Changes

The so-called '''problem of [[evil]]''' is a topic of much debate in theology and the philosophy of religion. Many atheists (persons who do not believe that a god or gods exist) base their views to some degree on their assessment of this argument's strength:

The so-called '''problem of evil''' is a topic of much debate in [[theology]] and the [[philosophy]] of [[religion]]. Many [[atheist]]s base their views to some degree on their assessment of this argument's strength:

God is, according to accounts given by the holy texts of most monotheistic religions,

[[God]] is, according to accounts given by the holy texts of most monotheistic religions, "[[omniscience|omniscient]], [[omnipotence|omnipotent]] and omnibenevolent."

"omniscient, omnipotent and omnibenevolent."

# An omniscient being knows all the true propositions, including those which describe all the evil that exists.

# An omniscient being knows all the true propositions, including those which describe all the [[evil]] that exists.

# A benevolent person seeks to prevent evil from befalling others, to the extent that he or she knows of it and can do something about it (ought implies can), and an <i>omnibenevolent</i> being never strays from this goal.

# A [[benevolence|benevolent]] person seeks to prevent evil from befalling others, to the extent that he or she knows of it and can do something about it (ought implies can), and an ''omnibenevolent'' being never strays from this goal.

# However, an omnipotent being has the power to prevent evil from befalling persons.

# However, an omnipotent being has the power to prevent evil from befalling persons.

# Given 1, 2 and 3, we would expect that God should prevent evil from occurring. However, we know evil occurs from time to time.

# Given 1, 2 and 3, we would expect that God should prevent evil from occurring. However, we know evil occurs from time to time.

== Is the Argument Logically Valid? ==

== Is the Argument Logically Valid? ==

If a deductive argument is valid, the conclusion <i>must be</i> true if the premises are true. If it turns out that the conclusion is false while all the premises are true, then one has exposed an "argument" as invalid. Many theists think the argument from evil is logically invalid, meaning that the conclusion (God does not exist) does not necessarily follow from the premises (which theists tend to accept as true).

If a deductive argument is valid, the conclusion ''must be'' true if the premises are true. If it turns out that the conclusion is false while all the premises are true, then one has exposed an "argument" as invalid. Many theists think the argument from evil is logically invalid, meaning that the conclusion (God does not exist) does not necessarily follow from the premises (which theists tend to accept as true).

Theists point to many possible explanations, called theodicies, that attempt to show how some greater good is achieved by the allowance of some evil. Some common examples:

Theists point to many possible explanations, called theodicies, that attempt to show how some greater good is achieved by the allowance of some evil. Some common examples:

-God allows evil in order to allow for soul-making - the process by which humans grow spiritually, from self-centered beings to moral beings who have compassion for others. <br>

*God allows evil in order to allow for soul-making - the process by which humans grow spiritually, from self-centered beings to moral beings who have compassion for others.

-God allows evil because it is necessary for the existence of free will.<br>

*God allows evil because it is necessary for the existence of free will.

-God allows evil so that we may come to see what life is like for human creatures when they have separate themselves from God and His will.

*God allows evil so that we may come to see what life is like for human creatures when they have separate themselves from God and His will.

An atheist usually replies to such explanatory stories by reminding the theist that each story's plausibility depends on one already believing in God. Thus, using simple theodicies as arguments against the logical validity of the problem of evil amounts to circular reasoning, in which the claim to be proved is assumed true at the beginning. Circular reasoning does not imply the claim is false, but it is a logical error. Therefore, theodicies cannot give anyone <i>more</i> reason(s) to believe that God exists than they already possessed.

An atheist usually replies to such explanatory stories by reminding the theist that each story's plausibility depends on one already believing in God. Thus, using simple theodicies as arguments against the logical validity of the problem of evil amounts to circular reasoning, in which the claim to be proved is assumed true at the beginning. Circular reasoning does not imply the claim is false, but it is a logical error. Therefore, theodicies cannot give anyone ''more'' reason(s) to believe that God exists than they already possessed.

An alternative reply that a theist might offer attempts to compare the finite pains associated with human existence to the infinite bliss of heaven. Given that the reward for the faithful is immeasurable bliss for eternity, then any amount of finite pain caused in a finite time period is vanishingly irrelevant.

