Changes

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign <ref>Communism at Pearl, Kubek, 1959.</ref>, submitted an appeal to the President:

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959.</ref>, submitted an appeal to the President:

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

{{Cquote|with complete effectiveness if only you retain the people's confidence in your courage and steadfastness…it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.

{{Cquote|with complete effectiveness if only you retain the people's confidence in your courage and steadfastness…it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable. <ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable. <ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Secretary Hull a long memorandum drafted by Mr. White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White recieved through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Secretary Hull a long memorandum drafted by Mr. White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White recieved through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>