis.<ref name=Lira/>

[[File:Ration Card from Salvador Allende's Regime.jpg|250px|thumbnail|A Ration Card from Salvador Allende's Regime.]]

[[File:Ration Card from Salvador Allende's Regime.jpg|250px|thumbnail|A Ration Card from Salvador Allende's Regime.]]

Several facts show the reality of the situation: Bolivian meat was imported in the north, and in Santiago, when DIRINCO inspectors tried to seize meat that a southern cooperative was selling directly to the public, they had to leave amidst a hail of carterazos (scuffles) by the owners of the house. SOCOAGRO, the CORFO subsidiary that channels the state supply of meat, has the butchers going crazy, sleeping in the offices of the firm to get some piece of animal.

Several facts show the reality of the situation: Bolivian meat was imported in the north, and in Santiago, when DIRINCO inspectors tried to seize meat that a southern cooperative was selling directly to the public, they had to leave amidst a hail of carterazos (scuffles) by the owners of the house. SOCOAGRO, the CORFO subsidiary that channels the state supply of meat, has the butchers going crazy, sleeping in the offices of the firm to get some piece of animal.

Opposition and government agreed that the issue is not a sympathetic one. "The former blame the government's mistakes: increase of the purchasing power, discouragement of production, errors in the exchange policy". "The government parties say it is a fabrication of the opposition". As far as construction materials are concerned, the problem was generalized. Cement, nails, wire, wood and hardware products are in short supply. As for clothing, the cotton and cashmere line is out of stock. When Undersecretary Garretón was asked about the possible outcome of all this, he said that the problems arise from the State's failure to intervene sufficiently. "There are distribution problems; we cannot rule out boycotts and there has been an increase in demand. This leads us to conclude that we have to participate in distribution"<ref>{{cite book|title=Cfr. Augusto Pinochet. " El día decisivo". Edit. Estado Mayor Ejército}}</ref>.

Opposition and government agreed that the issue is not a sympathetic one. "The former blame the government's mistakes: increase of the purchasing power, discouragement of production, errors in the exchange policy". "The government parties say it is a fabrication of the opposition". As far as construction materials are concerned, the problem was generalized. Cement, nails, wire, wood and hardware products are in short supply. As for clothing, the cotton and cashmere line is out of stock. When Undersecretary Garretón was asked about the possible outcome of all this, he said that the problems arise from the State's failure to intervene sufficiently. "There are distribution problems; we cannot rule out boycotts and there has been an increase in demand. This leads us to conclude that we have to participate in distribution".<ref>{{cite book|title=Cfr. Augusto Pinochet. " El día decisivo". Edit. Estado Mayor Ejército}}</ref>

[[File:Empty Pot Protests, Chile 1971.jpg|thumbnail|Empty Pot Protests, Chile 1971.]]

[[File:Empty Pot Protests, Chile 1971.jpg|thumbnail|Empty Pot Protests, Chile 1971.]]

Several businessmen were murdered when they refused to pay the "revolutionary" tax. An example is the case of Raúl Méndez Espinosa, dedicated to the industrial manufacture of sweets, beaten to death for refusing to give money to the terrorists.

Several businessmen were murdered when they refused to pay the "revolutionary" tax. An example is the case of Raúl Méndez Espinosa, dedicated to the industrial manufacture of sweets, beaten to death for refusing to give money to the terrorists.

Jorge Baraona Puelma, former congressman, died on April 30, 1971 of a heart attack after being evicted from his property and seeing his Nilahue de Colchagua farm occupied by officials of the Corporation of the Agriarian Reform.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://buenmuseo.blogspot.com/2019/05/allende-asesinatos-y-violencia-para.html|title=Allende, asesinatos y violencia para imponer el socialismo a sangre y fuego|date=May 23, 2019|publisher=Museo de la Buena Memoria|language=es|author=Juan E. Pflüger}}</ref>

