Eldred v. Ashcroft
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which extended the term of most existing copyrights to 95 years and that of many new copyrights to 70 years after the author's death. The economic effect of this 20-year extension—the longest blanket extension since the Nation's founding—was to make the copyright term not limited, but virtually perpetual. Its primary legal effect was to grant the extended term not to authors, but to their heirs, estates, or corporate successors. But the Court upheld the law under the Constitution's Copyright Clause, which grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science ... by securing for limited Times to Authors ... the exclusive Right to their respective Writings." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote the opinion for the 7-2 Court. As of 2023, only Justice Clarence Thomas in that majority remains on the U.S. Supreme Court.
Dissents
Justice John Paul Stevens dissented by arguing that the Court majority ignored "the central purpose of the Copyright/Patent Clause -- the Court has quitclaimed to Congress its principal responsibility in this area of the law. Fairly read, the Court has stated that Congress' actions under the Copyright/Patent Clause are, for all intents and purposes, judicially unreviewable." Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 242, 123 S. Ct. 769, 801 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting). . Justice Stephen Breyer also vigorously dissented, writing that the practical effect of the law is not to promote, but to inhibit, the progress of "Science"—by which word the Framers meant learning or knowledge.[1]
Both Justices Stevens and Breyer thought that perpetually extending copyright would be unconstitutional, and Justice Breyer mentioned First Amendment concerns.
Justice Alito
Justice Alito did not become part of the Supreme Court until a few years after this decision. But he apparently holds Justice Breyer's preference to limit copyright, as illustrated by Justice Alito by joining his dissent in Dolan v. Holder:
“ | The upshot is that text, history, and precedent demonstrate that the Copyright Clause places great value on the power of copyright to elicit new production. Congress in particular cases may determine that copyright's ability to do so outweighs any concomitant high prices, administrative costs, and restrictions on dissemination. And when it does so, we must respect its judgment. See Eldred, 537 U.S., at 222, 123 S. Ct. 769, 154 L. Ed. 2d 683. But does the Clause empower Congress to enact a statute that withdraws works from the public domain, brings about higher prices and costs, and in doing so seriously restricts dissemination, particularly to those who need it for scholarly, educational, or cultural purposes--all without providing any additional incentive for the production of new material? That is the question before us. And, as I have said, I believe the answer is no. Congress in this statute has exceeded what are, under any plausible reading of the Copyright Clause, its permissible limits.
The Act before us says that it “restores” American copyright to a set of works, which, for the most part, did not previously enjoy American copyright protection. These works had fallen into America's public domain, but as of the “restoration” date, they had not yet fallen into the public domain of the foreign country where they originated. |
” |
Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 351, 132 S. Ct. 873, 903 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting, joined by Alito, J.).
References
- ↑ E. Walterscheid, The Nature of the Intellectual Property Clause: A Study in Historical Perspective 125-126 (2002).