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| − | '''Harry S. Truman,''' (1884-1972) a [[liberal]] [[Democrat]] from [[Missouri]], was the president of the United States from 1945-1953, taking over when [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] died in April 1945. He made the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to force Japan's surrender. Angered at the Soviet Union's seizure of eastern Europe, he moved away from FDR's [[détente]] to a policy of [[containment]], reinforced by the Truman Plan (1947) to resist Communist subversion, the [[Marshall Plan]] (1948-51) to rebuild and modernize western Europe's economies, and the [[NATO]] military alliance of 1949. Truman, advised by [[Dean Acheson]] and the State Department, set the policies to oppose the Soviet Union as the [[Cold War]] began. | + | '''Harry S. Truman,''' (1884-1972) a [[liberal]] [[Democrat]] from [[Missouri]], was the president of the United States from 1945-1953, taking over when [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] died in April 1945. He made the decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in order to force Japan's surrender. Angered at the Soviet Union's seizure of eastern Europe, he moved away from FDR's [[détente]] to a policy of [[containment]], reinforced by the Truman Plan (1947) to resist Communist subversion, the [[Marshall Plan]] (1948–51) to rebuild and modernize western Europe's economies, and the [[NATO]] military alliance of 1949. Truman, advised by [[Dean Acheson]] and the State Department, set the policies to oppose the Soviet Union as the [[Cold War]] began. |
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| | Ignoring Asia, he later saw America's close ally China fall to the anti-American Communists under [[Mao Zedong]] in 1949; the US and China fought each other to a draw during the undeclared [[Korean War]], 1950-53. Truman fired his top general, [[Douglas MacArthur]], during this conflict and saw his popularity plunge. | | Ignoring Asia, he later saw America's close ally China fall to the anti-American Communists under [[Mao Zedong]] in 1949; the US and China fought each other to a draw during the undeclared [[Korean War]], 1950-53. Truman fired his top general, [[Douglas MacArthur]], during this conflict and saw his popularity plunge. |
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| | ==Early life== | | ==Early life== |
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| − | Truman was born on a farm near [[Lamar, Missouri|Lamar]], in western Missouri, and grew up on a farm near Independence, Missouri. His grandparents had been Confederate sympathizers who had been rounded up by the Union army in the Civil War.<ref> His middle initial, S, does not stand for anything, but was chosen because his parents could not decide whether to name him for his grandfather Shippe or for his grandfather Solomon.</ref> After graduating from high school in Independence, with good skills in history and music, he decided against college and became a bank clerk in Kansas City. Always a joiner, he was active in the Missouri National Guard. From 1906 to 1917 he managed his father's 600-acre farm at [[Grandview, Missouri]]. During World War I his National Guard regiment was mobilized in 1917, he entered the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, sailing for France in 1917 as a lieutenant. Truman was soon promoted to captain in Battery D, 129 Field Artillery Battalion, 35th Division, A.E.F., and returned to the United States a major in 1919, after combat at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne offensive. He was in an artillery unit, and learned about gas warfare; he was never wounded, He married Elizabeth "Bess" Wallace on June 28, 1919; they had one daughter, Margaret, who married a ''New York Times'' editor. With an army buddy he invested his savings in a Kansas City haberdashery, but this venture was a failure. | + | Truman was born on a farm near [[Lamar, Missouri|Lamar]], in western Missouri, and grew up on a farm near Independence, Missouri. His grandparents had been Confederate sympathizers who had been rounded up by the Union army in the Civil War.<ref>His middle initial, S, does not stand for anything, but was chosen because his parents could not decide whether to name him for his grandfather Shippe or for his grandfather Solomon.</ref> After graduating from high school in Independence, with good skills in history and music, he decided against college and became a bank clerk in Kansas City. Always a joiner, he was active in the Missouri National Guard. From 1906 to 1917 he managed his father's 600-acre farm at [[Grandview, Missouri]]. During World War I his National Guard regiment was mobilized in 1917, he entered the Field Artillery School at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, sailing for France in 1917 as a lieutenant. Truman was soon promoted to captain in Battery D, 129 Field Artillery Battalion, 35th Division, A.E.F., and returned to the United States a major in 1919, after combat at St. Mihiel and in the Argonne offensive. He was in an artillery unit, and learned about gas warfare; he was never wounded, He married Elizabeth "Bess" Wallace on June 28, 1919; they had one daughter, Margaret, who married a ''New York Times'' editor. With an army buddy he invested his savings in a Kansas City haberdashery, but this venture was a failure. |
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| | ==Pendergast machine== | | ==Pendergast machine== |
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| | In 1944, after Vice-President [[Henry A. Wallace]] had been rejected by leading Democrats as too far to the left, Truman supported his friend former senator [[James F. Byrnes]] of South Carolina for that office. Catholics vetoed Byrnes, who had left that faith. Truman himself became Roosevelt's choice as a compromise vice presidential candidate, and the two were elected. | | In 1944, after Vice-President [[Henry A. Wallace]] had been rejected by leading Democrats as too far to the left, Truman supported his friend former senator [[James F. Byrnes]] of South Carolina for that office. Catholics vetoed Byrnes, who had left that faith. Truman himself became Roosevelt's choice as a compromise vice presidential candidate, and the two were elected. |
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| − | Roosevelt had been in ill-health since his return from the [[Teheran conference]]. At the 1944 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, DNC Chairman Bob Hannegan went for instructions to President Roosevelt's private railway car just before the July convention officially began. Roosevelt had decided to dump incumbent Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]]. Worried over dissension on the choice of a successor, Roosevelt told Hannegan: "Go on down there and nominate Truman before there's any more trouble. And clear everything with Sidney." <ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791619,00.html "Clear everything with Sidney"], [[Time magazine]], Sep. 25, 1944.</ref> The President could not make the selection of Truman until [[Sidney Hillman]] <ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 2, Ch. 8, [http://www.rooseveltmyth.com/book/fdrmyth_Chapter_Eight___The_Shock_Troops.htm ''The Shock Troops of the Third New Deal'']</ref>, Director of the Political Action Committee for the [[Congress on Industrial Organizations]] (CIO) approved it. <ref> ''Roosevelt Myth'', Book 3, Ch. 10, [http://www.rooseveltmyth.com/book/fdrmyth_Chapter_Ten___Politics__Disease_.htm ''Politics, Disease and History''], Flynn, 1948.</ref> When Harry Truman walked into the smoke-filled room <ref>[http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/index_print.asp?ProgramID=1109 ''Truman''], Interview with David McCullough, C-Span Booknotes, July 19, 1992. Retrieved August 6, 2007.</ref> of DNC at headquarters at the Stevens Hotel in Chicago, Soviet spies [[John Abt]], [[Lee Pressman]], and [[Nathan Witt]], were on hand." <ref>''The Yalta Betrayal'', Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 75.