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| | The accusations against White revolve around four incidents with which White was involved. | | The accusations against White revolve around four incidents with which White was involved. |
| | *White was the real author of the Morgenthau plan to "turn Germany into a potato field," which when leaked, united non-Nazis with Nazis, stiffened resistance, and prolonged the war. | | *White was the real author of the Morgenthau plan to "turn Germany into a potato field," which when leaked, united non-Nazis with Nazis, stiffened resistance, and prolonged the war. |
| − | *White used his position in the Treasury Department to develop a hostile U.S. policy toward Japan. The reason was to distract Japan from their plans to attack the Soviet Union and draw the U.S. into the war as an ally with the Soviet Union. White was the author of an extreme ultimatum that Japan could not comply with in the days just prior to the attack on [[Pearl Harbor]]. | + | *White used his position in the Treasury Department to develop a hostile U.S. policy toward Japan. The reason was to distract Japan from their plans to attack the Soviet Union and draw the U.S. into the war as an ally with the Soviet Union. White was the author of an extreme ultimatum that Japan could not comply with in the days just prior to the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]]. |
| | *White delayed financial support mandated by law to Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s [[Nationalist Chinese]] government causing the triumph of [[Mao Tse-Tung]]'s [[Communist Chinese]] government. | | *White delayed financial support mandated by law to Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]]'s [[Nationalist Chinese]] government causing the triumph of [[Mao Tse-Tung]]'s [[Communist Chinese]] government. |
| | *White was instrumental in handing over the Allied Military mark printing plates to the Soviets. This caused a $250,000,000 deficit in the occupational government budget paid out by the U.S. Treasury. This in effect amounted to the US taxpayer paying the salaries of Soviet occupation troops at a time when US/Soviet relations were deteriorating precisely because of the presence and behavior of Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe. | | *White was instrumental in handing over the Allied Military mark printing plates to the Soviets. This caused a $250,000,000 deficit in the occupational government budget paid out by the U.S. Treasury. This in effect amounted to the US taxpayer paying the salaries of Soviet occupation troops at a time when US/Soviet relations were deteriorating precisely because of the presence and behavior of Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe. |
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| | At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, l941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Comming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref> | | At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, l941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Comming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref> |
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| − | In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> | + | In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> |
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| | The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roseevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played | | The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roseevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played |