Changes

:With respect to the discriminatory motive, a plaintiff must establish that a class-based or racially discriminatory motive lurks behind the conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 ("[Section] 1985(3) does not 'apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,' but rather, only to conspiracies motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338)). To survive summary judgment, Babbar argues he needed to show only that he was treated differently than a similarly-situated individual, but needed demonstrate no specific form of discrimination, relying on Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), in support of that proposition. Jacobs, however, was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a § 1985 conspiracy case. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a § 1985 conspiracy case, we have stated unequivocally that a plaintiff must establish a genuine issue of material fact as to class-based or racially discriminatory motives underlying conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686. As discussed in the context of his Title VII reverse discrimination claims, Babbar has not provided evidence of race- or class-based discriminatory motives sufficient to withstand defendants' summary judgment motion. Because he has not alleged any facts showing defendants agreed to single him out for disparate treatment or establishing race- or class-based animus as required by § 1985, see Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983), the judgment of the district court must be affirmed as to this claim.

:With respect to the discriminatory motive, a plaintiff must establish that a class-based or racially discriminatory motive lurks behind the conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686 ("[Section] 1985(3) does not 'apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of others,' but rather, only to conspiracies motivated by 'some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.'" (quoting Griffin, 403 U.S. 88, 101-02, 91 S. Ct. 1790, 29 L. Ed. 2d 338)). To survive summary judgment, Babbar argues he needed to show only that he was treated differently than a similarly-situated individual, but needed demonstrate no specific form of discrimination, relying on Jacobs, Visconsi & Jacobs, Co. v. City of Lawrence, 927 F.2d 1111 (10th Cir. 1991), in support of that proposition. Jacobs, however, was an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, not a § 1985 conspiracy case. To survive a motion for summary judgment in a § 1985 conspiracy case, we have stated unequivocally that a plaintiff must establish a genuine issue of material fact as to class-based or racially discriminatory motives underlying conspiratorial activities. See Tilton, 6 F.3d at 686. As discussed in the context of his Title VII reverse discrimination claims, Babbar has not provided evidence of race- or class-based discriminatory motives sufficient to withstand defendants' summary judgment motion. Because he has not alleged any facts showing defendants agreed to single him out for disparate treatment or establishing race- or class-based animus as required by § 1985, see Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719, 725-26, 75 L. Ed. 2d 413, 103 S. Ct. 1483 (1983), the judgment of the district court must be affirmed as to this claim.

[[Category:Section 1985]]

[[Category:Section 1985]]

[[category:Employment Discrimination]]

[[category:Employment Discrimination]]