</ref> | + | Roosevelt had been in ill-health since his return from the [[Teheran conference]]. At the 1944 Democratic National Convention in Chicago, DNC Chairman Bob Hannegan went for instructions to President Roosevelt's private railway car just before the July convention officially began. Roosevelt had decided to dump incumbent Vice-President [[Henry Wallace]]. Worried over dissension on the choice of a successor, Roosevelt told Hannegan: "Go on down there and nominate Truman before there's any more trouble. And clear everything with Sidney." <ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791619,00.html "Clear everything with Sidney"], [[Time magazine]], Sep. 25, 1944.</ref> The President could not make the selection of Truman until [[Sidney Hillman]],<ref>''The Roosevelt Myth'', John T. Flynn, Fox and Wilkes, 1948, Book 2, Ch. 8, [http://www.rooseveltmyth.com/book/fdrmyth_Chapter_Eight___The_Shock_Troops.htm ''The Shock Troops of the Third New Deal'']</ref> Director of the Political Action Committee for the [[Congress on Industrial Organizations]] (CIO) approved it.<ref>''Roosevelt Myth'', Book 3, Ch. 10, [http://www.rooseveltmyth.com/book/fdrmyth_Chapter_Ten___Politics__Disease_.htm ''Politics, Disease and History''], Flynn, 1948.</ref> When Harry Truman walked into the smoke-filled room <ref>[http://www.booknotes.org/Transcript/index_print.asp?ProgramID=1109 ''Truman''], Interview with David McCullough, C-Span Booknotes, July 19, 1992. Retrieved August 6, 2007.</ref> of DNC at headquarters at the Stevens Hotel in Chicago, Soviet spies [[John Abt]], [[Lee Pressman]], and [[Nathan Witt]], were on hand." <ref>''The Yalta Betrayal'', Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 75.</ref> |
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| | ==Presidency== | | ==Presidency== |
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| | ====How the decision was made==== | | ====How the decision was made==== |
| − | The decision to drop the atomic bomb has been the focus of one of the most heated debates among both scholars and the public since 1945. After 1945 the debate was dominated by "traditionalist" scholars, who argued that the U.S. had no choice but to drop the bomb as a way to bring World War II to an end. The traditionalists were succeeded in the 1960s by "revisionists," who asserted that the dropping of the bomb was done to intimidate Stalin, not end the war. The leading revisionist historians emerged from the "new left" movement of the 1960s and rejected any notion of the moral superiority of America or capitalism to the Soviet Union. They thought the Cold War and containment were poor policies and generally favored détente, along the lines proposed by Henry Wallace. They include Gar Alperovitz, Barton J. Bernstein, Kai Bird, Diane Shaver Clemens, Bruce Cumings, Richard Freeland, Lloyd Gardner, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber, Thomas Paterson, Harvard Sitkoff, Ronald Steel, Athan Theoharis, and William A. Williams (the leader of the "Wisconsin School"). The revisionists are not monolithic, but they usually agree that Truman and his advisers were wrong whether the issue is the Cold War, Korea, or the atomic bomb. Revisionists had argued that Truman's goal at Potsdam was to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the atomic bomb was used to scare them off. However in 1983 archivists discovered a letter Truman wrote to his wife from Potsdam on July 18, 1945: "I've gotten what I came for-- Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it . . . I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That's the important thing."<ref>''New York Times'' March 14, 1983. </ref> | + | The decision to drop the atomic bomb has been the focus of one of the most heated debates among both scholars and the public since 1945. After 1945 the debate was dominated by "traditionalist" scholars, who argued that the U.S. had no choice but to drop the bomb as a way to bring World War II to an end. The traditionalists were succeeded in the 1960s by "revisionists," who asserted that the dropping of the bomb was done to intimidate Stalin, not end the war. The leading revisionist historians emerged from the "new left" movement of the 1960s and rejected any notion of the moral superiority of America or capitalism to the Soviet Union. They thought the Cold War and containment were poor policies and generally favored détente, along the lines proposed by Henry Wallace. They include Gar Alperovitz, Barton J. Bernstein, Kai Bird, Diane Shaver Clemens, Bruce Cumings, Richard Freeland, Lloyd Gardner, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber, Thomas Paterson, Harvard Sitkoff, Ronald Steel, Athan Theoharis, and William A. Williams (the leader of the "Wisconsin School"). The revisionists are not monolithic, but they usually agree that Truman and his advisers were wrong whether the issue is the Cold War, Korea, or the atomic bomb. Revisionists had argued that Truman's goal at Potsdam was to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the atomic bomb was used to scare them off. However in 1983 archivists discovered a letter Truman wrote to his wife from Potsdam on July 18, 1945: "I've gotten what I came for-- Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it . . . I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That's the important thing."<ref>''New York Times'' March 14, 1983.</ref> |
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| | In the 1990s, a more nuanced historical approach emerged searching for a middle ground, offering a number of more credible studies, essentially arguing that neither the traditional nor the revisionist interpretations were entirely satisfactory.<ref>J. Samuel Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: a Search for Middle Ground." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 311-334. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | | In the 1990s, a more nuanced historical approach emerged searching for a middle ground, offering a number of more credible studies, essentially arguing that neither the traditional nor the revisionist interpretations were entirely satisfactory.<ref>J. Samuel Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: a Search for Middle Ground." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 311-334. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
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| | The process of reconversion to peacetime was rocky. It was impossible to bring soldiers home fast enough, and they and their families protected loudly. All war contract were canceled, shutting down munitions plants and throwing millions of workers (many of them women) out of jobs, just as the 12 million service members were coming home. Truman sought to retain price controls against the vehement opposition of business but yielded somewhat in the face of bitter popular opposition. Large-scale strikes disrupted the economy, especially a coal miners strike and a threatened nationwide strike by railroad workers. He threatened to draft the railroad workers and the strike was called off; unions began to oppose him but he regained union support by his later attempts to veto or repeal the [[Taft-Hartley]] labor relations law. Truman's opposition to tax cuts, his insistence on price controls, and his lack of aggressive support of labor programs weakened his party. To voters frustrated with shortages and controls, Truman seemed indecisive and inconsistent; his efforts to deal with a postwar wave of strikes managed to alienate both organized labor and those who wanted more restraints on unions. Voters who normally supported liberal and labor candidates stayed home, resulting in a Republican landslide in 1946, giving the GOP a majority in both houses of Congress. Ohio Senator [[Robert A. Taft]] became the main GOP spokesman in Congress, tangling often with Truman. | | The process of reconversion to peacetime was rocky. It was impossible to bring soldiers home fast enough, and they and their families protected loudly. All war contract were canceled, shutting down munitions plants and throwing millions of workers (many of them women) out of jobs, just as the 12 million service members were coming home. Truman sought to retain price controls against the vehement opposition of business but yielded somewhat in the face of bitter popular opposition. Large-scale strikes disrupted the economy, especially a coal miners strike and a threatened nationwide strike by railroad workers. He threatened to draft the railroad workers and the strike was called off; unions began to oppose him but he regained union support by his later attempts to veto or repeal the [[Taft-Hartley]] labor relations law. Truman's opposition to tax cuts, his insistence on price controls, and his lack of aggressive support of labor programs weakened his party. To voters frustrated with shortages and controls, Truman seemed indecisive and inconsistent; his efforts to deal with a postwar wave of strikes managed to alienate both organized labor and those who wanted more restraints on unions. Voters who normally supported liberal and labor candidates stayed home, resulting in a Republican landslide in 1946, giving the GOP a majority in both houses of Congress. Ohio Senator [[Robert A. Taft]] became the main GOP spokesman in Congress, tangling often with Truman. |
