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The landing was hurried, a second pre-attack air strike was withheld. The idea was that the people in Cuba would join the fight against Castro once they learned about the liberation forces landing. The resistance in the Escambray mountains and else where was blocked by massive militia encirclement (see [[War Against the Bandits]]); mass arrests of the order of 300,000 disrupted anti-Castro urban resistance(details below).
 
The landing was hurried, a second pre-attack air strike was withheld. The idea was that the people in Cuba would join the fight against Castro once they learned about the liberation forces landing. The resistance in the Escambray mountains and else where was blocked by massive militia encirclement (see [[War Against the Bandits]]); mass arrests of the order of 300,000 disrupted anti-Castro urban resistance(details below).
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While militia and police were sacrificed in bloody charges, and died by the hundreds in burning buses along the swamp causways, Castro quickly moved artillery and tanks (supplied by the [[Soviet Union]]) and planes (inherited from the previous regime) to the landing site. Although the Cuban patriots fought heroically and far more skillfully than the communist Cubans, the far greater  numbers of Castro government troops and loss of air cover to protect supply lines brought an end to the invasion. Kennedy, and his advisors lost confidence and forbade direct American intervention by US Navy carriers already in the area.  Within two days, over 100 of the anti-Castro Cubans were killed and over a thousand were captured.  Castro government troops had far greater losses a matter still veiled by the present Cuban government (see below).
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While militia and police were sacrificed in bloody charges, and died by the hundreds in burning buses along the swamp causeways, Castro quickly moved artillery and tanks (supplied by the [[Soviet Union]]) and planes (inherited from the previous regime) to the landing site. Although the Cuban patriots fought heroically and far more skillfully than the communist Cubans, the far greater  numbers of Castro government troops and loss of air cover to protect supply lines brought an end to the invasion. Kennedy, and his advisers lost confidence and forbade direct American intervention by US Navy carriers already in the area.  Within two days, over 100 of the anti-Castro Cubans were killed and over a thousand were captured.  Castro government troops had far greater losses a matter still veiled by the present Cuban government (see below).
    
This incident led to the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].
 
This incident led to the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]].
 
[[Category:United States History]]
 
[[Category:United States History]]
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===Details===
 
===Details===
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Tensions between [[The United States]] and [[Cuba]] had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. The [[Dwight Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administrations had judged that Castro's policies, including the [[expropriation]] of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated.
 
Tensions between [[The United States]] and [[Cuba]] had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. The [[Dwight Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] and [[John F. Kennedy|Kennedy]] administrations had judged that Castro's policies, including the [[expropriation]] of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated.
 
                                  
 
                                  
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On March 17, 1960, the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] administration agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand"> ''A Thousand days:John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965 </ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the [[Sierra Madre de Chiapas|Sierra Madre]] mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>  
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On March 17, 1960, the [[Dwight D. Eisenhower|Eisenhower]] administration agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand"> ''A Thousand days:John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965 </ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the [[Sierra Madre de Chiapas|Sierra Madre]] mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>  
    
The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran|Iranian]] prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president [[Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán]] in 1954.  [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.]], one of [[Allen Dulles]]'s three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."   
 
The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran|Iranian]] prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president [[Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán]] in 1954.  [[Richard Mervin Bissell Jr.]], one of [[Allen Dulles]]'s three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."   
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==Notes==
 
==Notes==
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==Bibliography==
 
==Bibliography==
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*Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
 
*Welch, David A and James G Blight (editors) 1998 Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Frank Cass Publishers, London and Portland Oregon ISBN 0-7146-4883-3 ISBN 0-7146-4435-8
 
*Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40
 
*Wyden, Peter 1979 Bay of Pigs Simon. and Schuster New York ISBN 0-671-24006-40
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