Changes

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

In 1939 the U. S. supplied Japan with 59% of all war materials. The havoc wrought upon China by Japan using American made bombs dropped from American made airplanes was publicized as Japanese atrocities. (cf Porter Sargent, Bulletin #1 ''War Propaganda'', May 30, 1939).<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, [http://americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Getting_Us_Into_War-Porter_Sargent-1941-640pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=218&PHPSESSID=03d3557b41f249f71349e6d730cc8498 pgs. 525 - 544 pdf], pdf</ref>

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Comintern]] operative and editor of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] publication ''Pacific Affairs'', [[Owen Lattimore]] characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[KGB]] source [[I. F. Stone]] wrote on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

''Time'' magazine referred to Thomas Lamont in its November 25, 1940 issue as a specialist on Japan. Years earlier Lamont visited Japan with [[Walter Lippmann]]. At the Academy of Political Science, Lamont responded to the question, "Should the U.S. tighten trade embargoes against Japan?" ''Time'' said "he pointed out inconsistencies and omissions in U.S. embargoes  that still permitted Japan to get war supplies."  The outcry against supplying Japan with the essentials for her aggressive war against China was met by an announcement from the [[Roosevelt Administration]] of 'embargoes' on the export of scrap and oil. Porter Sargent observed, "Subtle influences through the organizations of fund raising, public relations and communication by radio or print, make it possible to soft pedal the profit from arming Japan while promoting the use of armed force against her."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, quoted in ''Getting Us into War'', Porter Sargent Publisher: P. Sargent, Boston, 1941, pg. 530.</ref> "Watertight as a fish-net" is how [[Comintern]] operative and editor of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication ''Pacific Affairs'', [[Owen Lattimore]] characterized the embargo on November 9, 1940.  "The Royal Dutch-Shell group and a subsidiary of the Standard-Vacuum Oil Company will supply 7,000,000 barrels of oil to Japan over six months," a ''New York Times'' dispatch of October 17 reported. "Arrangements have been virtually concluded for Japan to get 40 per cent of her oil requirements for the next six months in the Dutch Indies." [[KGB]] source [[I. F. Stone]] wrote on the State Department's handling of the embargo in the October 5, 1940 issue of ''[[The Nation]]'',

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>

:"Within the department, over the objections of a more farsighted minority, the experts made a joke of the discourses by protecting the profits accruing to American business from the aggressions we were so nobly denouncing."  The trade "treaty expired in January of [1940], but it was not until July that an 'embargo' on oil and scrap was announced . . . . The details were left to the State Department experts. When the regulations were promulgated it was found that the only scrap 'embargoed'" was one little used of the 75 varieties of iron and steel scrap, and "the only petroleum 'embargoed' was aviation gas". Stone continued, "the 'embargo' itself was only a system of licensing. It is now revealed that few if any licenses were denied under these regulations . . . . The Japanese, with about a year's supply on hand, do not need our scrap as much as they did, and the scrap industry, with a defense boom in the offing, does not need Japanese orders . The big steel companies cannot oppose an embargo on scrap by claiming that we have an over-supply of steel and at the same time ask for a higher price for steel on the ground of a shortage . . . . Both big steel and the scrap industry have accepted the embargo with a curious equanimity. This may be the result of a new sense of patriotism or it may be something else." <ref>I.F. Stone, ''The Nation'', October 5, 1940.</ref>

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, ''Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor'' (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war.  On the 25th of November, U.S. Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] had stated the problem as one of "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot." <ref>As Stimson explained: "In spite of the risk involved... in letting the Japanese fire the first shot, we realized that in order to have the full support of the American people, it was desirable to make sure that the Japanese be the ones to do this so that there should remain no doubt in anyone's mind as to who were the aggressors." Stimson's Testimony quoted in Basil Rauch, ''Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor'' (New York: Creative Age, 1950), p. 473.  In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General George C. Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref> It is significant that in the ten-point ultimatum sent to Japan on November 26, 1941, eight of the drastic demands were written by Harry Dexter White. The harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Ambassador Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because White's demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref>In other words, Harry Dexter White, an agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of Soviet [[foreign policy]] to advance the interests of the [[Comintern]] and the Soviet Union in the Far East <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Dr. Anthony Kubek, pg. 19.  Kubek writing in 1959 during the interwar period between the [[Korean War]] and the [[Vietnam War]], two "hot wars" in the "[[cold war]]," concluded: "The United States destroyed the one power that was able to check the flow of that Red tide in the Far East. ...The present Soviet military might, which threatens our national security, is the direct product of billions of [[lend-lease]] aid, coddling of Communists in high places in the American Government and failure to understand the basic drives of world [[Communism]]. ...Never before in our history was Presidential leadership so devoid of vision and never before had the mistakes of our Chief Executive been so fraught with peril to our nation."</ref>

Porter Sargent observed, "[[Frederick V . Field]] in his ''Far Eastern Survey : America's Stake in the Far East'' quoted in the ''North American Review'', Winter, 1938-39, gives the cost of our foreign service in Eastern Asia as $905,754 and adds to this detailed figures totaling approximately $300,000 for State and [[Commerce Department]]s, and a proportion of the cost of our Army and Navy running to hundreds of millions annually . To this might be added subsidies for our Pacific merchant marine. This great relief to the British Treasury could not have been continued had it not been skilfully concealed from the American people.<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 527.</ref>

KGB agent [[Frederick V . Field]]<ref>In the final report the [[SISS]] stated: "The IPR itself was like a specialized political flypaper in its attractive power for Communists. . . . British Communists like [[Michael Greenberg]]...Chinese Communists like Chi Chao-ting, Chen Han-seng, Chu Tong, Y.Y. Hsu;...Japanese Communists (and espionage agents) like Saionji and Ozaki (Hozumi); United States Communists like James S. Allen, Frederick V. Field, William M. Mandel, Harriet Moore, Lawrence Rosinger, and [[Alger Hiss]]....The IPR has been considered by the [[American Communist Party]] and by Soviet officials as an instrument of Communist policy, propaganda and [[military intelligence]]. The IPR disseminated and sought to popularize false information including information originating from Soviet and Communist sources. . . . The IPR was a vehicle used by the Communists to orientate American far eastern policies toward Communist objectives. . ." U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations, Washington 1952.</ref> in the [[IPR]]'s ''Far Eastern Survey: America's Stake in the Far East'', Porter Sargent observed "gives the cost of our foreign service in Eastern Asia as $905,754 and adds to this detailed figures totaling approximately $300,000 for State and [[United States Department of Commerce|Commerce Department]]s, and a proportion of the cost of our Army and Navy running to hundreds of millions annually . To this might be added subsidies for our Pacific merchant marine. This great relief to the British Treasury could not have been continued had it not been skilfully concealed from the American people."<ref>''Prodding Japan Into War'', Porter Sargent, Bulletin #95, December 30, 1940, pg. 527, quoted in the ''North American Review'', Winter, 1938-39.</ref>

==Second Sino-Japanese War==

==Second Sino-Japanese War==