| | ===Moving left=== | | ===Moving left=== |
| − | Gradually Truman created his own administration, using the '''''Fair Deal''''' label to express its goals in domestic affairs. Truman systematically removed the Roosevelt cabinet and inner circle of advisers. The most dramatic episode was firing [[Henry A. Wallace]] in 1946 because of his outspoken criticism of the administration's foreign policy as too harsh on the Soviet Union. Liberals saw themselves in a struggle with conservatives for Truman's soul after the 1946 election. Linked to the President through top aide [[Clark Clifford]], these liberals included Oscar Ewing, former party official and director of the Federal Security Agency, Leon Keyserling, member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and David Morse, assistant secretary of labor. They embraced the memo plotting 1948 campaign strategy written by former Roosevelt adviser James Rowe, which urged Truman to "move to the left and focus on building a coalition of groups that centered on organized labor, liberals, and northern urban African Americans."<ref> The memo until 1991 was mis-attributed to Clifford, who passed it along to Truman.</ref> Liberals had national support from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), led by [[Walter Reuther]], [[Eleanor Roosevelt]], Joseph Rauh, James Rowe, [[Reinhold Niebuhr]], [[Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.]], [[Hubert Humphrey]], and [[Ronald Reagan]]<ref> Reagan was an energetic liberal supporter of Truman. He moved to the right in the late 1950s.</ref> . The ADA was hostile to the Soviet Union, battled American Communists and fellow travelers like Wallace, and supported the purge of Communists from the [[CIO]] labor unions. Truman agreed with the ADA and moved left after 1946.<ref> Steven M. Gillon, ''Politics and Vision: the ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985'' (1987).</ref> | + | Gradually Truman created his own administration, using the '''''Fair Deal''''' label to express its goals in domestic affairs. Truman systematically removed the Roosevelt cabinet and inner circle of advisers. The most dramatic episode was firing [[Henry A. Wallace]] in 1946 because of his outspoken criticism of the administration's foreign policy as too harsh on the Soviet Union. Liberals saw themselves in a struggle with conservatives for Truman's soul after the 1946 election. Linked to the President through top aide [[Clark Clifford]], these liberals included Oscar Ewing, former party official and director of the Federal Security Agency, Leon Keyserling, member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and David Morse, assistant secretary of labor. They embraced the memo plotting 1948 campaign strategy written by former Roosevelt adviser James Rowe, which urged Truman to "move to the left and focus on building a coalition of groups that centered on organized labor, liberals, and northern urban African Americans."<ref>The memo until 1991 was mis-attributed to Clifford, who passed it along to Truman.</ref> Liberals had national support from the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA), led by [[Walter Reuther]], [[Eleanor Roosevelt]], Joseph Rauh, James Rowe, [[Reinhold Niebuhr]], [[Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.]], [[Hubert Humphrey]], and [[Ronald Reagan]].<ref>Reagan was an energetic liberal supporter of Truman. He moved to the right in the late 1950s.</ref> The ADA was hostile to the Soviet Union, battled American Communists and fellow travelers like Wallace, and supported the purge of Communists from the [[CIO]] labor unions. Truman agreed with the ADA and moved left after 1946.<ref>Steven M. Gillon, ''Politics and Vision: the ADA and American Liberalism, 1947-1985'' (1987).</ref> |
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| | However he could not tolerate [[Henry A. Wallace]] and the far left, which had considerable Communist support. When Wallace, then Secretary of Commerce, in 1946 denounced Truman's tough stand against Stalin, Truman fired Wallace. | | However he could not tolerate [[Henry A. Wallace]] and the far left, which had considerable Communist support. When Wallace, then Secretary of Commerce, in 1946 denounced Truman's tough stand against Stalin, Truman fired Wallace. |
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| − | In 1947 Truman asked Congress for stand-by price controls, rationing, and bank and consumer credit control as parts of an anti-inflation program, but his ideas were ignored by the Republicans who controlled Congress. [[Image:Rrstrike48.jpg|thumb|350px|When railroad unions threatened to shut down the national transportation system in May 1948, Truman stopped them by threatening to seize the railroads and use the Army to move trains.]] In his state of the union message of Jan. 7, 1948, Truman called for rent control, increased social security benefits, universal military training, national health insurance, and other social legislation. The next week he again asked for passage of his anti-inflation measures. In February 1948 he asked for civil-rights legislation, including a federal anti-lynching law, a federal fair employment practices commission, a permanent civil rights commission, and abolition of the poll tax--measures that enraged many Southern Democrats. None of his proposals became law. More successful was Truman's drive to increase the efficiency of the executive branch; he appointed a commission headed by former President [[Herbert Hoover]] which recommended numerous changes, including unification of the armed services. | + | In 1947 Truman asked Congress for stand-by price controls, rationing, and bank and consumer credit control as parts of an anti-inflation program, but his ideas were ignored by the Republicans who controlled Congress. [[Image:Rrstrike48.jpg|thumb|350px|When railroad unions threatened to shut down the national transportation system in May 1948, Truman stopped them by threatening to seize the railroads and use the Army to move trains.]] In his state of the union message of Jan. 7, 1948, Truman called for rent control, increased social security benefits, universal military training, national health insurance, and other social legislation. The next week he again asked for passage of his anti-inflation measures. In February 1948 he asked for civil-rights legislation, including a federal anti-lynching law, a federal fair employment practices commission, a permanent civil rights commission, and abolition of the poll tax—measures that enraged many Southern Democrats. None of his proposals became law. More successful was Truman's drive to increase the efficiency of the executive branch; he appointed a commission headed by former President [[Herbert Hoover]] which recommended numerous changes, including unification of the armed services. |
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| | ===Civil Rights=== | | ===Civil Rights=== |
