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perception of resistance and collaboration proved decisive not only to the military and diplomatic course of the war but also to the history of postwar Yugoslavia.<ref> Walter R. Roberts, ''Tito, Mihailović, and the allies, 1941-1945‎,'' (1987) [http://books.google.com/books?id=43CbLU8FgFsC&dq=intitle:Mihailovi%C4%87&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&num=30&as_brr=0 excerpt and text search]</ref>

perception of resistance and collaboration proved decisive not only to the military and diplomatic course of the war but also to the history of postwar Yugoslavia.<ref> Walter R. Roberts, ''Tito, Mihailović, and the allies, 1941-1945‎,'' (1987) [http://books.google.com/books?id=43CbLU8FgFsC&dq=intitle:Mihailovi%C4%87&lr=&as_drrb_is=q&as_minm_is=0&as_miny_is=&as_maxm_is=0&as_maxy_is=&num=30&as_brr=0 excerpt and text search]</ref>

   

   

All parties assumed—falsely—that sooner or later the Allies would invade.  Many optimistic plans were based on the assumption of Western Allied support, and on its magical power to put everything right. Historians are unsure why there was such universal faith among all parties in Allied invasion or intervention. Was it Nazi disinformation? Faulty intelligence? Wishful thinking? Or a combination of all three? Meanwhile there was an exiled royal government in London sponsored by Churchill.  

All parties assumed—falsely—that sooner or later the Allies would invade.  Many optimistic plans were based on the assumption of Western Allied support, and on its magical power to put everything right. Historians are unsure why there was such universal faith among all parties in Allied invasion or intervention. Was it Nazi disinformation? Faulty intelligence? [[Wishful thinking]]? Or a combination of all three? Meanwhile there was an exiled royal government in London sponsored by Churchill.  

Besides receiving British aid, Mihailović served as war minister of the royalist government and chief of Supreme Command Staff in the homeland. But the Allies, the exiled government, and even young King Peter II eventually concluded (not without reason) that the Communist partisans were the only ones effectively resisting the Axis and transferred their support to Tito during 1944.

Besides receiving British aid, Mihailović served as war minister of the royalist government and chief of Supreme Command Staff in the homeland. But the Allies, the exiled government, and even young King Peter II eventually concluded (not without reason) that the Communist partisans were the only ones effectively resisting the Axis and transferred their support to Tito during 1944.