Changes

The explanation above is absolutely wrong.  No postmodernist has ever proposed that language keeps us from truth, as if language is some sort of screen that stands between ourselves and a determined Truth beyond language.  That model, in fact, is precisely the one that poststructuralism (to use a more precise, if less comprehensive term) has dismantled.

The explanation above is absolutely wrong.  No postmodernist has ever proposed that language keeps us from truth, as if language is some sort of screen that stands between ourselves and a determined Truth beyond language.  That model, in fact, is precisely the one that poststructuralism (to use a more precise, if less comprehensive term) has dismantled.

Poststructuralists don't deny that there is truth as opposed to falsehood.  The only thing they critique is the definition of Truth as something that exists as a determined ''iteration''.  There is a certain rhetoric that arises -- especially in relation to history and historiography -- where this mistake arises.  For instance: Most historians, like poststructuralists, agree that the reality of the past is a kind of material continuum that we, as speakers of language, divide up into conceptual units like "events"; and we take portions of that continuum and create discrete entities out of it by assigning those portions Names.  This is how history becomes intelligible to us: a historiographer creates a narrative out Names and Events (the latter, strictly speaking, function as names as well: the Name of the Event).

Poststructuralists don't deny that there is truth as opposed to falsehood.  The only thing they critique is the definition of Truth as something that exists as a determined ''iteration''.  There is a certain rhetoric that arises -- especially in relation to history and historiography -- where this mistake arises.  For instance: Most historians, like poststructuralists, agree that the reality of the past is a kind of material continuum that we, as speakers of language, divide up into conceptual units like "events"; and we take portions of that continuum and create discrete entities out of it by assigning those portions Names.  This is how history becomes intelligible to us: a historiographer creates a narrative out of Names and Events (the latter, strictly speaking, function as names as well: the Name of the Event).

Now: How do historians come to an agreement (more or less) about the Names and Events that will constitute a particular historical narrative?  Answer: they come to a consensus based on the greatest agreement of Names and Events as articulated in witness testimonials, other documents and other forms of evidence (e.g., archaeological).

Now, how do historians come to an agreement (more or less) about the Names and Events that will constitute a particular historical narrative?  Broadly speaking, they come to a consensus based on the greatest agreement of Names and Events as articulated in witness testimonials, other documents, and other forms of evidence (e.g., archaeological).

A crucial point to remember is that Names and Events are wholly distinct from everything else that goes into history-writing: most significantly: interpretations as to ''motives'' of individuals, and interpretations as to ''causal relationships'' among events.  Even the most conservative historian will tell you that these elements can only be the result of interpretation -- hopefully a judicious interpretation, but interpretation nonetheless.

A crucial point to remember is that Names and Events are wholly distinct from everything else that goes into history-writing: most significantly, interpretations as to ''motives'' of individuals, and interpretations as to ''causal relationships'' among events.  Even the most conservative historian will tell you that these elements can only be the result of interpretation -- hopefully a judicious interpretation, but interpretation nonetheless.

No historian ever claims that there exists "out there" somewhere a "true" historiography where all of these Facts (Names and Events) and interpretations are ''already iterated'' -- i.e., where they are iterated, but no human has created that iteration.  No historian believes that this kind of ''determined and iterated Truth'' exists.

No historian ever claims that there exists "out there" somewhere a "true" historiography where all of these Facts (Names and Events) and interpretations are ''already iterated'' -- i.e., where they are iterated, but no human has created that iteration.  No historian believes that this kind of ''determined and iterated Truth'' exists.