An alternative reply that a theist might offer attempts to compare the finite pains associated with human existence to the infinite bliss of heaven. Given that the reward for the faithful is immeasurable bliss for eternity, then any amount of finite pain caused in a finite time period is vanishingly irrelevant.

A likely reply to <i>this</i> like of objection is that such a calculus illegitimately treats human persons as objects that can be manipulated to one's own ends so long as one returns the favor at a later date. It is utterly implausible that a person would be justified in enslaving another for a year, even if their plan was to give the victim a billion dollars in compensation afterwards. To treat a human in such a way is to lack respect for humanity's essential nature: we are autonomous moral agents who are ends in ourselves, rather than means to ends.

A likely reply to ''this'' like of objection is that such a calculus illegitimately treats human persons as objects that can be manipulated to one's own ends so long as one returns the favor at a later date. It is utterly implausible that a person would be justified in enslaving another for a year, even if their plan was to give the victim a billion dollars in compensation afterwards. To treat a human in such a way is to lack respect for humanity's essential nature: we are autonomous moral agents who are ends in ourselves, rather than means to ends.

== Free Will ==

== Free Will ==

The twentieth century saw the rise of a "reformed" philosophy of religion, spearheaded primarily by Alvin Plantinga, a prominent professor at Notre Dame. Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work <i>God and Other Minds</i>, a defense of theism that counters the argument of evil with several observations about freedom of will. Rather than trying to give a moral justification for evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>.

The twentieth century saw the rise of a "reformed" philosophy of religion, spearheaded primarily by Alvin Plantinga, a prominent professor at Notre Dame. Plantinga introduced, in his 1967 work ''God and Other Minds'', a defense of theism that counters the argument of evil with several observations about freedom of will. Rather than trying to give a moral justification for evil, Plantinga prefers to establish only that the existence of God and evil are jointly <i>possible</i>.

Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. Thus, Plantinga opposes theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil. If he is right, theological compatiblism is incoherent; and could be likened to the claim that 'God can make a color that is bluer than blue.'

Plantinga argues that God has a sufficient reason to allow some moral evil: only in this way can He make possible the greater moral good of human freedom. Thus, Plantinga opposes theological compatiblism - the view that God can allow human freedom and prevent moral evil. If he is right, theological compatiblism is incoherent; and could be likened to the claim that 'God can make a color that is bluer than blue.'

Plantinga's view hinges on the claim that even God cannot ensure free moral agents always do the right thing:

Plantinga's view hinges on the claim that even God cannot ensure free moral agents always do the right thing:

Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, he must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand). But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will <i>freely</i> choose to do right or wrong. The upshot is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. "God determines that an agent must freely choose to do right" is analogous to "God creates a married bachelor."

Suppose God creates an agent with the intent that this agent freely chooses good all the time. Now, if the agent is to <i>freely</i> choose some good, he must actually be free to choose it or to refrain from choosing it. Further suppose that there is a world - the world God wants to make actual - in which that agent does choose the good all the time. This world can only be made actual if its predecessor - a "world segment" that includes all of the world's states of affairs save the agent's choice - is first made actual (before it can be true that an agent chooses the right thing in a situation, the agent must be presented with the situation at hand). But if a world segment is made actual, then, if the agent is free with respect to the decision that must be made, God cannot control whether the agent will ''freely'' choose to do right or wrong. The upshot is that theological compatiblism must be false - for God to determine that an agent will do right all the time is inconsistent with that agent freely choosing to do right all the time. "God determines that an agent must freely choose to do right" is analogous to "God creates a married bachelor."

Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>

Plantinga furthers his defense in ''God, Freedom and Evil.'' If it is <i>logically possible</i> that all agents are depraved (will go wrong with respect to some action or other) in any world in which they exist, then it is logically possible that God could, no matter which agents he caused to exist, never create a world with human freedom and no moral evil.<br><br>

== References ==

== References ==

Plantinga, Alvin: <i>God and Other Minds</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).<br>

*Plantinga, Alvin: <i>God and Other Minds</i> (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1967).

Plantinga, Alvin: <i>God, Freedom and Evil</i> (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's Publishing Co, 1977).

*Plantinga, Alvin: <i>God, Freedom and Evil</i> (Grand Rapids: Eerdman's Publishing Co, 1977).

[[Category: Philosophy]]

[[Category: Philosophy]]