| | :As to the conspiracy claim, to survive a motion for summary judgment Babbar must furnish a genuine factual basis to support the existence of the defining elements of a conspiracy--agreement and concerted action. See Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1990). In that regard, he suggests that he has proffered indirect evidence showing a meeting of the minds to deny him tenure by showing members of the tenure committee accepted Ebadi's letter without question and upper-level members of the KSU administration "rubber-stamped" the committee's recommendation. (Appellant's Br. at 26.) But as the district court points out, Babbar has thereby established only that each defendant arrived at the same negative conclusion on the question of tenure. See Babbar, No. 97-2677-JWL, at 20. That bare coincidence is insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an agreement between defendants or a meeting of their minds. See Muchmore, 904 F.2d at 1476. | | :As to the conspiracy claim, to survive a motion for summary judgment Babbar must furnish a genuine factual basis to support the existence of the defining elements of a conspiracy--agreement and concerted action. See Crabtree v. Muchmore, 904 F.2d 1475, 1476 (10th Cir. 1990). In that regard, he suggests that he has proffered indirect evidence showing a meeting of the minds to deny him tenure by showing members of the tenure committee accepted Ebadi's letter without question and upper-level members of the KSU administration "rubber-stamped" the committee's recommendation. (Appellant's Br. at 26.) But as the district court points out, Babbar has thereby established only that each defendant arrived at the same negative conclusion on the question of tenure. See Babbar, No. 97-2677-JWL, at 20. That bare coincidence is insufficient to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence of an agreement between defendants or a meeting of their minds. See Muchmore, 904 F.2d at 1476. |
| − | :With respect to the discriminatory motive, a plaintiff must establish that a class-based or racially discriminatory motive lurks behind the conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 HN9Go to the description of this Headnote.("[Section] 1985(3) does not 'apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,' but rather, only to conspiracies motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338)). To survive summary judgment, Babbar argues he needed to show only that he was treated differently than a similarly-situated individual, but needed demonstrate no specific form of discrimination, relying on Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), in support of that proposition. Jacobs, however, was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a § 1985 conspiracy case. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a § 1985 conspiracy case, we have stated unequivocally that a plaintiff must establish a genuine issue of material fact as to class-based or racially discriminatory motives underlying conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686. As discussed in the context of his Title VII reverse discrimination claims, Babbar has not provided evidence of race- or class-based discriminatory motives sufficient to withstand defendants' summary judgment motion. Because he has not alleged any facts showing defendants agreed to single him out for disparate treatment or establishing race- or class-based animus as required by § 1985, see Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983), the judgment of the district court must be affirmed as to this claim. | + | :With respect to the discriminatory motive, a plaintiff must establish that a class-based or racially discriminatory motive lurks behind the conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 ("[Section] 1985(3) does not 'apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,' but rather, only to conspiracies motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338)). To survive summary judgment, Babbar argues he needed to show only that he was treated differently than a similarly-situated individual, but needed demonstrate no specific form of discrimination, relying on Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), in support of that proposition. Jacobs, however, was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a § 1985 conspiracy case. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a § 1985 conspiracy case, we have stated unequivocally that a plaintiff must establish a genuine issue of material fact as to class-based or racially discriminatory motives underlying conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686. As discussed in the context of his Title VII reverse discrimination claims, Babbar has not provided evidence of race- or class-based discriminatory motives sufficient to withstand defendants' summary judgment motion. Because he has not alleged any facts showing defendants agreed to single him out for disparate treatment or establishing race- or class-based animus as required by § 1985, see Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983), the judgment of the district court must be affirmed as to this claim. |