Changes

see [[Ukrainian Famine]]

see [[Ukrainian Famine]]

With [[Stalin]]'s change of course in the late 1920s, however, Moscow's toleration of Ukrainian national identity came to an end. Systematic state terror of the 1930s destroyed Ukraine's writers, artists, and intellectuals; the Communist Party of Ukraine was purged of its "nationalist deviationists"; and the peasantry was crushed by means of collectivization, resulting in the [[Great Famine]] or "Holodomor" (Голодомор) of 1932-1933, which claimed some 3-7 million lives as crops failed and remaining food wtocks were forcibly removed by the government. Stalin had full knowledge of the destructive force of the famine. It was a by-product of his war on the peasantry that began with collectivization and dekulakization and as an attempt to eradicate peasant culture in its entirety.  Ellman explains the causes for the excess deaths in rural areas of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan during 1931-34 by dividing the causes into three groups: objective nonpolicy-related factors, like the drought of 1931 and poor weather in 1932; inadvertent result of policies with other objectives, like rapid industrialization, socialization of livestock, and neglected crop rotation patterns; and deaths caused intentionally by a starvation policy. The Communist leadership perceived famine not as a humanitarian catastrophe but as a means of class struggle and used starvation as a punishment tool to teach peasants to work well in the collective farms.<ref>Michael Ellman, "The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934." ''Europe-Asia Studies'' 2005 57(6): 823-841. Issn: 0966-8136 Fulltext in [[Ebsco]]</ref>

With [[Stalin]]'s change of course in the late 1920s, however, Moscow's toleration of Ukrainian national identity came to an end. Systematic state terror of the 1930s destroyed Ukraine's writers, artists, and intellectuals; the Communist Party of Ukraine was purged of its "nationalist deviationists"; and the peasantry was crushed by means of collectivization, resulting in the [[Great Famine]] or "Holodomor" (Голодомор) of 1932-1933, which claimed some 3-7 million lives as crops failed and remaining food wtocks were forcibly removed by the government. Stalin had full knowledge of the destructive force of the famine. It was a by-product of his war on the peasantry that began with collectivization and dekulakization and as an attempt to eradicate peasant culture in its entirety.  Ellman explains the causes for the excess deaths in rural areas of Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan during 1931-34 by dividing the causes into three groups: objective nonpolicy-related factors, like the drought of 1931 and poor weather in 1932; inadvertent result of policies with other objectives, like rapid industrialization, socialization of livestock, and neglected crop rotation patterns; and deaths caused intentionally by a starvation policy. The Communist leadership perceived famine not as a humanitarian catastrophe but as a means of [[class struggle]] and used starvation as a punishment tool to teach peasants to work well in the collective farms.<ref>Michael Ellman, "The Role of Leadership Perceptions and of Intent in the Soviet Famine of 1931-1934." ''Europe-Asia Studies'' 2005 57(6): 823-841. Issn: 0966-8136 Fulltext in [[Ebsco]]</ref>

It was largely the same groups of individuals who were responsible for the mass killing operations during the civil war, collectivization, and the Great Terror. These groups were associated with Efim Georgievich Evdokimov (1891-1939) and operated in Ukraine during the civil war, in the North Caucasus in the 1920's, and in the Secret Operational Division within General State Political Administration (OGPU) in 1929-31. Evdokimov transferred into Communist Party administration in 1934, when he became Party secretary for North Caucasus Krai. But he appears to have continued advising Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Yezhov on security matters, and the latter relied on Evdokimov's former colleagues to carry out the mass killing operations that are known as the Great Terror in 1937-38.<ref> Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "Agency and Terror: Evdokimov and Mass Killing in Stalin's Great Terror." ''Australian Journal of Politics and History'' 2007 53(1): 20-43. Issn: 0004-9522  Fulltext in  [[Ebsco]]; Robert Conquest, ''The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine'' (1986). Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933" ''Slavic Review'', Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 70-89, notes the harvest was unusually poor. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-6779(199121)50%3A1%3C70%3AT1HATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H online in JSTOR]; R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, S. G. Wheatcroft, "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933," ''Slavic Review,'' Vol. 54, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 642-657 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-6779(199523)54%3A3%3C642%3ASGSATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7];  online in JSTOR]; Michael Ellman. "Stalin and the Soviet famine of 1932-33 Revisited," ''Europe-Asia Studies,'' Volume 59, Issue 4 June 2007 , pages 663-93.</ref>

It was largely the same groups of individuals who were responsible for the mass killing operations during the civil war, collectivization, and the Great Terror. These groups were associated with Efim Georgievich Evdokimov (1891-1939) and operated in Ukraine during the civil war, in the North Caucasus in the 1920's, and in the Secret Operational Division within General State Political Administration (OGPU) in 1929-31. Evdokimov transferred into Communist Party administration in 1934, when he became Party secretary for North Caucasus Krai. But he appears to have continued advising Joseph Stalin and Nikolai Yezhov on security matters, and the latter relied on Evdokimov's former colleagues to carry out the mass killing operations that are known as the Great Terror in 1937-38.<ref> Stephen G. Wheatcroft, "Agency and Terror: Evdokimov and Mass Killing in Stalin's Great Terror." ''Australian Journal of Politics and History'' 2007 53(1): 20-43. Issn: 0004-9522  Fulltext in  [[Ebsco]]; Robert Conquest, ''The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine'' (1986). Mark B. Tauger, "The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933" ''Slavic Review'', Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 70-89, notes the harvest was unusually poor. [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-6779(199121)50%3A1%3C70%3AT1HATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-H online in JSTOR]; R. W. Davies, M. B. Tauger, S. G. Wheatcroft, "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-1933," ''Slavic Review,'' Vol. 54, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 642-657 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0037-6779(199523)54%3A3%3C642%3ASGSATF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-7];  online in JSTOR]; Michael Ellman. "Stalin and the Soviet famine of 1932-33 Revisited," ''Europe-Asia Studies,'' Volume 59, Issue 4 June 2007 , pages 663-93.</ref>