Changes

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl18 />

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl18 />

German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> The Germans argued it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." During the Haldane Mission of February 1912, a proposal to partition the Portuguese and Belgian colonies was discussed, but no agreement was reached. The idea that war was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance to go to war with Britain began to look quaint, even to his own advisors. In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. As a result of the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). After this election, the left-of-center parties -- the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and the Progressives -- together constituted a majority of the parliament.<ref>The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>

German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Germans argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." During the Haldane Mission of February 1912, a proposal to partition the Portuguese and Belgian colonies was discussed, but no agreement was reached. The idea that war with Britain was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors. In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. In the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). This election also gave the left-of-center parties a majority in the parliament.<ref>This refers to the combined total of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and Progressives. The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. In December, the Kaiser was informed that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 />

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. In December, the Kaiser was informed that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 />