| | The question of whether a judge acted in excess of his or her authority in making a judicial ruling is a distinct issue from the question of whether a judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Even if a judge exceeds his or her authority in making a judicial ruling in a particular case, that judge is immune if the case is properly before him or her. ''[[Mireles v. Waco]]'', 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991). The difference between acting in the absence of jurisdiction and acting in excess of authority is made clear in the following example: "if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a [[criminal]] case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune." ''Stump v. Sparkman'', 435 U.S. at 357 (internal citation omitted). | | The question of whether a judge acted in excess of his or her authority in making a judicial ruling is a distinct issue from the question of whether a judge acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction. Even if a judge exceeds his or her authority in making a judicial ruling in a particular case, that judge is immune if the case is properly before him or her. ''[[Mireles v. Waco]]'', 502 U.S. 9, 13 (1991). The difference between acting in the absence of jurisdiction and acting in excess of authority is made clear in the following example: "if a probate judge, with jurisdiction over only wills and estates, should try a [[criminal]] case, he would be acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction and would not be immune from liability for his action; on the other hand, if a judge of a criminal court should convict a defendant of a nonexistent crime, he would merely be acting in excess of his jurisdiction and would be immune." ''Stump v. Sparkman'', 435 U.S. at 357 (internal citation omitted). |
| | + | The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law. See ''Floyd v. Barker'', 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608). Chancellor Kent traced some of its history in Yates v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810), and this Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335 (1872). See n. 12, supra. The immunity of grand jurors, an almost equally venerable common-law tenet, see Floyd v. Barker, supra, also has been adopted in this country. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872). Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials - judge, grand juror, and prosecutor - exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them. Smith v. Parman, supra, Watts v. Gerking, supra. It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers, and their immunities being termed "quasi--judicial" as well. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, supra, at 69; Watts v. Gerking, supra, at 661, 228 P., at 138.<ref>''Imbler v. Pachtman'', 424 U.S. 409 (1976).</ref> |