Cuban Missile Crisis

Overview

The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the climactic points of the Cold War. Tension had been building between the Soviet Union, and The United States. The USSR had been giving aid to the Cubans, who in turn were prepared to allow the Soviet Union to place nuclear missiles on their island. While the entire crisis lasted much longer, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.

Photography

An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.

At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the United States in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM) range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the U-2, or Utility 2.

New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributers of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.

Photographic Interpretation

After a U-2 Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the CIA was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.

ExComm

The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.

The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The Excomm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.

Overall, the Excomm was composed of 22 members including:

• George W.Ball, Under Secretary of State
• Charles "Chip" Bohlen, Former Ambassador to the Soviet Union; left ExComm to become Ambassador to France
• McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury
• William C. Foster, Head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
• Roswell Gilpatrick, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, State Department
• Lyndon B. Johnson, Vice President
• John F. Kennedy, President
• Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General
• Edwin M. Martin, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, State Department
• John A. McCone, Director - Central Intelligence Agency
• Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of Defense
• Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
• Kenneth O'Donnell, Special Assistant to the President
• Dean Rusk, Secretary of State
• Bramley Smith, Executive Secretary
• Theodore C. Sorensen, Special Counsel to the President
• Adlai E. Stevenson, United States Ambassador to the United Nations
• Maxwell D. Taylor, Military Advisor to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Llewellyn E. Thompson, United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union
• Donald Wilson, Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency

Soviet Missiles in Cuba

Using various techniques, the photo interpreters were able to provide specific measurements on the size of the missiles, which could be matched with other information gathered by the United Sates intelligence force. The first type of missile discovered in Cuba was found to be the SS-4 "Sandal". The SS-4 was a MRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 1,100 Nautical Miles (1,265 Miles). The SS-4 itself was capable of striking primary targets such as Washington D.C., Houston, TX, and practically anywhere in the southeastern United States.

However, further dangers would develop. Soon after these missiles were discovered, U-2 flights uncovered installations of the SS-5 "Skean", a IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capable of delivering a nuclear warhead up to 2,200 Nautical Miles (2,530 Miles). With installations of the SS-5, the Soviet Union had the capability of striking anywhere in the United States, with the exception of the area around Seattle, WA.

Further complications were added to the crisis by the placement of SA-2 missiles, the SA-2 a SAM or Surface-To-Air-Missile. These missiles had the ability to shoot down any aircraft, even the high flying U-2. When operational, these sites would pose a great danger to the photographic missions, necessary for the United States to keep informed on the crisis.

Soviet military doctrine

In the post-Stalin era, the Soviet military regained ascendancy in the Communist ideal of collective leadership as an equal partner in the Politburo with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the KGB. The Soviet military is constitued of five branches which includes the Strategic Rocket Forces who controlled nuclear weapons. Contrary to long held misperceptions in America, CPSU General Secretary Khrushchev was not the final decision making with the power and authority to launch a nuclear strike against the United States from Cuba. The role of the General Secretary of the CPSU was not analogous to the powers and authority of the President of the United States, and under Soviet military doctrine the decision to launch a nuclear attack was deleagated to military commanders who, in their estimation, could authorize a strike if they felt threatened.

In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the decision for a Societ nuclear strike upon the continental United States had been delegated from Moscow military commanders, to the commander in the field in Cuba. This fact, or misperception in the United States, was never fully understood or disclosed by American media outlets, who simply did not understand that the Soviet military was not subordinated to the civilian authority, as is the tradition in the United States and other NATO allies. Media sources frequently portrayed internal Soviet political realities as analagous to the US, maintaining the Soviet Premier had final decision making power in all matters, foreign policy and military, like the President of the United States had. And that the Politburo itself functioned rather analagous to the American President's cabinet, where in reality, it constituted a political power analagous to all three branches of the United States, Executive, Legislative, and Judicial. This misreporting lead to many common misunderstandings and miscalculations throughout the Cold War, both in times of crisis, and in times of peaceful negotiations.

Further reading

• The Cuban Missile Crisis, Ray S. Cline, Foreign Affairs, Fall 1989.
• Thirteen Days - Robert F. Kennedy
• Eyeball To Eyeball - Dino Brugioni