| Line 72: |
Line 72: |
| | ===Low Level Photography=== | | ===Low Level Photography=== |
| | Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis. | | Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis. |
| − | ==Missiles== | + | ==Strategic balance== |
| | At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more. | | At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more. |
| | | | |
| − | ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army [[division]]s (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 [[nuclear weapon|nuclear warheads]] were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref> | + | ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killedd and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref> |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| Line 81: |
Line 81: |
| | [[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]] | | [[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]] |
| | ==Naval Quarantine== | | ==Naval Quarantine== |
| − | On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate. | + | On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate. |
| | | | |
| − | In analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, it has been said that the quarantine was meant to be a form of communication, rather than a method of eliminating the missiles, as enough had already been delivered as to cause concern to the United States.
| |
| | | | |
| − | ==Adlai Stevenson, and The United Nations== | + | ==The United Nations== |
| − | During the Cuban Missile Crisis, the [[United States]] made efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]].
| + | The U.S. made vigorous efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]]. For example, UN amabassador [[Adlai Stevenson]] confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin, and publicly showed the U-2 photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist. |
| − | | |
| − | During the heat of the Crisis, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin in the United Nations, with the following statement:
| |
| − | | |
| − | <blockquote>
| |
| − | "Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium- and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba?... Don't wait for the translation! Yes or no?" Zorin responded, "I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and I do not wish to answer a question put to me in the manner in which a prosecutor does-" Stevenson interrupted and said, "You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer yes or no. You have denied that they exist, and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.... I am prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over, if that's your decision. And I am also prepared to present the evidence in this room."
| |
| − | <ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/people/a_stevenson.html</ref></blockquote>
| |
| − | The United States followed up by publicly showing the [[U-2]] photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.
| |
| | | | |
| | ==Soviet Missiles in Cuba== | | ==Soviet Missiles in Cuba== |
| | [[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]] | | [[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]] |
| − | Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.<ref name="thinkquest">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/recon_room.html</ref>
| + | The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States. U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States. |
| − | | |
| − | However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.<ref name="thinkquest"/>
| |
| | | | |
| | Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref> | | Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref> |
| | | | |
| − | ==U-2 Shot Down==
| |
| − | [[Image:R_Anderson.jpg|thumb|185px|Major Rudolph Anderson.]]
| |
| − | Despite the fact that negotiations between both countries didn’t appear to be favorable, and that missiles were becoming extremely close to being active, there was no advancement by either party, for a time. On October 27, 1962, Major Rudolph Anderson began a routine U-2 photographic mission over Cuba. Similar missions had been flown successfully in the past few days, without any unusual activity. This time however, a Soviet SA-2 SAM Site fired upon Maj. Anderson, destroying the aircraft.
| |
| − |
| |
| − | When word reached Washington D.C., many on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. No action was taken due to President Kennedy's expressed desire to wait and communicate with the Soviet government. This incident was a dangerous move in the crisis, which caused additional difficulties in negotiations between countries.
| |
| | | | |
| − | (Note: Different sources have printed that [[Fidel Castro]] had been the individual to launch upon Major Anderson, but these rumors have been dismissed by many US government officials of that time. It is most likely that the decision was made by the Soviet Commander located in Cuba, though the justification is not fully known.)
| + | On October 27, 1962, a U-2 photographic mission over Cuba was shot down by a Soviet SA-2 SAM missile. Some on the ExComm called for air strikes upon that SAM site, or further military action. Kennedy decided to wait. |
| | | | |
| − | ==Final Negotiations== | + | ==Jupiters in Turkey== |
| | | | |
| − | The [[United States]] had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the [[United States Air Force]] would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between [[Washington D.C.]] and [[Moscow]], the United States prepared it's final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] payed a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref> | + | The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the ssiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ==Soviet military doctrine== | | ==Soviet military doctrine== |