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| − | ==First Term== | + | ==Presidency== |
| − | During this term, the Korean War ended in a stalemate after a treaty was signed. Eisenhower's term in office is also notable for the creation of the enormous Interstate Highway System, which was funded by the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 <ref>http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.html</ref>. | + | Journalists in the 1950s depicted Eisenhower as a laid-back "chairman of the board" who let his subordinates run the government. The opening of Eisenhower's papers surprised scholars, who discovered that behind the scenes Eisenhower was a hands-on leader. He ran the show in his White House, not Sherman Adams or John Foster Dulles. He was well informed, on top of the issues, and possessed of an impressively analytic mind and a formidable capacity for clear, incisive expression in literate prose that is worlds apart from his opaque press conference locutions. He emphatically was the engine of his presidency who watched details and made all the major decisions. As a consequence Eisenhower's ratings by historians and political scientists rose from 22nd place in the 1962 Schlesinger poll to 12th place in the 1981 David Porter poll to 9th in Steve Neal's 1996 poll.<ref> Fred I. Greenstein, "The Hidden-hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader. A 1994 Perspective." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 233-241; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. "Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton." ''Political Science Quarterly'' 1997 112(2): 179-190. Issn: 0032-3195 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0032-3195(199722)112%3A2%3C179%3ARTPWTC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4 in Jstor] </ref> |
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| | + | Truman, bitterly unhappy with his own White House staff, joked that when Ike became president he would push a button and nothing will happen. Truman was wrong, for Eisenhower was the best organizer in the Army, and he redesigned the White House staff and the executive departments so he had clear control at all times, and brought on board talented senior staff to oversee the process, such as former New Hampshire governor Sherman Adams, his chief assistant from 1953 to 1958.<ref> Alfred D. Sander, ''Eisenhower's Executive Office'' (1999); Charles Walcott and Karen M. Hult, "White House Organization as a Problem of Governance: the Eisenhower System." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' (1994) 24(2): 327-339. Issn: 0360-4918 </ref> |
| | + | ===McCarthy=== |
| | + | Republican Senator [[Joe McCarthy]] transformed the national discourse to a focus on internal treason by charging in 1950 that Roosevelt had allowed Soviet spies into the government (such as [[Alger Hiss]]), and that by protecting them Truman was guilty of "20 years of treason." When Eisenhower was elected McCarthy turned his attention to Eisenhower's administration and hinted at "21 years of treason." His main case was a reserve dentist who was recalled to active duty and promoted to major, even though he was a member of the Communist party. "Who promoted Major Peress??" he shouted. Eisenhower would not tolerate government employees who failed loyalty or security standards, but stressed his support for civil liberties and proper procedures. He succeeded in using behind-the-scenes tactics to undermine McCarthy, particularly after January 1954 when the senator took on the US Army. Eisenhower's shrewd plan included making political speeches about what his administration had done to remove Communists from the executive branch. Among other things, the president denied McCarthy access to certain White House documents, supported anti-McCarthy Republicans in the Senate, and publicly denounced McCarthy's methods without naming the senator. In October, 1954, the Senate censured McCarthy for bringing disgrace on that body, and he disappeared from the scene.<ref> Michael J. Birkner, "Eisenhower and the Red Menace." ''Prologue: Quarterly of the National Archives and Records Administration'' (2001) 33(3): 196-207. Issn: 0033-1031 </ref> |
| | + | ===Foreign policy and the military=== |
| | + | [[Image:Eisenhower family.jpeg|right|thumb|350px|Eisenhower, his wife Mamie, his son John and his daughter-in-law Barbara at the second inauguration in 1957]] |
| | + | Viewing the limited war in Korea as a mistake, Eisenhower believed that American national security and containment of Communist expansion could best be achieved through nuclear deterrence and the utilization of other assets, such as negotiations, psychological warfare and economic aid. Eisenhower worried that excessive defense spending would weaken the economy in the long-run, and thus be counterproductive. His "New Look" strategy economized by cutting back on Army divisions (much to the chagrin of the soldiers), and emphasizing instead nuclear weapons, which gave "more bang for the buck."<ref>Saki Dockrill, "Dealing with Soviet Power and Influence: Eisenhower's Management of U.S. National Security." ''Diplomatic History'' (2000) 24(2): 345-352. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
