| Line 13: |
Line 13: |
| | One point of contention with opponents of the Patriot Act is with the roving wiretaps provision. Some claim that the since the FBI does not have to determine the location of their suspect before they start collecting intelligence, the privacy of innocent citizens could accidentally be intruded upon.<ref name="dempsey">Dempsey, James X. “Section 206: Roving Surveillance Authority Under FISA: A Summary” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-206 (Accessed April 16th, 2007).</ref> They also claim that, due to changes within FISA outside of the realm of the Patriot Act, it is not necessary to know the identity of the person upon whom the warrant is being issued. This could lead to “John Doe” warrants, in which the government does not specify a suspect or a place of interception.<ref name="dempsey" /> | | One point of contention with opponents of the Patriot Act is with the roving wiretaps provision. Some claim that the since the FBI does not have to determine the location of their suspect before they start collecting intelligence, the privacy of innocent citizens could accidentally be intruded upon.<ref name="dempsey">Dempsey, James X. “Section 206: Roving Surveillance Authority Under FISA: A Summary” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-206 (Accessed April 16th, 2007).</ref> They also claim that, due to changes within FISA outside of the realm of the Patriot Act, it is not necessary to know the identity of the person upon whom the warrant is being issued. This could lead to “John Doe” warrants, in which the government does not specify a suspect or a place of interception.<ref name="dempsey" /> |
| | | | |
| − | Another problem opponents have with the Patriot act is with the sneak and peek search warrants. They claim that the standards are too low, and the definitions are too vague, such that warrants could be executed non-terror related crimes or even non-violent crimes like [[health care]] fraud.<ref>Dempsey, James X. “Section 213: ‘Sneak and Peek’ Search Warrants: Replies” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-213 (Accessed April 16th, 2007)</ref> These opponents argue that the weak definition of a “reasonable” time to notify the suspect that he had been searched could lead to situations where the suspect is denied his constitutional rights.<ref>Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th Congress. Ed. Edward H. Crane and David Boaz, p. 118-9 (Cato Institute, 2003)</ref> If, for example, the FBI got a search warrant to search a suspect’s garbage but found evidence by searching the subject’s desk, by the time the suspect was notified it is likely he will have no legal recourse. | + | Another problem opponents have with the Patriot Act is with the sneak and peek search warrants. They claim that the standards are too low, and the definitions are too vague, such that warrants could be executed non-terror related crimes or even non-violent crimes like [[health care]] fraud.<ref>Dempsey, James X. “Section 213: ‘Sneak and Peek’ Search Warrants: Replies” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/section-213 (Accessed April 16th, 2007)</ref> These opponents argue that the weak definition of a “reasonable” time to notify the suspect that he had been searched could lead to situations where the suspect is denied his constitutional rights.<ref>Cato Handbook for Congress: Policy Recommendations for the 108th Congress. Ed. Edward H. Crane and David Boaz, p. 118-9 (Cato Institute, 2003)</ref> If, for example, the FBI got a search warrant to search a suspect’s garbage but found evidence by searching the subject’s desk, by the time the suspect was notified it is likely he will have no legal recourse. |
| | | | |
| | A lot of criticisms have been aimed towards the libraries provision of the Patriot Act. As with other criticisms, those for the libraries provision rest largely in the broad and vague language in the bill. These types of searches had existed before in criminal law, but not with such loose and broad terms. The new law could be used to gain access to records usually subject to privacy protections, such as medical records.<ref name="swire">Swire, Peter P. “Section 215: Access to Business Records under FISA (‘Libraries Provision’): Replies” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/sections-214-and-215 (Accessed April 16th, 2007)</ref> Opponents also dislike the [[gag rule]], which makes it illegal for the business which has been subpoenaed to even reveal that they have received a FISA request. Gag rules have been in place for such things as ongoing wiretaps, where informing the suspect would result in negating the usefulness of the tap, but never before have they been used to keep a subject in the dark about completed searches (even sneak and peek suspects eventually discover that they were searched).<ref name="swire" /> | | A lot of criticisms have been aimed towards the libraries provision of the Patriot Act. As with other criticisms, those for the libraries provision rest largely in the broad and vague language in the bill. These types of searches had existed before in criminal law, but not with such loose and broad terms. The new law could be used to gain access to records usually subject to privacy protections, such as medical records.<ref name="swire">Swire, Peter P. “Section 215: Access to Business Records under FISA (‘Libraries Provision’): Replies” (American Bar Association, 2005). http://www.abanet.org/natsecurity/patriotdebates/sections-214-and-215 (Accessed April 16th, 2007)</ref> Opponents also dislike the [[gag rule]], which makes it illegal for the business which has been subpoenaed to even reveal that they have received a FISA request. Gag rules have been in place for such things as ongoing wiretaps, where informing the suspect would result in negating the usefulness of the tap, but never before have they been used to keep a subject in the dark about completed searches (even sneak and peek suspects eventually discover that they were searched).<ref name="swire" /> |
| Line 38: |
Line 38: |
| | | | |
| | ::Maybe we need to address the various things that FBI agents wanted to do when they first heard about Arab-looking men who wanted to learn how to '''steer''' a jumbo jet, but didn't care about landing one. What legal powers would they need, to investigate further? Which of these powers - if used "against" some innocent person - would violate their rights? (Please specify the rights by Amendment number, etc.) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] <sup>[[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]]</sup> 18:10, 9 April 2008 (EDT) | | ::Maybe we need to address the various things that FBI agents wanted to do when they first heard about Arab-looking men who wanted to learn how to '''steer''' a jumbo jet, but didn't care about landing one. What legal powers would they need, to investigate further? Which of these powers - if used "against" some innocent person - would violate their rights? (Please specify the rights by Amendment number, etc.) --[[User:Ed Poor|Ed Poor]] <sup>[[User talk:Ed Poor|Talk]]</sup> 18:10, 9 April 2008 (EDT) |
| | + | |
| | + | :I don't personally object to any of ''those'' portions. The Patriot Act definitely cleared out of the way a lot of the bureaucracy that would have been critical for communication between the FBI and other portions of the government that could have stopped the hijackers. I have more concern about the sneak and peak warrants, and how they are not clearly defined (i.e. the health care example above). Sneak and peak warrants in the case of imminent suspected terrorism are fine with me (and perhaps not with a lot of the critics of the Patriot Act), but I do think it is germane to comment on how the boundaries and limits are not clearly defined there. Similarly, the issue with the ''limits'' are germane with the library, such as the also provided example of how it could lead to fraud to spying or medical records. [[User:DanH|DanH]] 18:16, 9 April 2008 (EDT) |