Changes

In the field of [[evolutionary game theory]], an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which cannot be bettered by others in a population. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. Alternatively, [[Richard Dawkins]] describes it as a strategy which performs well against itself.<ref>Dawkins, R. (1976) ''The Selfish Gene''. Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-286092-5</ref>

In the field of evolutionary game theory, an '''evolutionarily stable strategy''' or '''ESS''' is one which resists infiltration by other strategies. The concept was proposed by [[population genetics|population geneticists]] [[John Maynard Smith]] and [[George R. Price]]<ref>Maynard Smith, J. and G. R. Price (1973) The logic of animal conflict. ''Nature'' '''246''': 15-18.</ref>. It is important to note that there may be multiple behaviors which could be potential ESSs in a given situation; which one actually prevails is dependent upon the initial conditions of the population.  

==See also==

==See also==