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| | The order in which the declaration was signed, first by the four major powers and then the other nations, reflected FDR's belief in the moral concept of "trusteeship of the powerful" for the well-being of the less powerful. The central proposal was the prompt creation of the United Nations Authority composed of all the signers of the "Grand Design",<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 3, Chapter 9, Section 2. ''Roosevelt's Great Design and Casablanca'', [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 345] pdf.</ref> led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. The President privately referred to these four major powers as the Four Policemen. <ref>Townsend Hooper and Douglas Brinkley, [http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/fdrbook.html ''FDR and the Creation of the U.N''], New Haven, 2000, pgs. 45 50.</ref> In October 1943 at the [[Moscow Conference]] the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the [[Kuomintang]] committed themselves to "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation...after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation... they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. " <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref> | | The order in which the declaration was signed, first by the four major powers and then the other nations, reflected FDR's belief in the moral concept of "trusteeship of the powerful" for the well-being of the less powerful. The central proposal was the prompt creation of the United Nations Authority composed of all the signers of the "Grand Design",<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 3, Chapter 9, Section 2. ''Roosevelt's Great Design and Casablanca'', [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/The_Roosevelt_Myth-John_T_Flynn-1948-444pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=276&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 345] pdf.</ref> led by the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Nationalist China. The President privately referred to these four major powers as the Four Policemen. <ref>Townsend Hooper and Douglas Brinkley, [http://www.ninehundred.net/~jveon/fdrbook.html ''FDR and the Creation of the U.N''], New Haven, 2000, pgs. 45 50.</ref> In October 1943 at the [[Moscow Conference]] the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the [[Kuomintang]] committed themselves to "the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organisation...after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation... they will confer and co-operate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period. " <ref>[http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1943/431000a.html Joint Four Power Declaration], Moscow Conference, October, 1943.</ref> |
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| − | [[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for [[Comintern]] operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref> During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency. <ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref> Defector [[Louis Budenz]] was to testify that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was alwaye along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Paciffic Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China." The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, in the ''New York Times'' of May 14, 1944, wrote of China's "agrarian reformers." Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]] was sent on a fifty-two-day, twenty-seven-thousand-mile trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref> In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States. <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref> | + | [[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for [[Comintern]] operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref> During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency. <ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref> |
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| − | Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that [[Harry Dexter White]] and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies. The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote, | + | On November 25, 1941 Lattimore dispatched from China an anxious cable to Currie in the [[White House]] arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan. Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> [[Harry Dexter White]]'s harsh, demanding language in the ultimatum only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Japanese Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the ultimatum to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]]. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan -- did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of his career. All [[Comintern]] designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''. The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953. The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103] Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref> |
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| | + | Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15 1943, Lattimore instructed Joseph Barnes<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China." The disinformation was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, in the ''New York Times'' of May 14, 1944, wrote of China's "agrarian reformers." Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]] was sent on a fifty-two-day, twenty-seven-thousand-mile trip to Siberia, China, and Mongolia. <ref>''Yalta Betrayal'', Wittmer, 1953, pg. 58. Retrieved from GELO.com [http://www.ogleo.com/search/ogleo-History_of_CzechoslovakiaHistory of Czechoslovakia] 05/08/07.</ref> In July and August 1943, the Chinese Communist forces -- in the midst of the war -- joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States. <ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref> |
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| | + | Chiang Kai-shek himself claimed that Harry Dexter White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies. The U.S. government made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to Nationalist China <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref> in 1943 at a time when inflation was spiraling out of control.<ref>John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, ''Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America, New Haven Yale University Press, 2000, pp. 142-145 ISBN 0-300-08462-5 </ref> White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote, |
| | {{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year. We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}} | | {{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year. We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}} |
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| − | In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in their areas they controlled and were part of the international Commintern movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine of [[Containment]] of Moscow [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref> | + | In July 1945 [[U.S. War Department]] memorandum entitled, ''The Chinese Communist Movement'', gave a depiction of the true nature of the CCP, reporting the Maoists allowed no opposition groups in their areas they controlled and were part of the international Comintern movement. <ref>Anne W. Carroll, [http://www.ewtn.com/library/HOMELIBR/FR89102.TXT ''Who Lost China''], 1996. Retrieved from www.ewtn com/library/ August 16, 2007.</ref> Chiang believed that the Truman Doctrine of [[Containment]] of Moscow [[Subversion (political)|subversion]] would extend to China, and ordered an offensive when he heard of the new policy. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. U.S. Secretary of State [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked, but General David Barr's military mission was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> In the summer of 1946, Truman told Chiang to be more willing to compromise. Chiang replied that first the Communists must abandon "their policy to seize political power through the use of armed force, to overthrow the government and to install a [[totalitarian]] regime such as those with which [[Eastern Europe]] is now being engulfed." <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 429.</ref> |
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| | [[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]], observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang. | | [[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]], observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and John Paton Davies all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang. |