| − | Disgusted by violence against black veterans in the deep South, Truman called for the extension of the wartime [[FEPC]] program that called for fair employment practices, but Congress refused and it ended. He created the Presidential Commission on Civil Rights in 1946 by executive order (with no congressional approval needed); it recommended desegregation of local public facilities and the removal of restrictive covenants that prevented blacks and Jews from purchasing houses in restricted neighborhoods. The Commission generated attention but no action.<ref> Steven F. Lawson, ed. ''To Secure These Rights: The Report of Harry S. Truman's Committee on Civil Rights.'' (2004)</ref> Indeed, Congress refused to pass any civil rights legislation before 1957. Truman therefore decided to use his executive powers, and focused on guaranteeing equal opportunity in the military and the civil service. The Army and Navy operated segregated units, and refused to be part of a "social experiment" in integration.<ref> Bernard C. Nalty, ''Strength For the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military'' (1986)</ref> The Air Force, however, was much more willing. Between 1941 and 1951 it went from a segregated force to the first truly integrated service. Key generals became convinced that segregation was a drag on efficiency, and the Air Force decided to integrate in April 1948. before Truman issued his famous Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948, calling for equal opportunity in all the armed services. It allowed segregation but called for "equality of treatment and opportunity." In the face of opposition from some high-ranking officers, the Air Force moved cautiously, but by 1951 the last black unit was dissolved and the Air Force was completely integrated.<ref> Alan L. Gropman, ''The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964.'' (2nd ed 1998) [http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gropmanintegrates.htm online edition]. </ref> Order 9981 created the Fahy Committee to implement the new policy. Truman's order did not actually integrate the Army--it used segregated units during the Korean War--but it opened the way for integration in the early 1950s.<ref> Richard M. Dalfiume, ''Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953.'' (1969)</ref> Public opinion was generally favorable except in the deep South (which voted against Truman in 1948). | + | Disgusted by violence against black veterans in the deep South, Truman called for the extension of the wartime [[FEPC]] program that called for fair employment practices, but Congress refused and it ended. He created the Presidential Commission on Civil Rights in 1946 by executive order (with no congressional approval needed); it recommended desegregation of local public facilities and the removal of restrictive covenants that prevented blacks and Jews from purchasing houses in restricted neighborhoods. The Commission generated attention but no action.<ref>Steven F. Lawson, ed. ''To Secure These Rights: The Report of Harry S. Truman's Committee on Civil Rights.'' (2004)</ref> Indeed, Congress refused to pass any civil rights legislation before 1957. Truman therefore decided to use his executive powers, and focused on guaranteeing equal opportunity in the military and the civil service. The Army and Navy operated segregated units, and refused to be part of a "social experiment" in integration.<ref>Bernard C. Nalty, ''Strength For the Fight: A History of Black Americans in the Military'' (1986)</ref> The Air Force, however, was much more willing. Between 1941 and 1951 it went from a segregated force to the first truly integrated service. Key generals became convinced that segregation was a drag on efficiency, and the Air Force decided to integrate in April 1948. before Truman issued his famous Executive Order 9981 on July 26, 1948, calling for equal opportunity in all the armed services. It allowed segregation but called for "equality of treatment and opportunity." In the face of opposition from some high-ranking officers, the Air Force moved cautiously, but by 1951 the last black unit was dissolved and the Air Force was completely integrated.<ref>Alan L. Gropman, ''The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964.'' (2nd ed 1998) [http://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/Publications/Annotations/gropmanintegrates.htm online edition].</ref> Order 9981 created the Fahy Committee to implement the new policy. Truman's order did not actually integrate the Army—it used segregated units during the Korean War—but it opened the way for integration in the early 1950s.<ref>Richard M. Dalfiume, ''Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces: Fighting on Two Fronts, 1939-1953.'' (1969)</ref> Public opinion was generally favorable except in the deep South (which voted against Truman in 1948). |
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| | ==1948 election== | | ==1948 election== |
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| | As the presidential election of 1948 approached, no one thought Truman could be reelected. Truman's policies had alienated left right and center, but the party had no real alternative. Neither Roosevelt nor Truman had groomed a likely successor. Party leaders considered asking [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to run, but he refused. Liberals led by Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota inserted a strong civil rights plank in the platform, causing a walkout of the deep South. Truman was renominated by default, with Barkley as the vice-presidential candidate. Truman thrilled the convention by announcing his plan to call the Republican-controlled Congress back into special session to "ask them to pass the laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis--which they say they are for in their platform." When this special session accomplished little, as Truman expected, it gave the president a chance to attack the "Do Nothing" Congress. | | As the presidential election of 1948 approached, no one thought Truman could be reelected. Truman's policies had alienated left right and center, but the party had no real alternative. Neither Roosevelt nor Truman had groomed a likely successor. Party leaders considered asking [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] to run, but he refused. Liberals led by Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota inserted a strong civil rights plank in the platform, causing a walkout of the deep South. Truman was renominated by default, with Barkley as the vice-presidential candidate. Truman thrilled the convention by announcing his plan to call the Republican-controlled Congress back into special session to "ask them to pass the laws to halt rising prices, to meet the housing crisis--which they say they are for in their platform." When this special session accomplished little, as Truman expected, it gave the president a chance to attack the "Do Nothing" Congress. |
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| − | Both the left and right wings of the party split off and ran their own candidates. Henry Wallace, the candidate of the Progressive Party, was expected to divert labor, leftist and black votes, while [[J. Strom Thurmond]] was the "Dixiecrat" candidate whose supporters controlled the Democratic party in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.<ref> Thurmond received only 15% of the vote in the other Southern states. Kari Frederickson, ''The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968.'' (2001) </ref> Truman exploited his multiple opponents, driving a wedge between the liberals and the Communists who controlled the Wallace movement, and holding the line in the outer South. Most of all he exploited the difference between the conservative Republicans who controlled Congress, and the liberal Republican candidate [[Tom Dewey]]. Truman crusaded against the Republicans as evil rich men, blasting them as fascists and denouncing the 80th Congress for its failure to help the average citizen.<ref>''Time'' magazine reported that "His irresponsible implication that a vote for Thomas Dewey was a vote for fascism horrified his soberer followers." ''Time'' Jan 3, 1949 at [http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1948.html]</ref> "Give 'em hell" fury delivered in 275 speeches over 21,928 train-miles had more impact that Truman's promises of more money for federal housing, higher social security and unemployment benefits, free medical care for everyone, the continued subsidy of farm prices, and a fair deal for minorities. The pollsters misjudged the election, as did all the traditional pundits. Truman rallied enough of the [[New Deal Coalition]] to win by 2.2 million votes, and carry in a Democratic Congress on his coattails. The key farm states of the farm states of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio that Dewey had carried in 1944 now switched to Truman, giving a solid victory in the electoral college of 303 for Truman, 189 for Dewey, 39 for Thurmond, and none for Wallace.