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In the fields of [[evolutionary biology]] and [[game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by population geneticists [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, [[Richard Dawkins]] describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref>

In the field of [[evolutionary game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, [[Richard Dawkins]] describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref>

==See Also==

 

==See also==

*[[Theory of evolution]]

*[[Theory of evolution]]

==References==

==References==

<references />

<references />

==Further reading==

==Further reading==

*Maynard Smith, J. (1982) ''Evolution and the Theory of Games''. ISBN 0-521-28884-3

*Maynard Smith, J. (1982) ''Evolution and the Theory of Games''. ISBN 0-521-28884-3