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→Background: Thank Mr. Carter for Ahmadinejad & Iranian nukes.
Since like many people, I don't have access to 1980s back-issues of the Washington Quarterly, can you quote a relevant passage so we can get an idea of what Michael Ledeen is alleging? --[[User:PF Fox|PF Fox]] 20:05, 28 March 2007 (EDT)
Since like many people, I don't have access to 1980s back-issues of the Washington Quarterly, can you quote a relevant passage so we can get an idea of what Michael Ledeen is alleging? --[[User:PF Fox|PF Fox]] 20:05, 28 March 2007 (EDT)
==Khomeini==
The Khomeini article has some links; Grinter, Dr. Lawrence E. [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1983/jan-feb/grinter.html ''Avoiding the Burden: The Carter Doctrine in Perspective''], Vol. XXXIV, No. 2, (January-February 1983): 73-82. Here's just some of the conclusion:
:'''''first and foremost, every administration must have a clear, consistent policy toward the Soviet Union'''''
:Perhaps the single most telling flaw in the Carter administration’s foreign policy was its lack of a clear, consistent policy toward the Soviet Union....Mr. Carter’s revelation after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan that the action had done more to educate him about real Soviet motives than anything else was an extraordinary statement for an incumbent American President to make....
:'''''the American government did not have adequate intelligence on Iran, its leadership, and the opposition'''''
:No other government but ours is to blame for our confusion about the situation in Iran. Executive and congressional branch confusion on Iran was, in part, a result of the hobbling of American intelligence services that began in 1974 during the Watergate affair. The dropping of area specialists from government service also played a role. The lesson: The intelligence curbs and the decline in area specialists during the 1970s went too far. Moreover, it is doubtful that the Iranian intelligence failure is an isolated case.
:'''''if a President repudiates his policies, there will be costs'''''
:Mr. Carter’s about-face on the Persian Gulf situation and the Soviet threat was forced on him by events. ...many of the officials that the President and his deputies appointed did not change their views. This seemed particularly true among the human rights advocates at State, CIA, and in the White House. ...
:'''''revolutions are nasty, unpredictable affairs; attempting to control or fine-tune them from the outside is risky'''''
:Once a revolution reaches a critical point, temporizing in support for a beleaguered government—or oscillating between supporting the government and dumping it—is probably a fatal practice. Trying to force a Third World government to reform when it is being gutted from within by a revolutionary totalitarian movement is a recipe for disaster. This, in essence, and after much uncertainty, is what the Carter administration’s approach toward Iran finally came down to. The lesson is applicable to a variety of Third World countries where the United States has critical interests.
Elsewhere this report says this,
:But the other side of the question involves why the attempt at regional containment embodied in the Carter Doctrine had to come ''after'' the collapse of Iran and ''after'' the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and whether, if it had been announced in 1977, it would have prevented the fall of the Shah and Soviet aggression.
But the elephant in the living room is this: (1) the democide of 1.8 million Aghanis ''after'' the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and (2) the crisis today of Iran pursueing [[nuclear weapons]] is a result of the loss of Iran as an ally in 1979. 20:29, 28 March 2007 (EDT)