<ref> Harold I. Gullan, ''The Upset That Wasn't: Harry S. Truman and the Crucial Election of 1948'' (1998); Gary A. Donaldson, ''Truman Defeats Dewey'' (1998) </ref> | + | Both the left and right wings of the party split off and ran their own candidates. Henry Wallace, the candidate of the Progressive Party, was expected to divert labor, leftist and black votes, while [[J. Strom Thurmond]] was the "Dixiecrat" candidate whose supporters controlled the Democratic party in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina.<ref>Thurmond received only 15% of the vote in the other Southern states. Kari Frederickson, ''The Dixiecrat Revolt and the End of the Solid South, 1932-1968.'' (2001)</ref> Truman exploited his multiple opponents, driving a wedge between the liberals and the Communists who controlled the Wallace movement, and holding the line in the outer South. Most of all he exploited the difference between the conservative Republicans who controlled Congress, and the liberal Republican candidate [[Tom Dewey]]. Truman crusaded against the Republicans as evil rich men, blasting them as fascists and denouncing the 80th Congress for its failure to help the average citizen.<ref>''Time'' magazine reported that "His irresponsible implication that a vote for Thomas Dewey was a vote for fascism horrified his soberer followers." ''Time'' Jan 3, 1949 at [http://www.time.com/time/subscriber/personoftheyear/archive/stories/1948.html]</ref> "Give 'em hell" fury delivered in 275 speeches over 21,928 train-miles had more impact that Truman's promises of more money for federal housing, higher social security and unemployment benefits, free medical care for everyone, the continued subsidy of farm prices, and a fair deal for minorities. The pollsters misjudged the election, as did all the traditional pundits. Truman rallied enough of the [[New Deal Coalition]] to win by 2.2 million votes, and carry in a Democratic Congress on his coattails. The key farm states of the farm states of Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio that Dewey had carried in 1944 now switched to Truman, giving a solid victory in the electoral college of 303 for Truman, 189 for Dewey, 39 for Thurmond, and none for Wallace.<ref>Harold I. Gullan, ''The Upset That Wasn't: Harry S. Truman and the Crucial Election of 1948'' (1998); Gary A. Donaldson, ''Truman Defeats Dewey'' (1998)</ref> |
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| | ==Second Term: Fair Deal== | | ==Second Term: Fair Deal== |
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| | ===Agriculture=== | | ===Agriculture=== |
| − | Truman won the farm vote in 1948 by charging the GOP shoved "a pitchfork in the farmer's back", but was unable to get new farm programs passed. His second secretary of agriculture, Charles F. Brannan promoted the Brannan Plan, intended to bring widespread changes to farm policy. Brannan proposed to replace market price supports with direct income payments to farmers. His plan set ceilings on the amount a farmer could receive and limited the program to farmers who did not exceed a set production mark. The Brannan Plan was supposed to foster the "family-sized farm" while providing affordable food for consumers. While Brannan could count on support from the left, especially the National Farmers Union (which was small), labor unions (which were powerful), and consumer groups (which were weak), he was opposed by leading farm economists and the national Farm Bureau (which was large) and the national Chamber of Commerce (representing business). The head of the Farm Bureau decried the plan as intrusive, a form of "creeping socialism," and expensive. The Farm Bureau, dominated by conservatives, resisted any curbs on full agricultural production. A bloc of Midwestern Republican and southern Democratic congressmen opposed replacing market mechanisms with outright government payments to farmers and setting limits on supports to individual farms. The Brannan Plan went nowhere and instead, the conservative farm bloc passed the Agricultural Act of 1949 with high price supports.<ref> See Dean (2006)</ref> | + | Truman won the farm vote in 1948 by charging the GOP shoved "a pitchfork in the farmer's back", but was unable to get new farm programs passed. His second secretary of agriculture, Charles F. Brannan promoted the Brannan Plan, intended to bring widespread changes to farm policy. Brannan proposed to replace market price supports with direct income payments to farmers. His plan set ceilings on the amount a farmer could receive and limited the program to farmers who did not exceed a set production mark. The Brannan Plan was supposed to foster the "family-sized farm" while providing affordable food for consumers. While Brannan could count on support from the left, especially the National Farmers Union (which was small), labor unions (which were powerful), and consumer groups (which were weak), he was opposed by leading farm economists and the national Farm Bureau (which was large) and the national Chamber of Commerce (representing business). The head of the Farm Bureau decried the plan as intrusive, a form of "creeping socialism," and expensive. The Farm Bureau, dominated by conservatives, resisted any curbs on full agricultural production. A bloc of Midwestern Republican and southern Democratic congressmen opposed replacing market mechanisms with outright government payments to farmers and setting limits on supports to individual farms. The Brannan Plan went nowhere and instead, the conservative farm bloc passed the Agricultural Act of 1949 with high price supports.<ref>See Dean (2006)</ref> |
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| − | Brannan justified his plan of direct assistance to small farmers, by reasserting the importance of the small family farmer as the foundation of American democracy. However in the [[Grange]] small farmers opposed the plan because it too closely resembled welfare and would undermine their self image as independent [[yeomen]] and successful entrepreneurs. Brannan sought to protect the small farmer against competition from the large companies, but the plan was not accepted by Congress because farmers self-image would not allow for welfare.<ref> Karen J. Bradley, "Agrarian Ideology and Agricultural Policy: California Grangers and the Post-world War II Farm Policy Debate," ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(2): 240-256, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3744267 in JSTOR]</ref> | + | Brannan justified his plan of direct assistance to small farmers, by reasserting the importance of the small family farmer as the foundation of American democracy. However in the [[Grange]] small farmers opposed the plan because it too closely resembled welfare and would undermine their self image as independent [[yeomen]] and successful entrepreneurs. Brannan sought to protect the small farmer against competition from the large companies, but the plan was not accepted by Congress because farmers self-image would not allow for welfare.<ref>Karen J. Bradley, "Agrarian Ideology and Agricultural Policy: California Grangers and the Post-world War II Farm Policy Debate," ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(2): 240-256, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3744267 in JSTOR]</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ==National Security== | | ==National Security== |
| | ===Truman Doctrine and origins of Cold War=== | | ===Truman Doctrine and origins of Cold War=== |
| − | In early 1947 the British government, which was [[socialist]] but [[anti-Communist]], secretly told Washington its treasury was empty and it could no longer give military and economic aid to Greece or Turkey, requested the U.S. take over. Acheson convinced Truman to act quickly lest Greece be taken over by its communist partisans who were at the time strongly supported by the Soviet government working through the communist Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments. If Greece fell, Turkey would be helpless and soon the eastern Mediterranean would fall under Stalin’s control. In a dramatic message to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman said that the U. S. must take immediate and resolute action to support Greece and Turkey.<ref> Turkey did not have an insurrection, but it was such a bitter rival of Greece that it had to get money if Greece did.</ref> The Republican Congress, after extensive hearings, approved this historic change in U. S. foreign policy in a bill signed May 22, 1947. Thus was born the “Truman Doctrine.” Greece suppressed the insurgents; both Greece and Turkey joined NATO.<ref> | + | In early 1947 the British government, which was [[socialist]] but [[anti-Communist]], secretly told Washington its treasury was empty and it could no longer give military and economic aid to Greece or Turkey, requested the U.S. take over. Acheson convinced Truman to act quickly lest Greece be taken over by its communist partisans who were at the time strongly supported by the Soviet government working through the communist Bulgarian and Yugoslav governments. If Greece fell, Turkey would be helpless and soon the eastern Mediterranean would fall under Stalin’s control. In a dramatic message to Congress on March 12, 1947, President Truman said that the U. S. must take immediate and resolute action to support Greece and Turkey.<ref>Turkey did not have an insurrection, but it was such a bitter rival of Greece that it had to get money if Greece did.</ref> The Republican Congress, after extensive hearings, approved this historic change in U. S. foreign policy in a bill signed May 22, 1947. Thus was born the “Truman Doctrine.” Greece suppressed the insurgents; both Greece and Turkey joined NATO.<ref> |
| | Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," ''Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,'' Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 74-84 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039114 in JSTOR]</ref> | | Joseph C. Satterthwaite, "The Truman Doctrine: Turkey," ''Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,'' Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 74-84 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039114 in JSTOR]</ref> |
| | ===Recognition of Israel=== | | ===Recognition of Israel=== |
| − | Truman usually followed the advice of the State Department in national security matters, largely ignoring the Pentagon and Congress. [[Image:Israel48.jpg|thumb|400px|left]] In the case of recognition of the independent state of [[Israel]] in 1948, however, he overruled the urgent pleas of the State Department and immediately recognized Israel. State had warned that recognition would anger the Arabs in the Middle East; Truman, however, was more responsive to domestic politics, where support for Israel was widespread.<ref> Michael T. Benson, ''Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel'' (1997) [http://www.amazon.com/Harry-S-Truman-Founding-Israel/dp/0275958078/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1221429694&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]; for the State Department perspective see Evan M. Wilson, "The American Interest in the Palestine Question and the Establishment of Israel," ''Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,'' Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 64-73 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039113 in JSTOR]</ref> | + | Truman usually followed the advice of the State Department in national security matters, largely ignoring the Pentagon and Congress. [[Image:Israel48.jpg|thumb|400px|left]] In the case of recognition of the independent state of [[Israel]] in 1948, however, he overruled the urgent pleas of the State Department and immediately recognized Israel. State had warned that recognition would anger the Arabs in the Middle East; Truman, however, was more responsive to domestic politics, where support for Israel was widespread.<ref>Michael T. Benson, ''Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel'' (1997) [http://www.amazon.com/Harry-S-Truman-Founding-Israel/dp/0275958078/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1221429694&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]; for the State Department perspective see Evan M. Wilson, "The American Interest in the Palestine Question and the Establishment of Israel," ''Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,'' Vol. 401, (May, 1972), pp. 64-73 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1039113 in JSTOR]</ref> |
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| | ===Religion=== | | ===Religion=== |
| − | Truman, a Southern Baptist, sought religious allies in the Cold War. He tried to unite the world's religions in a spiritual crusade against communism, sending his personal representative to Pope [[Pius XII]] to coordinate not only with the Vatican but also with the heads of the Anglican, Lutheran, and Greek Orthodox churches. "If I can mobilize the people who believe in a moral world against the Bolshevik materialists," Truman wrote in 1947, "we can win this fight." Since the [[Roman Catholic Church]] was his strongest religious ally in the moral battle against international communism, Truman put Rome first in his global strategy, even trying to confer formal diplomatic recognition on the Vatican. At home, he received solid support from Catholics, who were a major element of the [[New Deal Coalition]], but overwhelming resistance from Protestants, especially Southern Baptists who rejected anything "popish." Truman's political-diplomatic effort to formalize a public, faith-driven, ecumenical international campaign failed.<ref> Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, "True Believers" ''Wilson Quarterly'' 2006 30(2): 40-44, 46-48. Issn: 0363-3276 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> | + | Truman, a Southern Baptist, sought religious allies in the Cold War. He tried to unite the world's religions in a spiritual crusade against communism, sending his personal representative to Pope [[Pius XII]] to coordinate not only with the Vatican but also with the heads of the Anglican, Lutheran, and Greek Orthodox churches. "If I can mobilize the people who believe in a moral world against the Bolshevik materialists," Truman wrote in 1947, "we can win this fight." Since the [[Roman Catholic Church]] was his strongest religious ally in the moral battle against international communism, Truman put Rome first in his global strategy, even trying to confer formal diplomatic recognition on the Vatican. At home, he received solid support from Catholics, who were a major element of the [[New Deal Coalition]], but overwhelming resistance from Protestants, especially Southern Baptists who rejected anything "popish." Truman's political-diplomatic effort to formalize a public, faith-driven, ecumenical international campaign failed.<ref>Elizabeth Edwards Spalding, "True Believers" ''Wilson Quarterly'' 2006 30(2): 40-44, 46-48. Issn: 0363-3276 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref> |
| | | | |
| | ===Loss of China=== | | ===Loss of China=== |
| − | [[Chiang Kai-shek]], America's wartime ally and head of the Nationalist forces in China, was caught between two wars—a war on China by Japan and a war with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists. The U.S. policy was to avoid a civil war and to threaten to withhold additional aid to the Nationalists unless they worked out a compromise. No compromise was possible, and Truman refused to send in combat troops to fight the civil war. General George Marshall, who spent a year in China as Truman's emissary, testified that combat aid might have prevented a Communist victory, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance. <ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General Albert C. Wedemeyer recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report. <ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him. <ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> | + | [[Chiang Kai-shek]], America's wartime ally and head of the Nationalist forces in China, was caught between two wars—a war on China by Japan and a war with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communists. The U.S. policy was to avoid a civil war and to threaten to withhold additional aid to the Nationalists unless they worked out a compromise. No compromise was possible, and Truman refused to send in combat troops to fight the civil war. General George Marshall, who spent a year in China as Truman's emissary, testified that combat aid might have prevented a Communist victory, but General David Barr's military mission to China was specifically instructed not to supply this kind of assistance.<ref>Military Situation in the Far East, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, 82nd Congress (Washington, 1951), p. 558.</ref> General Albert C. Wedemeyer recommended this approach in his report on his 1947 fact-finding mission, but Marshall personally suppressed the report.<ref>Tang Tsou, ''America's Failure in China, 1941-1945'', Chicago 1964, pg. 457.</ref> Chiang believed that the [[Truman Doctrine]] to [[Containment|contain]] the spread of [[International Communism]] directed from Moscow would be extended to China, and ordered an offensive as soon as word of the new policy reached him.<ref>Richard C. Thornton, ''China: A Political History, 1917-1980'', Boulder CO 1982, pg. 208.</ref> |