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| | + | During his first three years as President, Eisenhower cut the federal budget, largely by controlling defense expenditures. By nature a fiscal conservative, he had no patience for corporate contractors' insistence that America needed ever more defense systems, even when the point ewas made by his Secretary of Defense, [[Charles E. Wilson]], a former CEO of [[General Motors]]. Wilson was ridiculed by Democrats for his garbled statement, "I thought that what was good for our country was good for General Motors and vice versa." (He meant to say what was bad for the country was bad for General Motors). Wilson proposed enormous Pentagon budget requests that Eisenhower slashed back. Rhe number of uniformed personnel dropped from 3.6 million in 1953 to 2.5 million in 1960; another 300,000 civilian jobs in the Defense department were ended. The overall military budget dropped from $43.8 billion in 1953 to $41.3 billion in 1960, or from 12.0% of GDP to 8.2%. In effect Eisenhower cut the military by 30%. |
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| | + | Eisenhower rejected the policy of limited war and use of tactical nuclear weapons to the strategic menu of ways to deal with the Communist threat, and instead adopted a new strategy of "massive resistance" whereby a small war with the Soviet Union would immediately turn into a major nuclear war. He knew the U.S. had substantial nuclear superiority. The effect was to deter both sides from any action that might escalate tensions into a small war. Eisenhower thus avoided World War III. |
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| | + | Between 1953 and 1955 Army leaders, headed by Chief of Staff General [[Matthew B. Ridgway]], attempted to overturn Eisenhower's New Look. Ridgway believed that the new policies were militarily unsound and ultimately rendered military professionalism unnecessary by eliminating the political utility of force. Determined to salvage the military profession, Ridgway tried to undermine the credibility of Eisenhower's policies. Eisenhower, however, had much greater military and political prestige and replaced him in 1955.<ref> A. J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 1953-1955" ''Journal of Military History'' (1997) 61(2): 303-333. Issn: 0899-3718 Fulltext: [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0899-3718(199704)61%3A2%3C303%3ATPOPER%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S in Jstor] </ref> Eisenhower likewise rejected criticism from his next Army chief of staff [[Maxwell Taylor]]. Taylor wanted more more money to achieve more flexibility, but Eisenhower got his way.<ref> Taylor retired and counterattacked, writing that Eisenhower's policy "offers no alternative other than reciprocal suicide or retreat in the face of the superiority of Soviet forces." [Taylor, ''The Uncertain Trumpet'' (1959) p. 137] President John F Kennedy greatly admired Taylor’s ideas and brought him back as chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1962.</ref> Eisenhower had a triad of nuclear delivery systems (the B-52 bomber, submarines, and missiles), added an early warning radar system in Canada, and tried to add a civil defense system for cities in case deterrence failed, but the public was completely uninterested in his bomb shelters. |
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| | + | He strengthened the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the expense of the traditional service chiefs.<ref> Gerard Clarfield, ''Security and Solvency: Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Shaping of the American Military Establishment.'' (1999)</ref> |
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| | + | At the time there were no intercontinental missiles, and the American air defense system was considered strong enough to fend off any Soviet air attack. American progress in rocketry was upstaged by the Soviets in 1957, as they launched Sputnik, the first earth satellite, and kept their lead in space for several years. Everyone realized that gave the Soviets a lead in long-range missiles as well. |
| | + | ====Defeating the Bricker amendment==== |
| | + | Much of Eisenhower's energy in 1953-54 was devoted to defeating the "Bricker Amendment," a constitutional amendment proposed in 1951 by Republican Senator John W. Bricker of Ohio. It would restrict the president's role in entering into treaties, threatening both presidential authority and America's new internationalist role in foreign affairs. Eisenhower was annoyed that the core of legislative support came from within the Taft wing of the GOP. The Bricker Amendment grew out of opposition to the perceived threat of [[United Nations]] intervention into domestic social, economic, and political affairs - the UN's "global socialism." Through strong personal lobbying and rescinding support for human rights treaties, Eisenhower and his congressional allies narrowly defeated the Bricker Amendment, and this effectively eliminated the strength of isolationism in the postwar period.<ref>Cathal J. Nolan, "The Last Hurrah of Conservative Isolationism: Eisenhower, Congress, and the Bricker Amendment" ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1992 22(2): 337-349. </ref> |
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| | + | ====Middle East==== |
