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[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
 
[[Image:Kennedygryomykont8.jpg|right|thumb|325px|President Kennedy meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko at the White House.]]
The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' was one of the top climactic points of the [[Cold War]]. Tension had been building for some time between the Soviet Union, and The United States. Now, this tension had the potential to plummet the world into a nuclear war.
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The USSR -- which had agents in [[Cuba]] since the arrival of [[Fabio Grobart]], who arrived in the 1920s and was Stalin's man when the Moscow loyal Cuban communist party was founded a few years afterwards -- perceived that it was in their interest to support the Castro regime.  Expelled by the democratically elected Prio government (1948-1852) Grobart returned to Cuba in early 1959 at the request of Castro's new government and spent most of the rest of his life there; in later years [[Raul Castro]] would refer to him as El Maestro, the master. The Castro government, allowed the USSR to secretly place nuclear missiles on their island. The crisis lasted for months afterwards, the "Thirteen Days" of October 15-28 was the most intense period of the crisis.<ref>Robert F. Kennedy - Thirteen Days</ref>
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The '''Cuban Missile Crisis''' of October, 1962 was a critical point in the [[Cold War]]. American spy planes discovered the Soviets had installed missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba with enough range and power to destroy much of the southeastern U.S. President [[John F. Kennedy]] was advised to send in the military to take out the missiles, but instead demanded that Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] (1894-1971) remove them. A naval blockade around Cuba guaranteed no more missiles would enter. After a few tense days a compromise was reached. The Soviets publicly removed all the missiles, the U.S. promised never to invade Cuba, and (secretly) the U.S. removed similar American missiles that had recently been installed in Turkey, near the Soviet border.
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==Photography==
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The Cubans refer to the "October Crisis," while the Soviets called it "the Caribbean crisis." This naming highlights three different views: (1) The Cubans see this as one of many crises; (2) The Soviets view it as a confrontation that took place in the Caribbean (thus deemphasizing Cuba's importance); and (3) the United States perceives this as a multidimensional time bomb with international consequences including the future of Berlin.<ref>James G. Blight and Philip Brenner, ''Sad and Luminous Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers After the Missile Crisis'' (2002) pp. 247-8 </ref>
[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
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==Origins==
Many reports of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  At the time, satellite technology was in its infancy. The satellites in orbit were few, as well as incapable of aiding the [[United States]] in resolving the conflict. Photography was found to be helpful in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.
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Frustrated by the rearmament of West Germany and the success of NATO, the Kremlin concocted a new strategy in the early 1960s in its quest to help capitalism self-destruct: encourage civil wars of "national liberation" in the third world. The Communist logic, following Lenin, was that the economic health of capitalism depended on its exploitation of the wealth of the Third World. Without that exploitation capitalism would finally collapse. Russia would give military and diplomatic support to anti-colonial, anti-capitalist pro- Communist movements. The new slogan of the left across the globe was that America--run by and for the benefit of giant corporations--had succeeded fascism as most dangerous agent of imperialism. Moscow's recent break with Beijing meant that it had to compete for influence among leftists: the winner would be the one seen as more anti-American. Third world proxy operations appeared to be much cheaper and safer than direct confrontation with [[NATO]].  
 
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==Cuba==
New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>
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Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]]'s first important opportunity to employ the strategy came in 1962, when the US seemed on the verge of rolling back the first pro-Communist regime in the Western Hemisphere, Cuba. [[Fidel Castro]] rubbed Americans the wrong way. In the first months after the bearded guerrilla captain came to power in 1959, Washington was willing to overlook reports that he was a true Marxist-Leninist, not merely some agrarian reformer. By 1960 Cuba had become a Soviet satellite; presidents [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] planned and President [[John F. Kennedy]] ordered the CIA to destabilize his regime. In April, 1961, 1,400 Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs, expecting the populace would rise up and throw out Castro's dictatorship. The exiles were armed, trained and directed by the CIA. Kennedy allowed the CIA to make one attack on Castro's small air force, but inexplicably canceled the necessary second strike. The invasion immediately came to grief; the exiles became prisoners (later they were ransomed in exchange for medicines.) Embarrassed, Kennedy cut off dollar trade with Cuba, while the CIA stepped up its sabotage; rumors abounded about a new invasion, this time by the Marines. The rumors were in fact disinformation designed to frighten and weaken Castro. The economic blockade tightened.
 