Jorge Baraona Puelma, former congressman, died on April 30, 1971, of a heart attack after being evicted from his property and seeing his Nilahue de Colchagua farm occupied by officials of the Corporation of the Agriarian Reform.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://buenmuseo.blogspot.com/2019/05/allende-asesinatos-y-violencia-para.html|title=Allende, asesinatos y violencia para imponer el socialismo a sangre y fuego|date=May 23, 2019|publisher=Museo de la Buena Memoria|language=es|author=Juan E. Pflüger}}</ref>

Among the actions of the left-wing radicals of the MIR and the VOP, among which there were quite a few militants of the Socialist Party, the assassinations of members of other political parties also stand out. Thus Héctor Castilla, of the Christian Democracy, was assassinated in retaliation for the victory of his student associations in Chilean universities. Also Rolando Matús, a member of the National Party, was assassinated by socialist militants collaborating with the MIR. And the frustrated assassination of the Christian Democrat leader Patricio Aylwin, when he was giving a lecture in a gymnasium in the town of Curicó.

Among the actions of the left-wing radicals of the MIR and the VOP, among which there were quite a few militants of the Socialist Party, the assassinations of members of other political parties also stand out. Thus Héctor Castilla, of the Christian Democracy, was assassinated in retaliation for the victory of his student associations in Chilean universities. Also Rolando Matús, a member of the National Party, was assassinated by socialist militants collaborating with the MIR. And the frustrated assassination of the Christian Democrat leader Patricio Aylwin, when he was giving a lecture in a gymnasium in the town of Curicó.

This 1972 guerrilla generation was trained in the Punto Cero camp in Cuba, in [[Algiers]], [[Algeria]] and [[Libya]].

This 1972 guerrilla generation was trained in the Punto Cero camp in Cuba, in [[Algiers]], [[Algeria]] and [[Libya]].

A typical phrase used by the far-left was "Momio to the wall, Momia to the mattress" (''Momio al paredón, Momia al colchón'') Momio reffers to conservatives, "to the wall" means execution and "Momia al colchón" means raping female conservatives. They also used the phrase "Enough of conciliating, it's time to fight back" (''Basta ya de conciliar, es la hora de luchar'') and other macabre expressions.

A typical phrase used by the far-left was "Momio to the wall, Momia to the mattress" (''Momio al paredón, Momia al colchón'') Momio refers to conservatives, "to the wall" means execution and "Momia al colchón" means raping female conservatives. They also used the phrase "Enough of conciliating, it's time to fight back" (''Basta ya de conciliar, es la hora de luchar'') and other macabre expressions.

The Foreigners who entered the country illegally between 1970 and 1973, based on a report of the "Special Commission for Consultation on Security" of the Organization of American States (OAS), formed by delegates from the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, and presented to the twenty-first special session of 1974, where it said:

The Foreigners who entered the country illegally between 1970 and 1973, based on a report of the "Special Commission for Consultation on Security" of the Organization of American States (OAS), formed by delegates from the United States, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay and the Dominican Republic, and presented to the twenty-first special session of 1974, where it said:

===Interference in the educational system===

===Interference in the educational system===

The Allende government proposed the Unified National School (''Escuela Nacional Unificada'', ''ENU''), a pamphlet from February 1971 entitled "For a democratic, pluralistic and popular national education: goals for 1973", caused fear in many Catholics since it would shatter Christian valoric education of Chile. The center party, Christian Democracy, typically spoke of "Let's wait, let's see what happens..." but this time they began to worry about Allende's political project (somewhat late). This project provoked the mass outing to the streets of conservative students from the Catholic University led by [[Jaime Guzmán]], father of [[Guildism]] and also those from the University of Chile.<ref>{{cite book|title=Allende Thank You|publisher=Maye|author=Nena Ossa|date=2009|language=es|pages=p. 151, 152}}</ref>

The Allende government proposed the Unified National School (''Escuela Nacional Unificada'', ''ENU''), a pamphlet from February 1971 entitled "For a democratic, pluralistic and popular national education: goals for 1973", caused fear in many Catholics since it would shatter Christian valoric education of Chile. The center party, Christian Democracy, typically spoke of "Let's wait, let's see what happens..." but this time they began to worry about Allende's political project (somewhat late). This project provoked the mass outing to the streets of conservative students from the Catholic University led by [[Jaime Guzmán]], father of [[Guildism]] and also those from the University of Chile.<ref>{{cite book|title=Allende Thank You|publisher=Maye|author=Nena Ossa|date=2009|language=es|pages=151, 152}}</ref>

===1973 Parliamentary Election Vote Fraud===

===1973 Parliamentary Election Vote Fraud===

===Supreme Court acussations===

===Supreme Court acussations===

Enrique Urrutia, President of the Supreme Court, sent a letter on May 26, 1973 to "El Mercurio" Newspaper about the illegal seizures of land by the regime directed to Allende.