| | + | Concerned over Communist subversion, Eisenhower created the '''Eisenhower Doctrine''' to support pro-Western Arab governments. At first the United States did not distinguish between Communism and radical Arab nationalism, perceiving Egyptian president [[Gamal Abdel Nasser]] as linked to Soviet encroachment. The political situation grew complex as radicals challenged the Lebanese and Jordanian governments, and the ruler of Iraq was brutally overthrown. In 1958 Eisenhower sent Marines to Lebanon to support the government but balked at British plans for greater military intervention.<ref> Douglas Little, "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis." ''Diplomatic History'' (1996) 20(1): 27-54. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> Eisenhower and Secretary of State [[John Foster Dulles]] eventually focused their strategy by distinguishing between Communism and Arab nationalism. The United States was able to limit its goals, accommodate itself to Nasser, and display a greater flexibility than the Eisenhower Doctrine originally offered. At the same time relations with Israel were greatly strengthened, which annoyed America's Arab allies.<ref> Jeffrey M. Nadaner, "Strife among Friends and Foes: the 1958 Anglo-American Military Interventions in the Middle East." ''UCLA Historical Journal'' (1997) 17: 82-123. Issn: 0276-864x </ref> |
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| | + | ====Nicaragua==== |
| | + | Scholars have spent a half century debating why the Eisenhower administration helped the Guatemalan army overthrow the Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán left-wing anti-American government in Guatemala in 1954. They have disagreed on the influence of the United Fruit Company, the potential role of Soviet influence, and the degree to which American officials simply misinterpreted social reform for Soviet backing. Newly declassified [[Central Intelligence Agency]] documents show the United Fruit Company played no major role, that Soviet influence was minimal, and that the Eisenhower administration did not need to be forced into the action by any lobby groups.<ref>Stephen M. Streeter, "Interpreting the 1954 U.S. Intervention in Guatemala: Realist, Revisionist, and Postrevisionist Perspectives." ''History Teacher'' (2000) 34(1): 61-74. Issn: 0018-2745 Fulltext: [[History Cooperative]] and [[http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0018-2745(200011)34%3A1%3C61%3AIT1UII%3E2.0.CO%3B2-T Jstor]] </ref> |
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| | + | ===Second term=== |
| | + | ====Reelection 1956==== |
| | + | =====Heart attack===== |
| | + | Eisenhower suffered a heart attack in 1955. In response he learned to control his hot temper, maintain his proper weight; stop smoking cigarettes; measure his blood pressure and blood cholesterol levels; manage anxiety, depression, and fear; and handle worry and stress. He learned to recognize skipped heart beats, too rapid pulses, and the need for the occasional use of nitroglycerin.<ref> Clarence G. Lasby, ''Eisenhower's Heart Attack: How Ike Beat Heart Disease and Held on to the Presidency.'' (1997)</ref> |
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| | + | Ike’s chief cardiologist, Dr. Paul Dudley White, declared in February 1956 that there was no medical reason why Eisenhower could not serve another term. These reports reassured the public, but new concern arose in June when Eisenhower had to undergo emergency abdominal surgery because of an ileitis attack. Although the President recovered fully and quickly, many voters wondered whether Eisenhower could withstand the rigors of a second term. Eisenhower had told close friends that he hoped to retire after a single term, because of his age (66), his desire for the emergence of new leadership in the GOP, and his conviction that he had performed his duty to his country. Yet after his heart attack Eisenhower could not think of a single Republican in whom he had confidence who could win the presidency. He doubted whether Nixon was ready enough for the presidency. Such ruminations persuaded Eisenhower by the beginning of 1956 that there really was no alternative to his running again to guarantee the nation's well-being. |
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| | + | =====Ike's campaign===== |
| | + | Ike worried that Nixon might be a political liability, but across the land Republican regulars loved Nixon's strident, partisan rhetoric. Nixon refused to take a cabinet post and Eisenhower could not dump him. At the San Francisco convention the delegates chose Nixon with only one dissenting vote. |
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| | + | At the beginning of the campaign, two-thirds of the voters approved of Eisenhower's performance in office. Eisenhower's high standing was based on peace and prosperity--securing an armistice in the Korean War, meeting with Soviet leaders at Geneva in 1955 in the first East-West summit conference since 1945, avoiding war in Vietnam, and presiding over a robust economy and a complacent society. Eisenhower was eager to run on this record; his campaign slogan was "Peace, Prosperity, and Progress." |
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| | + | =====Stevenson again===== |
| | + | Stevenson, a weak campaigner lacking Ike’s charisma, was the Democratic front runner because no senior Democrat wanted to be run over by the Eisenhower Express. His only major opponent was Senator [[Estes Kefauver]] of Tennessee, whose progressive views on civil rights and crusading investigations of organized crime had made him popular with liberals, reformers, and those weary of politics as usual. Kefauver won in New Hampshire on 13 March and a week later pulled off a stunning upset in Minnesota. The two men debated on 21 May, the first nationally televised presidential debate. Stevenson won narrowly in the Florida primary and then won a landslide victory in California that proved decisive. The delegates voted for Kefauver over [[John F. Kennedy]] as the vice presidential nominee. |
