Changes

In 1934, [[Jacob Viner]], a professor at the [[University of Chicago]] working at the [[U.S. Treasury Department]], wrote to White offering him a job in the US Treasury.  In his early years White concentrated on the relationship that gold and silver had to currency management. He also became an expert on Japanese and Chinese monetary policy. As early as 1935 White agreed to pass on Treasury documents for [[Whitaker Chambers]] to photograph and return. In the latter half of the thirties met with [[John Maynard Keynes]] and other leading economists.  

In 1934, [[Jacob Viner]], a professor at the [[University of Chicago]] working at the [[U.S. Treasury Department]], wrote to White offering him a job in the US Treasury.  In his early years White concentrated on the relationship that gold and silver had to currency management. He also became an expert on Japanese and Chinese monetary policy. As early as 1935 White agreed to pass on Treasury documents for [[Whitaker Chambers]] to photograph and return. In the latter half of the thirties met with [[John Maynard Keynes]] and other leading economists.  

In December 1941 after Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morgenthau]] gave White the responsibility to "take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters...in connection with the operation of the Army and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our armed forces are operating or are likely to operate" and to act as liaison between the Treasury and the [[State Department]] on all matters having a bearing on foreign relations. White was also given "responsibility for the management and operation of the [[Exchange Stabilization Fund]] without a change in its procedures."  

In December 1941 after the Japanese [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], Treasury Secretary [[Henry Morgenthau]] gave White the responsibility to "take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters...in connection with the operation of the Army and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our armed forces are operating or are likely to operate" and to act as liaison between the Treasury and the [[State Department]] on all matters having a bearing on foreign relations. White was also given "responsibility for the management and operation of the [[Exchange Stabilization Fund]] without a change in its procedures."  

Another of White's value to Soviet intelligence was his ability to place in the Treasury Department individuals the [[Greg Silvermaster|Silvermaster ring]] wanted to have assigned in the department. Among them were [[Lud Ullman]], [[William Henry Taylor]], and [[Sonia Steinman Gold|Sonia Gold]].

Another of White's value to Soviet intelligence was his ability to place in the Treasury Department individuals the [[Greg Silvermaster|Silvermaster ring]] wanted to have assigned in the department. Among them were [[Lud Ullman]], [[William Henry Taylor]], and [[Sonia Steinman Gold|Sonia Gold]].

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin_Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan. <ref>Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U. S. S. R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940] : Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948.</ref>  Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref> Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin_Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan. <ref>Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U. S. S. R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940] : Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948.</ref>  Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref> Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The purpose was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Japan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Japan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

Since the end of 1940 Ambassador Grew stressed US and Japanese differences "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and the President should take place." <ref>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1264.</ref> When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of our true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1343.</ref> Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoe's important proposal had not been accepted. Grew "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1330.</ref>

Since the end of 1940 Ambassador Grew stressed US and Japanese differences "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and the President should take place." <ref>Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1264.</ref> When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of the United States true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1343.</ref> Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoe's important proposal had not been accepted. Grew "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." <ref>Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1330.</ref>

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]].<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref> The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]].<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref> The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959.</ref>, submitted an appeal to the President:

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959.</ref> submitted an appeal to the President:

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

{{Cquote|Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….}}

Soviet Russia stood to gain vitally from U.S.- Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoe in agreement would have left Japanese troops as a threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from a U.S.- Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoe in agreement would have left Japanese troops as a threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.

At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>

At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>

In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in the [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref>

In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Kanoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref>

The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roosevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played  

The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roosevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played  

===Betrayal of the Kuomintang===

===Betrayal of the Kuomintang===

[[Chiang Kai-shek]] himself would claim that White and his staff sabotaged his government's economic policies.  The U.S. government had made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to curb inflation in Nationalist China. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref>  White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

[[Chiang Kai-shek]] himself would claim that White and his staff sabotaged the Chinese government's economic policies.  The U.S. government had made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to curb inflation in Nationalist China. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref>  White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time. <ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time.<ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

Senator William Jenner's Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Investigation by the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''. <ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The Report stated,  

Senator William Jenner's Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Investigation by the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''. <ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The Report stated,  

"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy…." <ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy."<ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

===Transfer of Occupation Currency Plates===

===Transfer of Occupation Currency Plates===

==Post war==

==Post war==

[[Image:Washeveningstarmay41946.JPG|right|thumb|''Washington Evening Star'' May 4, 1946 announcement of White's appointment to head the [[IMF]].  President Truman said, "I am confident that in your new position you will add distinction to your already distinguished career with Treasury."  The appointment came after the [[White House]] had been alerted to White's espionage activity.]]