Enrique Urrutia, President of the Supreme Court, sent a letter on May 26, 1973, to "El Mercurio" Newspaper about the illegal seizures of land by the regime directed to Allende.

{{quotebox-float|This Supreme Court, by unanimous resolution adopted yesterday, agreed to address Your Excellency in the following terms: "The Second Criminal Court of Rancagua has communicated that in the process for usurpation N? 11. 202 an order was given to the Carabineros of Machalí for the eviction of the usurped property, but that this order was not complied with, as reported by the Prefect of Carabineros of Rancagua, Mr. Manuel Blanco Castillo, on the 17th of the present, because the Intendant of the Province of O'Higgins, according to official letter s/n of February 27, 1973, ordered the suspension of the eviction in reference, considering that this is a conflictive situation that affects precisely the duties indicated in art. 45 of the Law of the Internal Regime.

{{quotebox-float|This Supreme Court, by unanimous resolution adopted yesterday, agreed to address Your Excellency in the following terms: "The Second Criminal Court of Rancagua has communicated that in the process for usurpation N? 11. 202 an order was given to the Carabineros of Machalí for the eviction of the usurped property, but that this order was not complied with, as reported by the Prefect of Carabineros of Rancagua, Mr. Manuel Blanco Castillo, on the 17th of the present, because the Intendant of the Province of O'Higgins, according to official letter s/n of February 27, 1973, ordered the suspension of the eviction in reference, considering that this is a conflictive situation that affects precisely the duties indicated in art. 45 of the Law of the Internal Regime.

"This Supreme Court must represent to Your Excellency, for the umpteenth time, the attitude of the Court of Appeals. for the umpteenth time, the illegal attitude of the administrative authority in the illicit interference in judicial matters, as well as the obstruction of the Carabineros in the fulfillment of orders emanating from a Criminal Court, which according to the law, must be executed by said body without any obstacle whatsoever; all of which signifies an open obstinacy in rebelling against judicial resolutions, disregarding the alteration that such attitudes or omissions produce in the legal order, which - in addition - signifies not only a crisis of the rule of law, as was represented to H. E. in the previous official letter, but also a crisis of the rule of law, as was represented to H. E. in the previous official letter. E. in the previous official letter, but a peremptory or imminent bankruptcy of the country's legality.  

"This Supreme Court must represent to Your Excellency, for the umpteenth time, the attitude of the Court of Appeals. for the umpteenth time, the illegal attitude of the administrative authority in the illicit interference in judicial matters, as well as the obstruction of the Carabineros in the fulfillment of orders emanating from a Criminal Court, which according to the law, must be executed by said body without any obstacle whatsoever; all of which signifies an open obstinacy in rebelling against judicial resolutions, disregarding the alteration that such attitudes or omissions produce in the legal order, which - in addition - signifies not only a crisis of the rule of law, as was represented to H. E. in the previous official letter, but also a crisis of the rule of law, as was represented to H. E. in the previous official letter. E. in the previous official letter, but a peremptory or imminent bankruptcy of the country's legality.  

