Changes

==Aftermath, reactions and re-evaluations==

==Aftermath, reactions and re-evaluations==

 

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA director]] [[Allen Dulles]], [[Deputy Director of Central Intelligence|deputy CIA director]] [[Charles Cabell]], and Deputy Director of Operations [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.|Richard Bissell]] were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA.  Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, [[Director of Central Intelligence|CIA director]] [[Allen Dulles]], [[Deputy Director of Central Intelligence|deputy CIA director]] [[Charles Cabell]], and Deputy Director of Operations [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.|Richard Bissell]] were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA.  Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching [[the Cuban Project]] to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching [[the Cuban Project]] to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.

The CIA wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. A number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

The CIA, apparently under a Presidential directive, wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. No blame was placed where it probably belonged, President Kennedy's most trusted advisers.  Thus the report only mentions a number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

*The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.

*The administration believed that the troops could retreat to the mountains to lead a guerrilla war if they lost in open battle. The mountains were too far to reach on foot, and the troops were deployed in swamp land, where they were easily surrounded.