Difference between revisions of "Hypersonic missile"
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==Combat testing== | ==Combat testing== | ||
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[[File:Hypersonic missile attack.jpg|right|350px|thumb|Aftermath of a Kinshal hypersonic missile attack on [[NATO]] [[mercenary]] training and command center at [[Yavoriv]], March 12, 2022]] | [[File:Hypersonic missile attack.jpg|right|350px|thumb|Aftermath of a Kinshal hypersonic missile attack on [[NATO]] [[mercenary]] training and command center at [[Yavoriv]], March 12, 2022]] | ||
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Shortly after the commencement of Russia's [[Special Military Operation]] in 2022, [[Russian Armed Forces]] fired the first of many hypersonic missiles at a Concentration Center in the northwest of [[Ukraine]], killing and dismembering some hundreds of Ukrainian and foreign soldiers and [[mercenaries]]. Since then, there have been many uses of the many variants of Russian hypersonic missiles across the Ukraine, including Deep Earth Penetrators to kill [[Ukrainian]], [[NATO]] and [[British]] officers and staff and destroy their deep underground bunker complexes. U.S. military sources acknowledge the successful fielding of Russian hypersonics, such performance that cannot be intercepted by U.S. [[Anti-Missile System]]s as "eye watering."<ref>[https://les7eb.substack.com/i/166442652/hypersonic-myths-hypersonic-realities Hypersonic Myths, Hypersonic Realities], 2025.les7eb.substack.com</ref> | Shortly after the commencement of Russia's [[Special Military Operation]] in 2022, [[Russian Armed Forces]] fired the first of many hypersonic missiles at a Concentration Center in the northwest of [[Ukraine]], killing and dismembering some hundreds of Ukrainian and foreign soldiers and [[mercenaries]]. Since then, there have been many uses of the many variants of Russian hypersonic missiles across the Ukraine, including Deep Earth Penetrators to kill [[Ukrainian]], [[NATO]] and [[British]] officers and staff and destroy their deep underground bunker complexes. U.S. military sources acknowledge the successful fielding of Russian hypersonics, such performance that cannot be intercepted by U.S. [[Anti-Missile System]]s as "eye watering."<ref>[https://les7eb.substack.com/i/166442652/hypersonic-myths-hypersonic-realities Hypersonic Myths, Hypersonic Realities], 2025.les7eb.substack.com</ref> | ||
Revision as of 20:33, July 6, 2025
A hypersonic missile travels at extremely high speech, typically at Mach 5 (five times the speed of sound, 3,800 mph) or greater, which makes them more difficult to shoot down with a missile defense system.
China, Russia and Iran have developed this technology. The Russian Kinzhal (Dagger) is the most famous combat tested hypersonic missile. In the United States, former SpaceX employees founded Castelion, which is a for-profit private-sector company attempting to develop this advanced technology.[1]
Nomenclature
1. Hypersonic cruise missile
A surface-launched missile, which remains in the Earth's atmosphere for its entire hypersonic flight. It may ascend to stratospheric altitude during its flight, or it may fly at low level. There is only one surface-launched hypersonic cruise missile in current service worldwide, and that is the scramjet-powered 3M22 Zircon.
2. Aeroballistic hypersonic missile
An air-launched missile, which after separation from its launching aircraft, rises into a ballistic trajectory which may or may not leave Earth's atmosphere. Examples of such missiles are the Russian Kh-47M2 Kinzhal, the Kh-22/32. There exist aeroballistic missiles made by other countries however none are true hypersonic weapons, and none have more than a small fraction of the payload of the above-mentioned Russian systems.
3. Hypersonic Glide Vehicle (HGV)
A system where a ballistic missile releases a MaRV (Maneuverable Reentry Vehicle), which does not follow a pure ballistic trajectory once it exits the atmosphere. Instead, the MaRV uses both rocket motors and aerodynamic forces to follow an unpredictable flight path at the very edge of the upper atmosphere.
HGVs have the following advantages:
a) much greater range for a given size of booster - as its name suggests, the HGV "glides" on top of the atmosphere using a sustainer rocket, maintaining altitude without losing speed. This allows the missile to use a much flatter and more efficient trajectory.
b) Less time to target - the flatter trajectory simply means less distance to travel, therefore less time is spent compared to the unpowered exoatmospheric coasting phase of traditional ballistic missiles.
c) Better survivability - The flight path of HGVs, in particular their ability to maneuver into and out of space, makes them extremely difficult to target using even the most sophisticated exoatmospheric ABMs such as the US THAAD, Israeli Arrow-2, or Russian S-400 and S-500. This is because these systems were designed to release an exoatmospheric kill vehicle which engages passive, non-maneuverable targets coasting on a predictable, computable ballistic trajectory in space. The flight envelope of current generation exoatmospheric kill vehicles does not allow them to reliably engage HGVs.
The only country in the world which has proven stockpiles of HGV weapons, is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which fields missiles such as the Kheybar Shekan.
Combat testing
- See also: NATO war in Ukraine
Shortly after the commencement of Russia's Special Military Operation in 2022, Russian Armed Forces fired the first of many hypersonic missiles at a Concentration Center in the northwest of Ukraine, killing and dismembering some hundreds of Ukrainian and foreign soldiers and mercenaries. Since then, there have been many uses of the many variants of Russian hypersonic missiles across the Ukraine, including Deep Earth Penetrators to kill Ukrainian, NATO and British officers and staff and destroy their deep underground bunker complexes. U.S. military sources acknowledge the successful fielding of Russian hypersonics, such performance that cannot be intercepted by U.S. Anti-Missile Systems as "eye watering."[2]
Ukraine Ministry of Defense claims a 25% interception rate for Russian hypersonic Kinzhal and Zircon missiles, but Ukrainian sources also indicate such interceptions require salvo firing all 32 launchers in a US-style Patriot missile battery to have any chance to shoot down a single hypersonic missile.