Changes

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, ''Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor'' (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, ''Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor'' (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

==Second Sino-Japanese War==

==Second Sino-Japanese War==