| Line 33: |
Line 33: |
| | *Nixon v. United States (found nonjusticiability, and addressed an argument about the "except in Cases of Impeachment") | | *Nixon v. United States (found nonjusticiability, and addressed an argument about the "except in Cases of Impeachment") |
| | *Office of Pers. Management v. Richmond (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) for the precedent that the pardon power does not extend to an order to repay the US Treasury) | | *Office of Pers. Management v. Richmond (citing Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877) for the precedent that the pardon power does not extend to an order to repay the US Treasury) |
| | + | === Chief Justice Marshall === |
| | + | *''Herrera v. Collins'', 506 U.S. 390, 412-14 (1993) stated as follows: |
| | + | |
| | + | Our Constitution adopts the British model and gives to the President the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States." Art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-161 (1833), Chief Justice Marshall expounded on the President's pardon power: |
| | + | |
| | + | <blockquote>"As this power had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial institutions ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles respecting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used by the person who would avail himself of it. |
| | + | |
| | + | "A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the [***225] laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case, of which he is not informed judicially. A private deed, not communicated to him, whatever may be its character, whether a pardon or release, is totally unknown and cannot be acted on. [****40] The looseness which would be introduced into judicial proceedings, would prove fatal to the great principles of justice, if the judge might notice and act upon facts not brought regularly into the cause. Such a proceeding, in ordinary cases, would subvert the best established principles, and overturn those rules which have been settled by the wisdom of ages."</blockquote> |
| | + | |
| | + | '''See also Ex parte Garland''', 71 U.S. 333, 4 Wall. 333, 380-381, 18 L. Ed. 366 (1867); The Federalist No. 74, pp. 447-449 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton) ("The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary severity that without an easy access to exceptions [*414] in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel"). |
| | === Indirectly related === | | === Indirectly related === |
| | *Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 275 (1998) (holding, in connection with state clemency proceedings, that “pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review” | | *Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 275 (1998) (holding, in connection with state clemency proceedings, that “pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for judicial review” |