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==Photographic Interpretation==
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After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.
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==Low Level Photography==
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As a loyal Democrat who had learned the "lesson" of Korea, Kennedy believed in the [[containment]] strategy, and rejected [[rollback]]. Furthermore the Bay of Pigs fiasco had taught the young president a bitter lesson: no matter how much he personally empathized with the sufferings of the Cuban people (who were fellow Catholics), he needed to act in terms of a cold-blooded analysis of the American national interest. The CIA threats were not a prelude to rollback but a substitute.  
Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.
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==ExComm==
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[[Image:Cuba62a.jpg|thumb|300px|Possible range of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba]]
[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
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==Havana and Moscow==
The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. In one instance, several members crowded into one car, in order to avoid suspicion.
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===Military aid===
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Since 1960 the Soviets had sent over $250 million worth of war matériel to Cuba, including 394 tanks and self-propelled weapons, 888 automatic and antiaircraft guns, 41 warplanes, 13 ships, 13 radio locators, 308 radio sets, and 3,619 trucks and tractors. The Soviets also provided technical training for Cuban crews including 300 crews for tanks and self-propelled weapons, 130 crews for artillery batteries, 20 crews of defensive artillery batteries, 42 pilots for the MiG-15, and 5 pilots for the fighter MiG-19A. Another 107 Cuban pilots and 618 sailors had been trained in Soviet military schools; meanwhile, 178 Cuban military specialists—including 62 pilots, 55 tankers, and 61 artillery technicians—had been trained in Czechoslovakia. Obviously it was far too little to defeat an American invasion that seemed imminent.<ref>Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, ''One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964.'' (1997) p. 166. </ref>
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Overall, the ExComm was composed of 22 members including:
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===Sending nuclear weapons===
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Havana and Moscow, however, were fearful. Without consulting his strategists, Khrushchev personally concocted a reckless scheme; Cuban leaders, terrified for their own safety, eagerly accepted it. The weapons were to remain under Soviet, not Cuban, control.  [[Fidel Castro]] rejected warnings that acceptance of the missiles would make Cuba a helpless pawn of the Kremlin, and he ordered his intelligence agencies to stop studying the matter.<ref> James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, eds.''Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis'' (1998) [http://books.google.com/books?id=aIN7NEKcC-EC&pg=PA134&lpg=PA134&dq=mccone+sam+cuba+kennedy&source=web&ots=mWfsqJuM8s&sig=XSxFaghUc4IQHSUVsNaVmJ6Q3vk&hl=en#PPA141,M1 online p. 141]</ref> Beginning in July, 1962, Khrushchev sent in 70 ships loaded with a billion dollars' worth of munitions--including 42 IL-28 nuclear bombers (without the bombs), 24 surface-to-air anti-aircraft missile complexes [SAM], and 42,000 troops. Most ominously, he delivered 42 medium-range (1100 mile) SS-4 ballistic missiles (MRBMs) with nuclear warheads, and began loading 24 intermediate-range (2200 miles) SS-5 IRBMs. They could hurl H-bombs to any target from Washington to the Panama Canal. Besides deterring an invasion, they would help redress NATO's lead in strategic weapons; above all the missiles on America's doorstep would enhance Soviet prestige across the world.
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==Intelligence failure and response==
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Kennedy believed Soviet assurances that there were no missiles--and warned Moscow there had better be none. A breakdown in data gathering prevented the CIA from convincingly refuting Moscow's cover story. An off-year election campaign was underway, and the White House loudly denied charges by Republican Senator Kenneth Keating from New York that the Soviets were installing nuclear weapons in Cuba to threaten the U.S. and Kennedy was covering it up.<ref>Keating's correct information came from dissident Cubans. Max Holland, "A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 1.3 (1999) 139-167 in [[Project Muse]]</ref>
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The missiles were discovered by a lone U-2 reconnaissance plane on October 14. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable.<ref>The ExComm, or Executive Committee, was the group of government officials whose office or relationship directly played a part in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The ExComm investigated new information, and thought out all possible options, for President Kennedy to consider. The ExComm met at unusual times and in unusual manners in order to keep the situation secret for the time being. The ExComm was composed of 22 members including:
    
*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
 
*George W.Ball'', Under Secretary of State''
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*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
 
*Maxwell D. Taylor'', Military Adviser to the President and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff''
 