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| | + | Stevenson found it impossible to dent the President's enormous popularity, even when warning about Ike’s dubious health (in fact Eisenhower, who was ten years older, outlived Stevenson). He criticized Eisenhower for using nuclear fears to keep the peace, settling for prosperity that excluded many farmers and small businessmen, and exulting in "progress" that forced children to endure a shortage of schools and teachers. Stevenson, a conservative on racial issues, ignored civil rights, as did Eisenhower. Stevenson ridiculed Eisenhower for narrow, weak, and even indolent leadership, quipping that the President devoted more energy to his golf game than to driving important legislation through Congress. Stevenson offered spending proposals to raise the quality of life by providing federal aid for educational programs, medical research, economic development of depressed areas, and health care for the elderly. Few voters paid attention. |
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| | + | Stevenson blundered by calling for suspension of nuclear testing and termination of the draft: he thereby highlighted defense issues that were Eisenhower's long suit. Stevenson argued that neither reform would weaken national defense. The American nuclear arsenal could already obliterate the Soviet Union many times over and so there was no need to poison the atmosphere with nuclear fallout; a switch from conscription to an all-volunteer force would result in longer terms of service and improved readiness in armed forces dependent on ever more sophisticated military technology. Stevenson advocated both proposals because he thought they were right rather than politically popular, but he never imagined how badly they would backfire. Eisenhower firmly replied that the United States could not maintain adequate military forces without a draft. Three weeks before the election the Soviet Premier endorsed Stevenson’s test ban; it was a kiss of death. Nixon condemned Stevenson as an appeaser, while Eisenhower, a five-star general, scorned his challenger for injecting a delicate international issue into the campaign. |
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| | + | World crises erupted in the Suez and Hungary in the final days of the campaign. When Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, Britain, France, and Israel launched a coordinated, surprise military attack to seize the canal, without consulting Washington. Eisenhower insisted on a cease-fire that humiliated the British and French. Meanwhile the Soviets sent 200,000 troops to break the Hungarian freedom movement. Eisenhower condemned the Soviet invasion, but there was nothing he could do to stop it. Stevenson, with scant experience in world affairs had no alternative policy, as the nation rallied behind the world leader in the White House.<ref> John Barlow Martin, ''Adlai Stevenson and the World'' (1977)</ref> |
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| | + | =====Landslide again===== |
| | + | On election day, Eisenhower won a landslide victory, with a plurality of almost ten million votes with 57.6% of the popular vote, a gain of 2.5%, and carried 41 states with 457 to 73 electoral votes. The Democrats held most of the Solid South, but little else as cities, suburbs, and farms and nearly every major social and economic group rallied to Ike. However it was a personal triumph with short coattails, for Eisenhower was the first winner since 1848 to see his party lose both houses of Congress. The election of 1956 was an individual victory for Eisenhower, a resounding vote of confidence in one of the most popular Presidents in American history. In 1958, however, the country was suffering a sharp recession, intensified by major strikes. The Democrats won a sweeping landslide to control large majorities in Congress. |
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| | + | ====Sputnik 1957==== |
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| | + | The surprise launch of Sputnik, the the first satellite around the earth by the Soviets in 1957 caused a major crisis and a rethinking of national goals in missile technology and science education generally. Eisenhower set up a civilian agency, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to carry out a highly publicized program of space exploration that would counteract the Soviet success. Five interest groups pressed Eisenhower for more aggressive action: a loose federation of physicists and astronomers interested in advancing basic research; the Pentagon, which wanted to use NASA's scientific discoveries to understand Soviet threats; engineering corporations who foresaw a large aerospace industry; space flight enthusiasts eager to pursue exploration beyond atmosphere; and politicians who wanted to restore national prestige.<ref>Roger D. Launius, "Eisenhower, Sputnik, and the Creation of NASA." ''Prologue'' (1996) 28(2): 126-143. Issn: 0033-1031 </ref> |