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| − | [[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18,1951 what the critics had been saying, | + | [[Dean Rusk]], Assistant Secretary of State in charge of the Far Eastern Division, said on May 18, 1951 what the critics had been saying, |
| | {{Cquote|The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world there is room for only one master. . . . How many Chinese in one community after another are being destroyed because they love China more than they love [[Soviet Russia]]? The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, [[democide|mass slaughter]], banishment to [[slavery|forced labor]] in [[Manchuria]] and Siberia. . . . The peace and security of China are being sacrificed by the ambitions of the Chinese conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure in foreign aggression.}} | | {{Cquote|The independence of China is gravely threatened. In the Communist world there is room for only one master. . . . How many Chinese in one community after another are being destroyed because they love China more than they love [[Soviet Russia]]? The freedoms of the Chinese people are disappearing. Trial by mob, [[democide|mass slaughter]], banishment to [[slavery|forced labor]] in [[Manchuria]] and Siberia. . . . The peace and security of China are being sacrificed by the ambitions of the Chinese conspiracy. China has been driven by foreign masters into an adventure in foreign aggression.}} |
| | | | |
| | Rusk continued, | | Rusk continued, |
| − | {{Cquote|We do not recognize the authorities in [[Peiping]] for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. . . . We recognize the [[Kuomintang|Nationalist government of the Republic of China]] even though the territory under its control is severely restricted. <ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the MacArthur Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}} | + | {{Cquote|We do not recognize the authorities in [[Peiping]] for what they pretend to be. It is not the government of China. It does not pass the first test. It is not Chinese. . . . We recognize the [[Kuomintang|Nationalist government of the Republic of China]] even though the territory under its control is severely restricted.<ref>Hearings before the Senate Committee on Armed Services and Committee on Foreign Relations (also known as the MacArthur Inquiry), June 2, 1951.</ref>…we believe it more authoritatively represents the views of the great body of the people of China, particularly their demand for independence from foreign control….That government will continue to receive important aid and assistance from the United States.}} |
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| | ===Risks in Korea=== | | ===Risks in Korea=== |
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| | The bipartisan statutory [[Moynihan Secrecy Commission]] concluded, "President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism." <ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Senate Document 105-2. 103rd Congress. Washington, D.C. United States Government Printing Office. 1997. [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/04dpm.pdf Chairman's Forward, pg. XL] pdf.</ref> | | The bipartisan statutory [[Moynihan Secrecy Commission]] concluded, "President Truman was almost willfully obtuse as regards American Communism." <ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. Senate Document 105-2. 103rd Congress. Washington, D.C. United States Government Printing Office. 1997. [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/04dpm.pdf Chairman's Forward, pg. XL] pdf.</ref> |
| | ===Foreign policy: détente to containment=== | | ===Foreign policy: détente to containment=== |
| − | Truman had no knowledge or interest in foreign policy before becoming president, and depended on the State Department for foreign policy advice.<ref> By 1946 he had two valuable aides Clark Clifford and George Elsey.</ref> Truman shifted from FDR's détente to [[containment]] as soon as [[Dean Acheson]] convinced him the Soviet Union was a long-term threat to American interests. They viewed communism as a secular, millennial religion that informed the Kremlin's worldview and actions and made it the chief threat to American security, liberty, and world peace. They rejected the moral equivalence of democratic and Communist governments and concluded that until the regime in Moscow changed only American and Allied strength could curb the Soviets. Following Acheson's advice, Truman in 1947 announced the [[Truman Doctrine]] of containing Communist expansion by furnishing military and economic American aid to Europe and Asia, and particularly to Greece and Turkey. He followed up with the [[Marshall Plan]], which was enacted into law as the European Recovery Program (ERP) and led ultimately to [[NATO]], the North Atlantic Alliance for military defense, signed in 1949. On May 14, 1948, Truman announced recognition of the new state of [[Israel]], making the United States the first major power to do so. | + | Truman had no knowledge or interest in foreign policy before becoming president, and depended on the State Department for foreign policy advice.<ref>By 1946 he had two valuable aides Clark Clifford and George Elsey.</ref> Truman shifted from FDR's détente to [[containment]] as soon as [[Dean Acheson]] convinced him the Soviet Union was a long-term threat to American interests. They viewed communism as a secular, millennial religion that informed the Kremlin's worldview and actions and made it the chief threat to American security, liberty, and world peace. They rejected the moral equivalence of democratic and Communist governments and concluded that until the regime in Moscow changed only American and Allied strength could curb the Soviets. Following Acheson's advice, Truman in 1947 announced the [[Truman Doctrine]] of containing Communist expansion by furnishing military and economic American aid to Europe and Asia, and particularly to Greece and Turkey. He followed up with the [[Marshall Plan]], which was enacted into law as the European Recovery Program (ERP) and led ultimately to [[NATO]], the North Atlantic Alliance for military defense, signed in 1949. On May 14, 1948, Truman announced recognition of the new state of [[Israel]], making the United States the first major power to do so. |
| | | | |
| | ==Korean War== | | ==Korean War== |
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| | Following NSC-68, Truman's last four budgets saw expenditures on national security quadruple from $13 billion in 1950 to $50 billion in 1953. | | Following NSC-68, Truman's last four budgets saw expenditures on national security quadruple from $13 billion in 1950 to $50 billion in 1953. |
| | [[Image:Mess1952.jpg|thumb|320px|Truman can't see the corruption all around him, according to this conservative editorial cartoon by Lute Pease in 1952]] | | [[Image:Mess1952.jpg|thumb|320px|Truman can't see the corruption all around him, according to this conservative editorial cartoon by Lute Pease in 1952]] |
| − | ===1952 election=== | + | ===1952 election=== |
| − | On the political front, revelation of scandals in the [[Reconstruction Finance Corporation]], in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and even the White House<ref> Truman's wife accepted an expensive deep freeze appliance in 1945; with General Vaughan as the fixer, the donor was given special privileges in Europe. </ref> opened the administration to attack. | + | On the political front, revelation of scandals in the [[Reconstruction Finance Corporation]], in the Bureau of Internal Revenue and even the White House<ref>Truman's wife accepted an expensive deep freeze appliance in 1945; with General Vaughan as the fixer, the donor was given special privileges in Europe.</ref> opened the administration to attack. |
