Changes

===Operation Snow===

===Operation Snow===

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin_Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan. <ref>Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U. S. S. R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940] : Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948.</ref>  Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref> Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin_Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan.<ref>"The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to [Molotov] entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object." [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html#17 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, the Deputy People's Commissar, Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor of Embassy Hilger and Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters, on November 12, 1940]. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U. S. S. R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940] : Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948.</ref>  Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref> Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitali Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.