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| | + | The Air Force reacted to Sputnik by developing a series of new bomber systems to keep pace with new missile systems, notably air-to-surface missiles, the B-52, and the B-70. Eisenhower vacillated on the B-70, and John F. Kennedy later canceled the program because it was technically questionable and too expensive.<ref>Peter J. Roman, "Strategic Bombers over the Missile Horizon, 1957-1963." ''Journal of Strategic Studies'' (1995) 18(1): 198-236. Issn: 0140-2390 </ref> |
| | + | ====Interstate Highways==== |
| | + | Eisenhower proposed a federal highway system in 1955, but Congress rejected it because of financing issues. The multiple interests groups came together in 1956 to pass the Federal Interstate Defense Highway Act, also known as the National Highway Act.<ref> The "defense" part was essential to get funding. It provided for fast military movement and allowed the evacuation of cities after an attack or natural disaster. Mark H. Rose, ''Interstate: Express Highway Politics 1941-1956'' (1979) |
| | + | </ref> The federal government paid 90% of the cost, which was passed along to users as the new Highway Trust Fund collected new taxes on fuels, tires, and vehicles to achieve pay-as-you-go funding. The 42,000-mile interstate highway system, largely completed in 25 years, integrated the nation into a single transportation system. Truckers saved enormous amounts on fuel and travel time, which reduced shipping costs and led to large-scale productivity gains, while driving another nail in the railroad coffin. Passenger traffic soared, opening up new horizons for vacations and job searches, and new ways for extended families to come together. Much of the traffic was short-distance, as the interstates opened up the outer suburbs around all major cities. The U.S. already had the world's best road system; the interstates made another quantum leap in the most modern transportation system in the world. Eisenhower is given the credit for the Interstate Highway System<ref>[http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/programadmin/interstate.html see source]</ref>. |
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| | + | ====Farewell address==== |
| | + | Eisenhower's farewell address on 17 January 1961 warned the nation against depending on an economy that was based on a military-industrial complex. Written by political scientist Malcolm Moos with help from brother Milton Eisenhower, the speech echoed the president's conviction that wars must be made obsolete. While he believed that the Soviet threat was being exaggerated, President Eisenhower argued for sufficiency, not superiority. The "military industrial complex" became a slogan used by the New Left in the 1960s to attack American capitalism, and became a standard ingredient of Soviet propaganda. Most Americans, however, ignored it.<ref>Douglas Brinkley, "Eisenhower the Dove." ''American Heritage'' (2001) 52(6): 58-63, 65. Issn: 0002-8738 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]] </ref> |
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| | + | ==Legacy== |
| | + | Eisenhower's legacy was victory in wartime, prosperity and peace afterwards. He was totally committed to the [[Republicanism, U.S.|core republican values]] of civic duty and common sacrifice. Throughout the war he called for voluntary self-restraint and obedience to duty, which he called the first tenet of his religion. His apocalyptic view of World War II was based on a dualism that pitted the selfish against the selfless. He saw the war largely as a spiritual struggle within the Allied camp between these two forces. Civilians as well as soldiers were exhorted to sacrifice personal interests for the sake of total mobilization, which meant exercising the virtue of selflessness. He interpreted fascism as a manifestation of selfishness and social disorder. As a soldier, his legacy includes common sense, caution, exhaustive planning, collaboration with allies, superb diplomatic timing, avoidance of casualties, and respect for the common soldier. As president his legacy was moderation, a sense of inclusiveness, a rejection of fear and paranoia, dedication to selecting the best experts, a disdain for partisanship, a commitment to entrepreneurial freedom, an abhorrence for war, a love of democracy. and a long-term sense of national greatness. <ref>: Ira Chernus, "Eisenhower's Ideology in World War II," ''Armed Forces & Society'' (1997) 23(4): 595-613; Stephen E. Ambrose, "Eisenhower's Legacy," ''Prologue'' (1994) 26 (Special Issue): 160-167. ISSN: 0033-1031 </ref> |
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| | + | The "Eisenhower Era", 1953-1963, marked a decade of peace and prosperity, with an end to the bitter conflicts regarding class and ideology that marked the 1940s, and before the even more violent and bitter years of the 1960s. People look back with nostalgia, and gratitude for the man who kept the peace and quiet. |
| | + | ===Eisenhower Library=== |
| | + | Opened in 1966, the Dwight D. Eisenhower presidential library at Abilene, Kansas, houses Eisenhower's presidential papers, collections of papers of 350 of his associates, and records of White House agencies that functioned during his presidency. The library also holds photographs, motion picture films, and Eisenhower memorabilia, and sponsors meetings of scholars to discuss Einsehower and his era. |
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| | ==Second Term== | | ==Second Term== |