[[Image:Washeveningstarmay41946.JPG|right|thumb|''Washington Evening Star'' May 4, 1946 announcement of White's appointment to head the [[IMF]].  President Truman said, "I am confident that in your new position you will add distinction to your already distinguished career with Treasury."  The appointment came after the [[White House]] had been alerted to White's espionage activity.]]

On December 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to President Truman to a report entitled "Soviet Espionage in the United States." The report summarized White's espionage activities. Copies of the report were sent to Attorney General [[Tom C. Clark|Thomas Clark]] too. The evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving White. Six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to the International Monetary Fund.

On December 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to President Truman to a report entitled "Soviet Espionage in the United States." The report summarized White's espionage activities. Copies of the report were sent to Attorney General [[Tom C. Clark|Thomas Clark]] too. The evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving White. Six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to head the International Monetary Fund.

On July 31st 1948, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] told the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] that White had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the [[Russia]] during [[World War II]].<ref> [http://foia.fbi.gov/silversm/silversm2b.pdf Elizabeth Bentley Deposition, FBI Silvermaster file, p. 27].</ref> Bentley said White's colleagues passed information to her from him.  

On July 31st 1948, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] told the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] that White had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the [[Soviet Union]] during [[World War II]].<ref> [http://foia.fbi.gov/silversm/silversm2b.pdf Elizabeth Bentley Deposition, FBI Silvermaster file, p. 27].</ref> Bentley said she received information passed information to her from him.  

[[Whittaker Chambers]] subsequently testified on August 3rd of his association with White in the [[Communist]] underground secret apparatus up to 1938. <ref>[http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-3testimony.html Testimony of Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (August 3, 1948)].</ref> FBI laboratories established a highly confidential handwritten memorandum provided to Chambers in 1938 was White's handwriting. Bentley said his colleagues had passed information to her from him and accused White of providing stolen U.S. currency plates to the Soviet Union. The plates were used to print unlimited amounts of occupation currency in the eastern zone of postwar Germany precipitating the [[Berlin Blockade|Berlin Crisis]].  

[[Whittaker Chambers]] subsequently testified on August 3rd of his association with White in the [[Communist]] underground secret apparatus up to 1938. <ref>[http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-3testimony.html Testimony of Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (August 3, 1948)].</ref> FBI laboratories established a highly confidential handwritten memorandum provided to Chambers in 1938 was White's handwriting. Bentley said White’s colleagues had passed information to her from him and accused White of providing stolen U.S. currency plates to the Soviet Union. The plates were used to print unlimited amounts of occupation currency in the eastern zone of postwar Germany precipitating the [[Berlin Blockade|Berlin Crisis]].  

On August 14th 1948, Harry Dexter White appeared before the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] to defend his reputation. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. He died of a heart attack three days later.

On August 14th 1948, Harry Dexter White appeared before the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] to defend his reputation. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. He died of a heart attack three days later.

In a memorandum dated 15 October 1950 White was [[conclusive]]ly identified in the [[Venona]] papers as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist". <ref>Posthumous [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist| FBI Memorandum conclusively identifies Harry Dexter White as KGB Agent Jurist] (1950).</ref>Venona ciphers quote him as saying he was willing for any self-sacrifice on behalf of the [[MGB]], but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the 1944 Presidential election. In 1953 [[J. Edgar Hoover]] convinced [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.|Brownell]] that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement.

In a memorandum dated 15 October 1950 White was [[conclusive]]ly identified in the [[Venona]] papers as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist". <ref>Posthumous [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist| FBI Memorandum conclusively identifies Harry Dexter White as KGB Agent Jurist] (1950).</ref>Venona ciphers quote him as saying he was willing for any self-sacrifice on behalf of the [[KGB]], but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the 1944 Presidential election. In 1953 [[J. Edgar Hoover]] convinced [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.|Brownell]] that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement.

In 1953, Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] and Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.]] alleged that Truman had known White was a Soviet spy when he appointed him to the IMF. <ref>[http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,823119,00.html Time Magazine, ''The White Case Record'', Nov. 30, 1953].</ref>However, this has now been refuted by declassified documents through the [[Freedom of Information Act]] which attest President Truman and the White House had not known of the existence of the Venona project. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy] (1997).</ref>  

In 1953, Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] and Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.]] alleged that Truman had known White was a Soviet spy when he appointed him to the IMF. <ref>[http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,823119,00.html Time Magazine, ''The White Case Record'', Nov. 30, 1953].</ref>However, this has now been refuted by declassified documents through the [[Freedom of Information Act]] which attest President Truman and the White House had not known of the existence of the Venona project. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy] (1997).</ref>