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{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in their areas they controlled and were part of the international Commintern movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>  Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine of [[Containment]] of Moscow [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref>  

In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in their areas they controlled and were part of the international Commintern movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref>  Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine of [[Containment]] of Moscow [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref>

 

In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref>

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.