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Line 100: − ==Soviet military doctrine== − In the post-[[Stalin]] era, the [[Soviet military]] regained ascendancy in the [[Communist]] ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the [[Politburo]] with the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]] (CPSU) and the [[KGB]]. The Soviet military is composed of five branches which includes the [[Strategic Rocket Forces]] who controlled [[nuclear weapons]]. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was delegated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened. − In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Soviet nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other [[NATO]] allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analogous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analogous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analogous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the [[Cold War]], both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.
→Soviet military doctrine
The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the ssiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>
The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the ssiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Attorney General [[Robert Kennedy]] paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington. As the discussion turned to the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]], both parties fully realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow. The next morning, a formal announcement of the removal of the missiles in Cuba was broadcast from Radio Moscow - The Soviets would remove their missiles from [[Cuba]]. Over the course of a few months after the agreement, the missiles were removed under U.N. and United States supervision. The Jupiter Missiles in Turkey followed some time afterwards. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.<ref>CNN Cold War: Vol. 4</ref>
==Further reading==
==Further reading==