"We inform Your Excellency that on this date, as on recent occasions, the Military Justice has been requested to instruct the corresponding process. "For the record, the present minutes are issued and signed by the President, the Ministers and the Secretary who is the author of this document.<ref name=SupremeCourt>{{cite web|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41605145?seq=3|title=Inminente Quiebre de la Juridicidad|date=May 29, 1973|publisher=El Mercurio|page=p. 17|location=[[Santiago de Chile]]|language=es}}</ref>}}

"We inform Your Excellency that on this date, as on recent occasions, the Military Justice has been requested to instruct the corresponding process. "For the record, the present minutes are issued and signed by the President, the Ministers and the Secretary who is the author of this document.<ref name=SupremeCourt>{{cite web|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/41605145?seq=3|title=Inminente Quiebre de la Juridicidad|date=May 29, 1973|publisher=El Mercurio|page=17|location=[[Santiago de Chile]]|language=es}}</ref>}}

===Congress accusations===

===Congress accusations===

But their involvement with the Americans made them even more suspect, and marginal, in Chilean society. Later, the CIA in order to justify itself and show that they had been effective in Chile, elevated these marginal or unimportant people as “key to the successful removal of Allende!” Leftists and historians ran with this notion. But it was just to hide CIA incompetence.

But their involvement with the Americans made them even more suspect, and marginal, in Chilean society. Later, the CIA in order to justify itself and show that they had been effective in Chile, elevated these marginal or unimportant people as “key to the successful removal of Allende!” Leftists and historians ran with this notion. But it was just to hide CIA incompetence.

Because of the trauma of the Schneider killing, it’s absurd to think that the Chilean armed forces would cooperate with the US [[Deep State]] for the 1973 military intervention, especially when they didn’t need them to pull it off successfully. It was only after the military intervention, and only out of national economic necessity, that the Military Government got closer to the Americans.

Because of the trauma of the Schneider killing, it's absurd to think that the Chilean armed forces would cooperate with the US [[Deep State]] for the 1973 military intervention, especially when they didn't need them to pull it off successfully. It was only after the military intervention, and only out of national economic necessity, that the Military Government got closer to the Americans.

But institutionally, the Chilean military never trusted the Americans, and never allowed themselves to be dependent on them. The American government was never happy with the Pinochet government, because it never gave back the lucrative copper mines that Allende had expropriated.<ref>{{cite web|author=[[Gonzalo Lira]]|url=https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1542742748188606466.html|title=Chilean history thread|date=July 1, 2022}}</ref>

But institutionally, the Chilean military never trusted the Americans, and never allowed themselves to be dependent on them. The American government was never happy with the Pinochet government, because it never gave back the lucrative copper mines that Allende had expropriated.<ref>{{cite web|author=[[Gonzalo Lira]]|url=https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1542742748188606466.html|title=Chilean history thread|date=July 1, 2022}}</ref>

<ref name=CIA_KGB>{{cite web|url=https://ellibero.cl/actualidad/la-mano-de-la-kgb-y-la-cia-en-el-quiebre-democratico-en-chile/|title=La mano de la KGB y la CIA en el quiebre democrático en Chile|September 11, 2015|language=es|publisher=El Líbero}}</ref>

<ref name=CIA_KGB>{{cite web|url=https://ellibero.cl/actualidad/la-mano-de-la-kgb-y-la-cia-en-el-quiebre-democratico-en-chile/|title=La mano de la KGB y la CIA en el quiebre democrático en Chile|September 11, 2015|language=es|publisher=El Líbero}}</ref>

According to Mark Falcoff: "Great things have been claimed for the Clinton declassifications. Thanks to them, Christopher Hitchens has been able to boast that in his book “I produce [government] documents that plainly show the orchestration of a plot to murder General René Schneider.” Likewise, he remarks, in the suit filed by the general’s family, “every paper for the prosecution is a declassified document of the U.S. government.” In fact, however, the Clinton declassifications are less rich in information than the findings of the Church committee, which was able to examine the documentary record in its unexpurgated form and also to interrogate the participants under oath. Nor do the Clinton declassifications contribute anything particularly useful to the case against Kissinger. Some of them actually corroborate the findings of the Church committee, and, what is even more ironic, support Kissinger’s own version of events as laid out in the relevant volumes of his memoirs.

According to Mark Falcoff: "Great things have been claimed for the Clinton declassifications. Thanks to them, Christopher Hitchens has been able to boast that in his book “I produce [government] documents that plainly show the orchestration of a plot to murder General René Schneider.” Likewise, he remarks, in the suit filed by the general's family, “every paper for the prosecution is a declassified document of the U.S. government.” In fact, however, the Clinton declassifications are less rich in information than the findings of the Church committee, which was able to examine the documentary record in its unexpurgated form and also to interrogate the participants under oath. Nor do the Clinton declassifications contribute anything particularly useful to the case against Kissinger. Some of them actually corroborate the findings of the Church committee, and, what is even more ironic, support Kissinger's own version of events as laid out in the relevant volumes of his memoirs.

