Changes

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl18 />

The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl18 />

German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Germans argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." During the Haldane Mission of February 1912, a proposal to partition the Portuguese and Belgian colonies was discussed, but no agreement was reached. The idea that war with Britain was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors. In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. In the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). This election also gave the left-of-center parties a majority in the parliament.<ref>This refers to the combined total of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and Progressives. The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>

German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Germans argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." During the Haldane Mission of February 1912, a proposal to partition the Portuguese and Belgian colonies was discussed, but no agreement was reached. The idea that war with Britain was inevitable became conventional wisdom, and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors.<ref>Röhl, p. 875. A few weeks after Agadir, Falkenhayen wrote, "Outwardly, our political situation has improved...but internally nothing has changed, in so far as H.M. is as determined as before to avoid a war."</ref> In response to the increasing militarism of the conservative parties, many voters switched to the anti-militarist Social Democratic Party. In the Reichstag election in January 1912, the party went from 43 seats to 110 (out of a total of 397). This election also gave the left-of-center parties a majority in the parliament.<ref>This refers to the combined total of the Social Democrats, Zentrum, and Progressives. The Zentrum, or Center Party, is the precursor of Germany's post-World War II conservative movement.</ref>

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. In December, the Kaiser was informed that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 />

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. These advisors had misled the Kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, the German ambassador to Britain informed the Kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 />

A meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 was identified by German historian Fritz Fischer as the decisive moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting consisted of the Kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In June 1913, the Reichstag approved a dramatic expansion of the army.<ref>The German army was expanded from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000. It was the largest expansion since 1871.</ref> In December, the Reichstag took a brief, futile stand against the onrush of militarism in an episode called the Zabern Affair.<ref>There was public outrage in response to abuses by a military officer in the Alsacian town of Zabern. On December 4, 1913, the Reichstag voted no confidence in Bethmann by a margin of 293 to 54. Under the German constitution, the emperor had exclusive authority over appointments. But if the budget had been rejected, Bethmann might have been forced out of office. In the end, only the Social Democrats (110 seats) and the Polish Party (18 seats) voted against the budget. Germany had failed to take advantage of its best chance to achieve parliamentary democracy and head off war.</ref> However, army expansion was confirmed when the annual budget was passed on December 9.

A meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 was identified by German historian Fritz Fischer as the decisive moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting consisted of the Kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In June 1913, the Reichstag approved a dramatic expansion of the army.<ref>The German army was expanded from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000. It was the largest expansion since 1871.</ref> In December, the Reichstag took a brief, futile stand against the onrush of militarism in an episode called the Zabern Affair.<ref>There was public outrage in response to abuses by a military officer in the Alsacian town of Zabern. On December 4, 1913, the Reichstag voted no confidence in Bethmann by a margin of 293 to 54. Under the German constitution, the emperor had exclusive authority over appointments. But if the budget had been rejected, Bethmann might have been forced out of office. In the end, only the Social Democrats (110 seats) and the Polish Party (18 seats) voted against the budget. Germany had failed to take advantage of its best chance to achieve parliamentary democracy and head off war.</ref> However, army expansion was confirmed when the annual budget was passed on December 9.