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In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S.Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The purpose was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S.Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The purpose was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Jaoan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, l941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Jaoan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, l941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carrol Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

==Post war==

==Post war==