That version is itself buttressed at points by other information, especially transcripts of Kissinger’s conversations with relevant figures in Washington and elsewhere. Some of these conversations took place by telephone. Records of Kissinger’s telephone exchanges, covering the entire span of his government service, are now in the process of being released—they form, for instance, the primary basis of his new book, Crisis, dealing with the Yom Kippur war and the end of the Vietnam war. All of them have been given by him for inclusion in the Nixon Library. Although the records relating specifically to Chile are not yet in the public domain, they will be before long, and he has kindly let me review them in advance.

That version is itself buttressed at points by other information, especially transcripts of Kissinger's conversations with relevant figures in Washington and elsewhere. Some of these conversations took place by telephone. Records of Kissinger's telephone exchanges, covering the entire span of his government service, are now in the process of being released—they form, for instance, the primary basis of his new book, Crisis, dealing with the Yom Kippur war and the end of the Vietnam war. All of them have been given by him for inclusion in the Nixon Library. Although the records relating specifically to Chile are not yet in the public domain, they will be before long, and he has kindly let me review them in advance.

First and foremost, these transcripts establish that Chile was not an important part of the then-National Security Adviser’s daily diet. This point is crucial, not least because in the BBC film we are continually being told that Kissinger micromanaged every detail of American foreign policy. While that may have been true for subjects of high geopolitical import, Chile was not one of them. In fact, during September and October 1970—which is to say, between the Chilean election and the congressional vote—the telephone record reveals a Kissinger preoccupied with a full-blown Middle East crisis, Vietnam, a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, the Black September plane hijacking, Nixon’s planned visit to Europe and to the Sixth Fleet, the defense budget, and the Pugwash conference on U.S.-Soviet relations, but with Chile only slightly. Thereafter, there is nothing at all until June 1973, when he and Nixon discuss a failed military revolt against Allende, and then no further references until after Pinochet’s assumption of power with the September 11 coup.

First and foremost, these transcripts establish that Chile was not an important part of the then-National Security Adviser's daily diet. This point is crucial, not least because in the BBC film we are continually being told that Kissinger micromanaged every detail of American foreign policy. While that may have been true for subjects of high geopolitical import, Chile was not one of them. In fact, during September and October 1970—which is to say, between the Chilean election and the congressional vote—the telephone record reveals a Kissinger preoccupied with a full-blown Middle East crisis, Vietnam, a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, the Black September plane hijacking, Nixon's planned visit to Europe and to the Sixth Fleet, the defense budget, and the Pugwash conference on U.S.-Soviet relations, but with Chile only slightly. Thereafter, there is nothing at all until June 1973, when he and Nixon discuss a failed military revolt against Allende, and then no further references until after Pinochet's assumption of power with the September 11 coup.

But this is not really surprising. During much of the Allende presidency, Kissinger was in Paris, Moscow, Beijing, or other locales of far greater importance to the U.S. than Santiago. And even when the subject was again broached at the time of the coup, Kissinger was principally concerned with the possible resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew and preparations for his own confirmation hearings as Secretary of State.

But this is not really surprising. During much of the Allende presidency, Kissinger was in Paris, Moscow, Beijing, or other locales of far greater importance to the U.S. than Santiago. And even when the subject was again broached at the time of the coup, Kissinger was principally concerned with the possible resignation of Vice President Spiro Agnew and preparations for his own confirmation hearings as Secretary of State.

