Changes

*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''

*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''

*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''. See [http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm details]</ref>

*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''. See [http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm details]</ref>

Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Burgioni, ''Eyeball To Eyeball'' (1993)</ref>

===Photographic Interpretation===

===Photographic Interpretation===

After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

===Low Level Photography===

===Low Level Photography===

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.

==Strategic balance==

==Strategic balance==

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons  capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons  capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM).  

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killedd and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.  

ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army divisions (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties (killed and wounded) were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 nuclear warheads were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>

==Naval Quarantine==

==Naval Quarantine==

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered. The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around Cuba, to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.

==Soviet Missiles in Cuba==

===The United Nations===

[[Image:Ss-4_missile2.jpg|thumb|250px|A SS-4 Missile In Moscow. The SS-4 Was Later Placed In Cuba.]]

The U.S. made vigorous efforts to gain international support, through organizations such as the [[Organization of American States]], and the [[United Nations]]. For example, UN ambassador [[Adlai Stevenson]] confronted Soviet Ambassador Zorin, and publicly showed the U-2 photography for the first time, gaining international support in the process, while proving that the missiles did exist.

The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the [[SS-4]] "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington, Houston, and anywhere in the southeastern United States. U-2 photos installations of the [[SS-5]] "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,530 miles. With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking most of the United States.  

 

 

The United States had stated early in the crisis that if the missiles were not voluntarily removed, the Air Force would remove them through aerial attacks. As the time drew near to the last exchanges between Washington  Moscow, the United States prepared its final offer. Robert Kennedy paid a secret visit to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin regarding the Jupiter type NATO missiles stationed in [[Turkey]]; both realized that this may be the deciding factor in deciding the outcome of the crisis. Kennedy revealed that he had been authorized to agree to the removal of the missiles, but not under pressure or in any way a publicized quid pro quo manner. This could not be done publicly or unilaterally in order to comply with [[NATO]] agreements, as well as world opinion of both parties. Dobrynin and Kennedy agreed, and Dobrynin rushed off to get a message through to Moscow.

 

Eyeball to eyeball, Khrushchev blinked. He obeyed the quarantine/blockade, and on October 28 agreed to dismantle, crate and remove the missiles, and never to station offensive forces on the island. In return, Kennedy lifted the quarantine/blockade, secretly removed the Jupiters, and publicly promised the US would never invade Cuba (a promise still in effect).  

 

The Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dangerous point in postwar history; neither side wanted to escalate the conflict, but both realized that it could get out of control, especially if local commanders made some mistakes. Kennedy demonstrated firmness in crisis, and avoided serious losses in the midterm elections. Ignoring the military chain of command, he established the pattern of command-post micromanagement over military matters that [[Lyndon Johnson]] after 1964 expanded during the Vietnam war. Kennedy's refusal to consult Congress enhanced the "imperial presidency." Conservative Republicans, dissatisfied that Castro had escaped the noose, rallied behind Senator Barry Goldwater and editor William Buckley. They redirected the GOP to an aggressive rollback policy of the sort represented by the rejected invasion option. Realizing how close they had come to war, Kennedy and Khrushchev became much friendlier in public. They signed a test ban treaty that eliminated nuclear testing above ground or in space; the treaty was primarily designed to hobble China and other countries trying to build their first bombs. Defense of the US no longer relied on field armies, but on a triad of strategic forces: 1,054 land-based ICBMs, 650 submarine-based SLBMs, and 400 B-52 bombers.

 

The Kremlin vowed never again would Communism be humiliated by raw American nuclear superiority. Khrushchev was overthrown and replaced with a less volatile, more systematic hardliner, [[Leonid Brezhnev]] (1906-82). Russia built its own 10 submarines and SLBM, and speeded manufacture of ICBMs; by 1971 it had caught up with the US. The US response was to add multiple warheads (MIRV) to each missile; the number of strategic warheads thereby doubled from about 5,000 in the 1960s to about 10,000 after 1976.  

 

 

Kennedy's removal of the Jupiters in Turkey, and his refusal to consult with any allies during the crisis, raised doubts in Germany about America's commitment to Berlin, led France to pull its forces out of NATO, and ruined a proposed multilateral nuclear force. The Europeans, increasingly prosperous, felt sufficiently well protected. They were annoyed when Washington wanted them to assume a larger fraction of defense costs, yet never consulted in critical emergencies. The Western alliance survived, but had been sorely wounded.  

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying [[U-2]]. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.<ref>http://www.nasm.si.edu/research/dsh/artifacts/RM-SA2.htm</ref>

Castro, was now immune from an American invasion, though the dollar embargo continued. He kept taking Moscow's subsidies until 1992, but independently launched an adventuresome program of subverting pro-capitalist governments throughout Latin America and Africa. Tens of thousands of Cuban combat troops and military advisers  were sent shore up left-wing regimes as distant as Angola and Ethiopia, and as close as Nicaragua and Grenada. Hundreds of thousands of people would die in civil wars supported by Castro, and it would take the US three decades and tens of billions of dollars to finally (in 1992) neutralize his efforts.  

==Further reading==

===Lesson plans===

*[http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19890901faessay5980/ray-s-cline/commentary-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html The Cuban Missile Crisis], Ray S. Cline, ''Foreign Affairs'', Fall 1989.

* [http://edsitement.neh.gov/view_lesson_plan.asp?id=683  "The Missiles of October: The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962" by John Moser and Lori Hahn (2006) from NEH EdSitement], very detailed lesson for grades 9-12, with links to primary documents

*[http://books.google.com/books?id=okXQtbp3svcC&dq=thirteen+days+robert+kennedy Thirteen Days] - Robert F. Kennedy

* [http://future.state.gov/educators/lessons/cuba/ Cuban Missile Crisis, middle school lesson plan from US State Department]

==References==

==See also==

====notes====

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[[Category:Cold War]]

[[Category:Cold War]]