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==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

In November 1945 a courier from a very large CPUSA underground apparatus which had operated in numerous federal agencies throughout [[World War II]], including the [[White House]], in fear for her life defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story to the FBI in a deposition.

In November 1945 a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret_apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] which operated in numerous federal agencies throughout [[World War II]], including the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition.

to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case." 

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents throughout the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of which were still employed in the US government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, but the FBI soon determined Bentley’s allegations were born out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

The FBI knew of 5 Soviet agents during the war, Bentley added at least another 80, some of them still employed in the government at that time.  Her story at first was incredible, and embarssing to the FBI, but it soon was determined that Bentley’s allegations were borne out by information already in Bureau files. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster008.pdf Vol. 8, pg. 3] pdf.</ref> By December, no fewer that 227 FBI agents were involved in the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Ladd to the Director, November 12, 1945, Vol. 8, pg. 6 pdf.</ref>

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. In the later part of February a 194 page report based upon Bentley's deposition entitled, "Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government." <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster023.pdf Underground Espionage Organization (NKVD) in Agencies of the United States Government"], Vol. 23, pgs. 55 - 272, February 21, 1946. Includes alphabetical index at end.</ref> was transmitted to Secretary of State [[George Marshall]].  By December of 1846 leaks began to develop. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

 

For much of 1946 the suspects were surveilled, and other information came from [[Igor Guzenko]] <ref>Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945, Central Intelligence Agency, [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/part1.htm Igor Gouzenko file. 5 pages].</ref> , a Soviet code clerk who defected in Canada, and the [[Army Signals Intelligence Service]] which began secretly reading [[KGB]] communications with Moscow. By December 1946 leaks began to develop. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Memorandum for the Attorney General, December 20, 1946, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster081.pdf Vol. 81, pgs. 55 - 56] pdf.  In transmitting a summary of the investigation on [[Harry Magdoff]], Hoover urges the Attorney General to give consideration to the overall facts of the case before making the information available to any other government official.  Hoover complains that a summary report prepared for the Secretary of the Treasury had been "lost" and a copy furnished to the White House was found in a desk drawer at the [[War Assets Administration]] -- the agency Greg Silvermaster had been working in.</ref>  

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Without [[Venona]] evidence, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."   

In January of 1947, Edward Morgan of the FBI was asked to make an objective analysis of the case. <ref>FBI Silvermaster file, [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memo_Morgan_to_Clegg%2C_Janaury_14%2C_1947 Morgan to Clegg, January 14, 1947].</ref>  Morgan writes, "Coming in after the event as the Bureau did, we are now on the outside looking in, with the rather embarrassing responsibility of having a most serious case of Soviet espionage laid in our laps without a decent opportunity to make it stick. This very circumstance, however, necessitates pursuing more direct methods."  Without [[Venona]] evidence, Morgan observes,  "the case is no more than the word of [Bentley]  against that of the several conspirators. The likely result would be an acquittal under very embarrassing circumstances."