According to Kyle Orton: "The U.S. actions in 1970 have created confusion, some of it honest and some of it wilful, about the coup that actually did bring down Allende in 1973. Almost invariably when somebody presents a “smoking gun” of U.S. complicity in the 1973 coup, it transpires to be a document or transcript from 1970. Five days after Allende was toppled in September 1973, Kissinger said in a telephone call with Nixon, “We didn’t do it”, and that is the plain truth. The U.S. did not plan the 1973 coup and was not even aware of the plot. The most that can be said is what Kissinger added in that call: that the U.S. “created the conditions as great as possible”. In reality, even this is overstating the case. Chileans acted in 1973 for Chilean reasons in response to conditions created by Chileans, but, whether self-flagellating or boasting, American officials can struggle with the idea events occur in the world without their involvement.

According to Kyle Orton: "The U.S. actions in 1970 have created confusion, some of it honest and some of it wilful, about the coup that actually did bring down Allende in 1973. Almost invariably when somebody presents a “smoking gun” of U.S. complicity in the 1973 coup, it transpires to be a document or transcript from 1970. Five days after Allende was toppled in September 1973, Kissinger said in a telephone call with Nixon, “We didn’t do it”, and that is the plain truth. The U.S. did not plan the 1973 coup and was not even aware of the plot. The most that can be said is what Kissinger added in that call: that the U.S. “created the conditions as great as possible”. In reality, even this is overstating the case. Chileans acted in 1973 for Chilean reasons in response to conditions created by Chileans, but, whether self-flagellating or boasting, American officials can struggle with the idea events occur in the world without their involvement.

The argument that the U.S. “created the conditions” for the 1973 coup centres on claims the U.S. took steps to damage the Chilean economy—and the evidence adduced consists of documents and statements from U.S. officials in 1970. Ten days after Allende’s election in 1970, Nixon was recorded saying that he would “make the economy scream”. This quotation is infamous in circles where the Chilean coup is the archetype of U.S. Imperial abuses. On 16 October, after the Viaux coup was paused but the general “Track II” policy continued, the CIA headquarters cabled the station in Santiago, “We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end”. Soon after Allende took office in November 1970, Nixon determined that the U.S.’s “public posture” would be “correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime”, and in the background the U.S. would “seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests.”

The argument that the U.S. “created the conditions” for the 1973 coup centres on claims the U.S. took steps to damage the Chilean economy—and the evidence adduced consists of documents and statements from U.S. officials in 1970. Ten days after Allende's election in 1970, Nixon was recorded saying that he would “make the economy scream”. This quotation is infamous in circles where the Chilean coup is the archetype of U.S. Imperial abuses. On 16 October, after the Viaux coup was paused but the general “Track II” policy continued, the CIA headquarters cabled the station in Santiago, “We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end”. Soon after Allende took office in November 1970, Nixon determined that the U.S.’s “public posture” would be “correct but cool, to avoid giving the Allende government a basis on which to rally domestic and international support for consolidation of the regime”, and in the background the U.S. would “seek to maximize pressures on the Allende government to prevent its consolidation and limit its ability to implement policies contrary to U.S. and hemisphere interests.”

This all sounds minatory, but the rhetoric far outstripped the policy. For instance, Nixon wanted to “bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile”. As it turned out, the maximum feasible influence was not much: Chile under Allende received over $100 million ($800 million in today’s money) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

This all sounds minatory, but the rhetoric far outstripped the policy. For instance, Nixon wanted to “bring maximum feasible influence to bear in international financial institutions to limit credit or other financing assistance to Chile”. As it turned out, the maximum feasible influence was not much: Chile under Allende received over $100 million ($800 million in today's money) from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

“The documentary evidence is … unambiguous”, Falcoff summarises, “the most serious charge that can be levied against the Nixon administration is that it contemplated economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was still making payments on Chile’s debts. But even that envisaged policy was never truly implemented.” As just a few examples: in July 1971, Allende expropriated American copper holdings and the Hickenlooper Amendment was not invoked; Chile defaulted on its debts to the U.S. in November 1971, but it did not stop agreed loans being sent; humanitarian aid was never cut off; and U.S. aid to the Chilean military tripled from 1970-73, which considerably assisted Allende in consolidating his regime by relieving pressure on the civilian budget and drawing the military leadership, Prats in particular, closer to being co-opted by the president.