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
 
*Llewellyn E. Thompson'', United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union''
*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''
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*Donald Wilson'', Deputy Director - U.S. Information Agency''. See [http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm details]</ref>
<ref>http://www.jfk.org/Research/Cuba/Missile_Crisis.htm</ref>
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Although the president and his brother Robert Kennedy (1925-68), the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]]. McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.
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The United States Intelligence Board (USIB) met regularly before the crisis. At its critical September 19, 1962, meeting it decided that the intelligence contained no evidence that the Soviets had sent nuclear missiles to Cuba, and
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it unanimously concluded that on balance they would not do so in the future.<ref>  USIB had five reasons, all mistaken. The likelihood of discovery was high. Second, they knew the U.S. would react strongly. Third, the missiles would reduce but not end Soviet strategic inferiority. Fourth, Moscow had never in the past sent nuclear weapons outside their own borders. Finally, Castro was not seen as trustworthy or stable by the Kremlin. Ergo, there would be no missiles. CIA director John McCone, dissented but had no counter evidence. McCone, a businessman, had no expertise in intelligence, Cuba or the Kremlin, and undercut his credibility be departing for a month-long honeymoon as the crisis began to escalate; his warnings were ignored. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 32-33.</ref>  Kennedy trusted the USIB and repeatedly denied there were Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. There is no evidence, Kennedy insisted, "of any significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance."<ref> Quoted in [http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,874434,00.html ''Time'' Sept. 14, 1962]</ref>
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[[Image:Cuba62b.jpg|thumb|300px|Intelligence photo showing Soviet IRBM missile site in Guanajay Cuba Oct 23 1962]]
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High-altitude [[U-2]] aircraft flown by the [[United States Air Force]], took photographs that were analyzed by the National Photointerpretation Center (NPIC), a joint CIA-military analytic group.  They showed missiles. Kennedy was stunned, and immediately assembled a high-level emergency group, called "ExComm" ("the Executive Committee of the National Security Council"), to immediately propose a solution. It considered military action almost inevitable. Although the president and his brother [[Robert Kennedy]], the Attorney General, distrusted men in uniform, they brought in a close friend General [[Maxwell Taylor]] (1901-87), the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. The other chiefs distrusted Taylor's dovish viewpoint and his inability to articulate their urgent advice. The Pentagon's civilian voice on ExComm was Defense Secretary [[Robert McNamara]].  McNamara largely ignored his generals and admirals and generally took a dovish position. ExComm decided that the SS-4 and SS-5s would not upset the strategic balance of power, but nevertheless represented a challenge to American prestige; they had to be removed, even at the risk of threatening war. When Navy Secretary [[Paul Nitze]] was added to ExComm, he forcefully argued the services' viewpoint that the missiles were highly destabilizing.
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The U.S. could tolerate a gradual evening out of the strategic balance if it took several years and so permitted political adjustments as it proceeded and at least tacit understandings, if not formal ones, on a whole range of matters including arms control. What Washington could not accept was a swift, sudden, and secret shift in the strategic equation by using a new threat of nuclear weapons that would cause massive political and diplomatic upheaval.<ref>Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 96 </ref>
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==Photography==
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[[Image:Cubaaerialphotographytq0.jpg|thumb|300px|An Aerial Photograph Taken Over Cuba by a U-2.]]
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Many rumors of missiles in Cuba were offered to the US Government by Cuban exiles and former residents. However, these reports were potentially of such importance that they required unequivocal verification before action could be taken,  Photography was essential in determining the range, power, and completion of Soviet missiles. The challenge was being able to run a photographic mission above range of detection, and ''Surface-to-Air-Missile (SAM)'' range. Lockheed designer Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson led a project to create a light, high altitude aircraft capable of carrying photographic equipment over hostile territory. The final aircraft was known as the [[U-2]], or Utility 2.
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New lens designs were needed to function adequately at these altitudes. Dr. James Baker was one of the contributors of lens designs to function at approximately 65,000-80,000 feet. Future enhancements enabled greater quality photos from the U-2s.<ref>Dino Burgioni - Eyeball To Eyeball</ref>
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===Photographic Interpretation===
 +
