Changes

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. By December 1946 leaks began to develop. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. By December 1946 leaks began to develop. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of where the case stood. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Without [[Venona]] evidence, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."   

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Without [[Venona]] evidence, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."   

Morgan suggests it is possible  “some of the lesser lights among the subjects would crack during the course of a careful and pointed interview" and concludes with the recommendation "That one of the subjects of this case, probably the weakest sister, be contacted with a view to making him an informant...Failing in this respect, that immediately the other subjects be exhaustively interviewed. Since an interview with one would virtually amount to putting all of them on notice, it would seem logical to conduct such interviews as nearly simultaneously as possible....That failing to break any of the subjects, serious consideration be given to exposing this lousy outfit and at least hounding them from the Federal Service. Several possibilities exist in this regard but this would seem to be a bridge to cross when we get to it."

Morgan suggests it is possible  “some of the lesser lights among the subjects would crack during the course of a careful and pointed interview" and concludes with the recommendation "That one of the subjects of this case, probably the weakest sister, be contacted with a view to making him an informant...Failing in this respect, that immediately the other subjects be exhaustively interviewed. Since an interview with one would virtually amount to putting all of them on notice, it would seem logical to conduct such interviews as nearly simultaneously as possible....That failing to break any of the subjects, serious consideration be given to exposing this lousy outfit and at least hounding them from the Federal Service. Several possibilities exist in this regard but this would seem to be a bridge to cross when we get to it."

Press leaks continued from the Executive Conference formed of DOJ prosecutors and FBI investigators who were discussing how to proceed with the case.  In a hand written note in the margin of a memo from January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing' done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref>  Hoover, in a somber tone, responded to the Attorney General’s request for a recommendation how to proceed. "I am of the opinion...it will be impossible to continue the investigation....the subjects...are now all very security conscious... any attempt to interrogate them, either by Bureau agents or before a grand jury, would produce nothing. Obviously, this situation leaves only the third alternative; that is, that the Department furnish to the employing departments the basic data concerning the activities of the individual subjects as a possible means of concluding the case. It is assumed, of course, that the employing departments will take administrative action against the subjects who are employed in these departments." <ref>FBI Silvermanster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_for_the_Attorney_General%2C_January_27%2C_1947 Memorandum for the Attorney General, January 27, 1947].</ref>

Press leaks continued from an Executive Conference formed of DOJ prosecutors and FBI investigators discussing how to proceed.  In a hand written note margin note from a memo dated January 23, 1947, Hoover writes, "in view of all the 'gabbing' done by the Dept to the Press there is little which can be expected from <u>any</u> action now." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Tamm to the Director, January 23, 1947, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf Vol. 93, pgs. 20 -22] pdf.</ref>  Four days later Hoover, in a somber tone, recommends to the Attorney General, "I am of the opinion...it will be impossible to continue the investigation....the subjects...are now all very security conscious... any attempt to interrogate them, either by Bureau agents or before a grand jury, would produce nothing. Obviously, this situation leaves only the third alternative; that is, that the Department furnish to the employing departments the basic data concerning the activities of the individual subjects as a possible means of concluding the case. It is assumed, of course, that the employing departments will take administrative action against the subjects who are employed in these departments." <ref>FBI Silvermanster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Memorandum_for_the_Attorney_General%2C_January_27%2C_1947 Memorandum for the Attorney General, January 27, 1947].</ref>

==Failure to discharge security risks==

==Failure to discharge security risks==