“The documentary evidence is … unambiguous”, Falcoff summarises, “the most serious charge that can be levied against the Nixon administration is that it contemplated economic sanctions against Chile at a time when Allende had yet to lay a hand on American investments in the country and was still making payments on Chile’s debts. But even that envisaged policy was never truly implemented.” As just a few examples: in July 1971, Allende expropriated American copper holdings and the Hickenlooper Amendment was not invoked; Chile defaulted on its debts to the U.S. in November 1971, but it did not stop agreed loans being sent; humanitarian aid was never cut off; and U.S. aid to the Chilean military tripled from 1970 to 1973, which considerably assisted Allende in consolidating his regime by relieving pressure on the civilian budget and drawing the military leadership, Prats in particular, closer to being co-opted by the president.

The economic ruin that afflicted Chile by 1973 was a result of Allende’s policies, not U.S. sanctions. Allende came into office at the head of Unidad Popular, a “popular front” coalition that had the Soviets’ “fraternal” Communist Party as one of its leading elements and contained the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), a terrorist-revolutionary outfit devoted to Lenin’s example, one of whose leaders was Allende’s nephew. “Our aim in Marxist socialism, total and scientific”, Allende told a stenographer in 1971, and to that end the paramilitary squads of the parties in his coalition directed the revolutionary workers’ committees (cordones industriales) in often-violent seizures of factories and farms across the country, inevitably bringing the enterprises to a near-halt, collapsing productivity, wages, and foreign investment, while creating a food shortage. The constant harassing of small businesses and other operators made goods Chileans had taken for granted unavailable—not that most people could have easily afforded them by late 1972. The unchecked printing of currency sent inflation through the roof: inflation hit nearly 80% in 1972, reached 350% by 1973, and stood at over 1,000% by August 1973. Chilean truckers went on strike in October 1972, infuriated at the extortionate freight rates they were being charged when they could not even access spare parts, and the strike spread to other sectors, notably shopkeepers, with threats that engineers, doctors, and other professionals would join in. Allende’s effort to dismantle or co-opt the independent trades unions was shown to be seriously incomplete, and the whole economy was virtually paralysed.

The economic ruin that afflicted Chile by 1973 was a result of Allende's policies, not U.S. sanctions. Allende came into office at the head of Unidad Popular, a “popular front” coalition that had the Soviets’ “fraternal” Communist Party as one of its leading elements and contained the Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR), a terrorist-revolutionary outfit devoted to Lenin's example, one of whose leaders was Allende's nephew. “Our aim in Marxist socialism, total and scientific”, Allende told a stenographer in 1971, and to that end the paramilitary squads of the parties in his coalition directed the revolutionary workers’ committees (cordones industriales) in often-violent seizures of factories and farms across the country, inevitably bringing the enterprises to a near-halt, collapsing productivity, wages, and foreign investment, while creating a food shortage. The constant harassing of small businesses and other operators made goods Chileans had taken for granted unavailable—not that most people could have easily afforded them by late 1972. The unchecked printing of currency sent inflation through the roof: inflation hit nearly 80% in 1972, reached 350% by 1973, and stood at over 1,000% by August 1973. Chilean truckers went on strike in October 1972, infuriated at the extortionate freight rates they were being charged when they could not even access spare parts, and the strike spread to other sectors, notably shopkeepers, with threats that engineers, doctors, and other professionals would join in. Allende's effort to dismantle or co-opt the independent trades unions was shown to be seriously incomplete, and the whole economy was virtually paralysed.

The economic disaster was accompanied by escalating political repression. The Soviets maintained regular contact with Allende once he was in power, notably doing this through his old KGB handler Kuznetsov, not the Soviet ambassador. Allende was officially a Soviet confidential contact, not an agent, but he was regularly paid by the Soviets—in just October 1971, he was given $30,000—and Allende did as directed by Moscow. (The details of Allende’s subordination to Moscow were revealed in the Mitrokhin Archive after the Cold War was over, but it was hardly a secret in real-time: Allende identified the Soviet Union as Chile’s “Big Brother” in a speech to the Kremlin in December 1972 and publicly said his views were “identical” to those of the Soviet Communist leaders.) The KGB’s consistent advice was for Allende to rely more heavily on the security apparatus in governing, to bring Soviet “advisers” into the military-intelligence system, and to tighten Chile’s links with Castro’s Cuba. Allende accepted all of these things. It was black-beret Cuban troops and Cuban-trained militiamen from Allende’s Socialist Party (PS) that formed the Praetorian Guards, the “Group of Personal Friends” (GAP or Grupo de Amigos Personales), for Allende and his family."<ref>[https://www.kyleorton.com/p/myth-1973-american-coup-in-chile The Myth of the “American Coup” in Chile]</ref>