After a [[U-2]] Mission was flown, duplicates were made from the film taken. One set remained at the base for safekeeping, the other was flown to Washington D.C. to be analyzed. The film would then be delivered to an elite team of CIA photo interpreters, who worked primarily in a vacated automotive building, to remain unknown. Using different methods, the [[CIA]] was able to keep the Government informed on the type, range, and completion of the missile sites.
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===Low Level Photography===
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Throughout the later parts of the Crisis, low level reconnaissance flights were run by the United States. Through the use of the RF-101C "Voodoo", the F-8 "Crusader" and the newly designed KA-18A Stereo Strip Camera, the CIA photo interpreters were able to update the United States in detail on the status of the Soviet missiles. These low level flights provided critical information, but also presented a higher risk.<ref>http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/recon/low_level.html</ref> No low-level flights were recorded as shot down during the crisis.
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==Missiles==
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At the time, Moscow had only a few [[intercontinental ballistic missile]]s ([[ICBM]]s) capable of reaching the US from Soviet launch pads, plus 150 long-range bombers. By contrast America had far more weapons  capable of reaching the Soviet homeland. The Strategic Air Command (SAC) had 200 ICBMs (126 Atlas, 60 Titan I, and 20 solid-fueled Minuteman I), plus 2,000 [[B-47]] medium and [[B-52]] long-range bombers; the Navy had 144 Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). In early 1962, an Air Force squadron of 15 Jupiter medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM) became operational in Turkey; two squadrons were deployed in Italy but due for retirement. "They have surrounded us with bases on all sides!" grumbled Khrushchev. The ExComm heard that Jupiters were "obsolete"; lacking good military advice they concluded they were therefore worthless. The Jupiters were set up in the open and burned kerosene and liquid oxygen. All three systems were obsolescent in comparison to solid-fuel missiles that could be launched from underground silos or submarines, but all were perfectly capable of delivering 1.5 megaton warheads (one megaton = one million tons of TNT). A Jupiter on alert could be launched on 15 minutes notice; the comparableSoviet SS-4 SS-5 missiles probably needed four or five hours to launch.<ref> NATO asked President [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to install the Jupiters as a response to the Soviet's deployment of MRBMs and IRBMs aimed at Western Europe. Kennedy had decided these missiles were useless and provocative and wanted to remove them. He therefore was eager to secretly trade them to get rid of the missiles in Cuba. Roger Hilsman, ''The Cuban Missile Crisis: The Struggle over Policy.'' (1996) p. 97</ref> Missiles in Cuba could knock out much of the US bomber force, and if Kennedy permitted the first 40 to stay, Khrushchev could have shipped hundreds more.
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ExComm debated four options: vigorous diplomatic protest might "talk" the missiles out. Second, a "sea" solution would blockade Cuba and squeeze them out. Third, the "air" solution (Op-Plan 3-12) would use tactical air power to shoot them out. Finally the menace could be ended once and for all by the land option. Op-Plan 3-14 would land one Marine and five Army [[division]]s (with three more in reserve) and seize the entire island within two weeks. US casualties were predicted to be 18,000-19,000. The Joint Chiefs recommended the air solution, but ExComm perhaps misunderstood what a "surgical strike" would entail. Finally Robert Kennedy vetoed the air solution, saying it would be too much like Pearl Harbor in reverse. The sea option was chosen; it would not require any casualties, and it would block the arrival of nuclear warheads. (Unknown to Washington, 42 [[nuclear weapon|nuclear warheads]] were already in Cuba.)<ref> for the minutes of the meetings of the [[Joint Chiefs of Staff]], see [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/621000%20Notes%20Taken%20from%20Transcripts.pdf online]</ref>
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[[Image:Excommoj9.jpg|thumb|300px|The ExComm Meeting Inside The White House.]]
 
==Naval Quarantine==
 
==Naval Quarantine==
 
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.
 
On October 21, 1962, an agreement was reached by the ExComm after much debate, to place a "Quarantine" around Cuba, in order to prevent more Soviet Missiles from being delivered.<ref name="thinkquest2">http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/timeline.html</ref>The quarantine was established at a perimeter of 800 miles around [[Cuba]], to search and reject any ships containing nuclear missiles. The call for a quarantine was a difficult one to make, because a blockade was technically an act of war, and needed caution to avoid a misunderstanding. At a later time, the quarantine line was moved back to 500 miles around Cuba<ref name="thinkquest2"/>, to provide more time for the United States and the Soviet Union to communicate.
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<references/>
 
<references/>
 
[[Category:Cold War]]
 
[[Category:Cold War]]
[[Category:United States History]]
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[[Category:1960s]]
 
[[category:diplomacy]]
 
[[category:diplomacy]]
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[[category:Cuba]]
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[[category:Soviet History]]
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