Changes

== History ==

== History ==

The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law. See ''Floyd v. Barker'', 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608). Chancellor Kent traced some of its history in Yates  v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810), and this Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher,  13 Wall. 335 (1872). See n. 12, supra.  The immunity of grand jurors, an almost equally venerable common-law tenet, see Floyd  v. Barker, supra, also has been adopted in this country. See, e.g.,  Turpen  v. Booth,  56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis,  40 Ind. 356 (1872). Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials - judge, grand juror, and prosecutor - exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them. Smith v. Parman, supra, Watts  v. Gerking,  supra. It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers, and their immunities being termed "quasi--judicial" as well. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, supra, at 69; Watts v. Gerking, supra, at 661, 228 P., at 138.<ref>''Imbler v. Pachtman'', 424 U.S. 409 (1976).</ref>

The immunity of a judge for acts within his jurisdiction has roots extending to the earliest days of the common law. See ''Floyd v. Barker'', 12 Coke 23, 77 Eng. Rep. 1305 (1608). Chancellor Kent traced some of its history in Yates  v. Lansing, 5 Johns. 282 (N.Y. 1810), and this Court accepted the rule of judicial immunity in Bradley v. Fisher,  13 Wall. 335 (1872). See n. 12, supra.  The immunity of grand jurors, an almost equally venerable common-law tenet, see Floyd  v. Barker, supra, also has been adopted in this country. See, e.g.,  Turpen  v. Booth,  56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis,  40 Ind. 356 (1872). Courts that have extended the same immunity to the prosecutor have sometimes remarked on the fact that all three officials - judge, grand juror, and prosecutor - exercise a discretionary judgment on the basis of evidence presented to them. Smith v. Parman, supra, Watts  v. Gerking,  supra. It is the functional comparability of their judgments to those of the judge that has resulted in both grand jurors and prosecutors being referred to as "quasi-judicial" officers, and their immunities being termed "quasi--judicial" as well. See, e.g., Turpen v. Booth, supra, at 69; Watts v. Gerking, supra, at 661, 228 P., at 138.<ref>''[[Imbler v. Pachtman]]'', 424 U.S. 409 (1976).</ref>

== References ==

== References ==