The economic disaster was accompanied by escalating political repression. The Soviets maintained regular contact with Allende once he was in power, notably doing this through his old KGB handler Kuznetsov, not the Soviet ambassador. Allende was officially a Soviet confidential contact, not an agent, but he was regularly paid by the Soviets—in just October 1971, he was given $30,000—and Allende did as directed by Moscow. (The details of Allende's subordination to Moscow were revealed in the Mitrokhin Archive after the Cold War was over, but it was hardly a secret in real-time: Allende identified the Soviet Union as Chile's “Big Brother” in a speech to the Kremlin in December 1972 and publicly said his views were “identical” to those of the Soviet Communist leaders.) The KGB's consistent advice was for Allende to rely more heavily on the security apparatus in governing, to bring Soviet “advisers” into the military-intelligence system, and to tighten Chile's links with Castro's Cuba. Allende accepted all of these things. It was black-beret Cuban troops and Cuban-trained militiamen from Allende's Socialist Party (PS) that formed the Praetorian Guards, the “Group of Personal Friends” (GAP or Grupo de Amigos Personales), for Allende and his family."<ref>[https://www.kyleorton.com/p/myth-1973-american-coup-in-chile The Myth of the “American Coup” in Chile]</ref>

==Unknown controversial statements==

==Unknown controversial statements==

Perhaps more dangerous was the second of the texts, the Sterilization Bill, which he attempted to pass in parliament. With it he tried to institutionalize measures such as sterilization or the compulsory introduction of treatment for venereal diseases or drug addicts. Allende himself explained that it was "a legislative tripod in defense of the race", which included the imposition of compulsory treatment for drug addicts and those infected by venereal diseases, in addition to considering their contagion as a crime and the "sterilization of the mentally alienated".

Perhaps more dangerous was the second of the texts, the Sterilization Bill, which he attempted to pass in parliament. With it he tried to institutionalize measures such as sterilization or the compulsory introduction of treatment for venereal diseases or drug addicts. Allende himself explained that it was "a legislative tripod in defense of the race", which included the imposition of compulsory treatment for drug addicts and those infected by venereal diseases, in addition to considering their contagion as a crime and the "sterilization of the mentally alienated".

In addition, the relatives of the sick were prevented from appearing in these proceedings. It also established therapies to deal with homosexuality, which it considered an illness. The text placed special emphasis on the problem of alcoholism, also proposing its sterilization, knowing that it did not cure the addiction and that it was, therefore, a measure based on punishment with no other objectives.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181127130102/https://gaceta.es/noticias/allende-racista-defensor-esterilizacion-forzosa-inspira-pablo-iglesias-23062016-2013|title=Allende, un racista defensor de la esterilización forzosa que inspira a Pablo Iglesias|language=es|date=June 23, 2016|publisher=La Gaceta}}</ref>

In addition, the relatives of the sick were prevented from appearing in these proceedings. It also established therapies to deal with homosexuality, which it considered an illness. The text placed special emphasis on the problem of alcoholism, also proposing its sterilization, knowing that it did not cure the addiction and that it was, therefore, a measure based on punishment with no other objectives.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://gaceta.es/noticias/allende-racista-defensor-esterilizacion-forzosa-inspira-pablo-iglesias-23062016-2013|title=Allende, un racista defensor de la esterilización forzosa que inspira a Pablo Iglesias|language=es|date=June 23, 2016|publisher=La Gaceta|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181127130102/https://gaceta.es/noticias/allende-racista-defensor-esterilizacion-forzosa-inspira-pablo-iglesias-23062016-2013|archive-date=2018-11-27}}</ref>

==References==

==References==