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| | Truman retired from politics at the conclusion of his presidential term and died on December 26, 1972 in his Independence, Missouri home. His Presidential library is located in Independence. | | Truman retired from politics at the conclusion of his presidential term and died on December 26, 1972 in his Independence, Missouri home. His Presidential library is located in Independence. |
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| − | ===China=== | + | ===China and Korea=== |
| − | Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism. Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively. [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have worked in China, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. | + | Without committing U.S. combat troops and without supporting a coalition government, the [[Truman Doctrine]] saved Greece from Communism. Greece received weapons and financial support and, most importantly, operational advisers at the battalion level, who ensured that American aid was used effectively. [[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have prevented a [[Comintern]] victory, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism. |
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| | + | The Korean part of Wedemeyer's report was suppressed. Wedemeyer said: |
| | + | {{Cquote|American and Soviet forces . . . are approximately equal, less than 50,000 troops each, [but] the Soviet-equipped and trained North Korean People's (Communist) Army of approximately 125,000 is vastly superior to the United States-organized constabulary of 16,000 Koreans equipped with Japanese small arms. The North Korean People's Army constitutes a potential military threat to [[South Korea]], since there is strong possibility that the Soviets will withdraw their occupation forces and thus induce our own withdrawal."<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations, June 6, 1951.</ref>}} |
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| | + | Wedemeyer warned that this would take place as soon as "they can be sure that the [[North Korea]]n [[puppet government]] and its armed forces . . . are strong enough . . . to be relied upon to carry out Soviet objectives without the actual presence of Soviet troops." |
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| | [[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18,1951 what the critics had been saying, | | [[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18,1951 what the critics had been saying, |
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| | Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the Mac Arthur | | Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the Mac Arthur |
| | Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}} | | Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}} |
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| | + | Conditions inviting the North Korean attack were created by the [[United Nations]] which issued a resolution for withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops. Troops began withdrawing September 15, 1948, leaving only about 7500 Americans lightly armed. This left in South Korea 16,000 Koreans and 7500 Americans, both groups lightly armed, against 150,000 fully armed North Korean Communists. General Roberts, head of the U. S. Military Mission said the South Koreans were not permitted to arm adequately. |
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| | + | [[Chiang Kai-shek]] was caught between two wars—a war on China by [[Japan]] and a war on China by the Soviet Union. American leaders refused to see this and insisted on acting in the illusion that China was fighting the Japanese only and that Soviet Union was an ally. Then came the startling realization that the United States, too, like China, were engaged in two wars in Asia, one against a common enemy, Japan; the other against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. The United States, with its ally China, fought the Japanese. But all the time the Soviet Union, with its satellite Comintern army in China, was fighting both China and the United States. The [[iron curtain]] that, with the [[Yalta agreement]], was rung down over American allies in Europe—[[Poland]] and [[Czechoslovakia]] and other little countries—now fell on China. And this was made possible wholly because of the Soviet Union's allies—conscious and unconscious—in America, in the U.S. government and even in the [[U.S. State Department]]. |
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| | ==Middle Initial== | | ==Middle Initial== |