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===Loss of China===

===Loss of China===

[[Chiang Kai-shek]], America's wartime ally and head of the Nationalist forces in China, was caught between two wars—a war on China by [[Japan]] and a war on China by the Soviet Union. American leaders refused to see this and insisted on acting in the illusion that China was fighting the Japanese only and that Soviet Union was an ally. Then came the startling realization that the United States, too, like China, were engaged in two wars in Asia, one against a common enemy, Japan; the other against a common enemy, the Soviet Union. The United States, with its ally China, fought the Japanese. But all the time the Soviet Union, with its satellite Comintern army in China, was fighting both China and the United States. The [[iron curtain]] that, with the [[Yalta agreement]], was rung down over American allies in Europe—[[Poland]] and [[Czechoslovakia]] and other little countries—now fell on China. And this was made possible wholly because of the Soviet Union's allies—conscious and unconscious—in America, in the U.S. government and even in the [[U.S. State Department]].

[[Chiang Kai-shek]], America's wartime ally and head of the Nationalist forces in China, was caught between two wars—a war on China by [[Japan]] and a war with [[Mao Zedong]] and the Chinese Communists. The U.S. policy was to avoid a civil war and to threaten to withhold additional aid to the Nationalists unless they worked out a compromise. No compromise was possible, and Truamn refused to send in combat troops to fight the civil war. General [[George Marshall]], who spent a year in China as Truman's emissary, testified that combat aid might have prevented a Communist victory, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>   

 

 

[[George Marshall]] himself testified that such aid might have prevented a [[Comintern]] victory, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General [[Albert C. Wedemeyer]] recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China:  A Political History, 1917-1980'',  Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref>  Truman however, made no effort to save China from Communism.

[[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18,1951 what the critics had been saying,

[[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18,1951 what the critics had been saying,

John T. Flynn observes that critics of the [[FDR]] and Truman Administrations who had been saying this earlier were denounced as “[[Fascists]].”<ref>''While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn,  New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 161] pdf.</ref> Rusk continued,

John T. Flynn observes that critics of the [[FDR]] and Truman Administrations who had been saying this earlier were denounced as “[[Fascists]].”<ref>''While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It'', John T. Flynn,  New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1951, [http://www.mises.org/books/whileyouslept.pdf pg. 161] pdf.</ref> Rusk continued,

{{Cquote|We do not recognize the authorities in [[Peiping]] for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. . . . We recognize the [[Kuomintang|Nationalist government of the Republic of China]] even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. <ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the Mac Arthur Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}}

{{Cquote|We do not recognize the authorities in [[Peiping]] for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. . . . We recognize the [[Kuomintang|Nationalist government of the Republic of China]] even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. <ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the Mac Arthur Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}}

===Risks in Korea===

===Risks in Korea===

Conditions inviting the North Korean attack were created by the [[United Nations]] which issued a resolution for withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops. Troops began withdrawing September 15, 1948, leaving only about 7500 Americans lightly armed. This left in South Korea 16,000 Koreans and 7500 Americans, both groups lightly armed, against 150,000 fully armed North Korean Communists. General Roberts, head of the U. S. Military Mission said the South Koreans were not permitted to arm adequately.  

Conditions inviting the North Korean attack were created by the [[United Nations]] which issued a resolution for withdrawal of both Soviet and American troops. Troops began withdrawing September 15, 1948, leaving only about 7500 Americans lightly armed. This left in South Korea 16,000 Koreans and 7500 Americans, both groups lightly armed, against 150,000 fully armed North Korean Communists. General Roberts, head of the U. S. Military Mission said the South Koreans were not permitted to arm adequately.