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| | Truman sought reelection in 1952 despite his dismal showing in the polls. He was defeated in the New Hampshire primary by Senator [[Estes Kefauver]] of Tennessee, and withdrew. Truman supported Illinois Governor [[Adlai Stevenson]]. Eisenhower won the GOP nomination and crusading against the Truman administration's failures regarding "Korea, Communism and Corruption," was elected in a landslide, ending 20 years of Democratic control of the presidency. | | Truman sought reelection in 1952 despite his dismal showing in the polls. He was defeated in the New Hampshire primary by Senator [[Estes Kefauver]] of Tennessee, and withdrew. Truman supported Illinois Governor [[Adlai Stevenson]]. Eisenhower won the GOP nomination and crusading against the Truman administration's failures regarding "Korea, Communism and Corruption," was elected in a landslide, ending 20 years of Democratic control of the presidency. |
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| | Truman's reputation among scholars has gone from very low when he left office, to high after 1990. He is now widely considered to have been a tough-minded, decisive, and effective leader who ably guided the nation through the perilous waters of the early Cold War and whose policy of containment essentially laid the foundations for American "victory" in that prolonged conflict in 1989. For many historians, the down-to-earth Midwesterner now merits consideration as one of the greatest American presidents. In recent years presidential aspirants of both parties have claimed Truman as their own, especially if their election chances seem as hopeless as Truman's did in 1948. His reputation has been bolstered by scholarly biographies by Ferrell (1994), Hamby (1995), and especially McCullough's Pulitzer prize-winning popular biography (1992). The in-depth analysis by Leffler (1992), cautiously praised the Truman administration's essential wisdom in handling a myriad of problems. | | Truman's reputation among scholars has gone from very low when he left office, to high after 1990. He is now widely considered to have been a tough-minded, decisive, and effective leader who ably guided the nation through the perilous waters of the early Cold War and whose policy of containment essentially laid the foundations for American "victory" in that prolonged conflict in 1989. For many historians, the down-to-earth Midwesterner now merits consideration as one of the greatest American presidents. In recent years presidential aspirants of both parties have claimed Truman as their own, especially if their election chances seem as hopeless as Truman's did in 1948. His reputation has been bolstered by scholarly biographies by Ferrell (1994), Hamby (1995), and especially McCullough's Pulitzer prize-winning popular biography (1992). The in-depth analysis by Leffler (1992), cautiously praised the Truman administration's essential wisdom in handling a myriad of problems. |
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| − | While Truman's public image was headed up, his reputation among scholars declined in the 1970s. Kirkendall concluded in 1974 that negative appraisals of Truman and his administration "may in fact have become the dominant interpretation, at least among the younger scholars."<ref> Kirkendall, ''Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal 1972'' (1974) p 6</ref> In terms of foreign policy a strong negative view comes from Offner (2002) who argues that Truman was a "parochial nationalist" whose "uncritical belief in the superiority of American values and political-economic interests," conviction that "the Soviet Union and Communism were the root cause of international strife," and "inability to comprehend Asian politics and nationalism" intensified the postwar conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, precipitated the division of Europe, and set Sino-American relations on a path of long-term animosity. Rather than being a great statesman who carefully weighed various policy alternatives, Offner asserts that Truman's myopia "created a rigid framework in which the United States waged long-term, extremely costly global cold war". As his title suggests, the Cold War was at best a Pyrrhic victory for the United States.<ref> Quotes from Offner (2002) p. xii</ref> | + | While Truman's public image was headed up, his reputation among scholars declined in the 1970s. Kirkendall concluded in 1974 that negative appraisals of Truman and his administration "may in fact have become the dominant interpretation, at least among the younger scholars."<ref>Kirkendall, ''Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal 1972'' (1974) p 6</ref> In terms of foreign policy a strong negative view comes from Offner (2002) who argues that Truman was a "parochial nationalist" whose "uncritical belief in the superiority of American values and political-economic interests," conviction that "the Soviet Union and Communism were the root cause of international strife," and "inability to comprehend Asian politics and nationalism" intensified the postwar conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, precipitated the division of Europe, and set Sino-American relations on a path of long-term animosity. Rather than being a great statesman who carefully weighed various policy alternatives, Offner asserts that Truman's myopia "created a rigid framework in which the United States waged long-term, extremely costly global cold war". As his title suggests, the Cold War was at best a Pyrrhic victory for the United States.<ref>Quotes from Offner (2002) p. xii</ref> |
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| | Truman became the model of the underdog who fights back and wins when the experts unanimously predict defeat. Gerald Ford, who had bitterly denounced Truman as a young Congressman proudly proclaimed the Missourian as his hero and conspicuously displayed a bust of Truman in the oval office after Ford became president in 1974. In the 1976 campaign both Ford and his Democratic rival, [[Jimmy Carter]], outdid one another in claiming to be cast from the Truman mold. By 1980 when the Gallup Poll asked "Of all the Presidents we've ever had, who do you wish were President?", Harry Truman finished an impressive third behind Kennedy and FDR. | | Truman became the model of the underdog who fights back and wins when the experts unanimously predict defeat. Gerald Ford, who had bitterly denounced Truman as a young Congressman proudly proclaimed the Missourian as his hero and conspicuously displayed a bust of Truman in the oval office after Ford became president in 1974. In the 1976 campaign both Ford and his Democratic rival, [[Jimmy Carter]], outdid one another in claiming to be cast from the Truman mold. By 1980 when the Gallup Poll asked "Of all the Presidents we've ever had, who do you wish were President?", Harry Truman finished an impressive third behind Kennedy and FDR. |
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| | * "No man should be allowed to be President who does not understand hogs." <ref>[http://books.google.com/books?id=FEnGUlTdwaUC&pg=PT52&dq=No+man+should+be+allowed+to+be+President+who+does+not+understand+hogs.&lr=&ei=qTMQTN_MIpeIzQTT38TyCg&cd=3#v=onepage&q=No%20man%20should%20be%20allowed%20to%20be%20President%20who%20does%20not%20understand%20hogs.&f=false A field guide to pigs By John Pukite]</ref> | | * "No man should be allowed to be President who does not understand hogs." <ref>[http://books.google.com/books?id=FEnGUlTdwaUC&pg=PT52&dq=No+man+should+be+allowed+to+be+President+who+does+not+understand+hogs.&lr=&ei=qTMQTN_MIpeIzQTT38TyCg&cd=3#v=onepage&q=No%20man%20should%20be%20allowed%20to%20be%20President%20who%20does%20not%20understand%20hogs.&f=false A field guide to pigs By John Pukite]</ref> |
| | | | |
| − | ==See Also== | + | ==See also== |
| | * [[World War II]] | | * [[World War II]] |
| | * [[Anti-Communist]] | | * [[Anti-Communist]] |
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| | * Graff, Henry F., ed. ''The Presidents: A Reference History''. 2nd ed. 1996, 443–458. ISBN 0-684-80471-9; by leading scholar | | * Graff, Henry F., ed. ''The Presidents: A Reference History''. 2nd ed. 1996, 443–458. ISBN 0-684-80471-9; by leading scholar |
| | * Hamby, Alonzo L. ''Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman'' (1995), the best scholarly biography; written by conservative historian who likes HST | | * Hamby, Alonzo L. ''Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman'' (1995), the best scholarly biography; written by conservative historian who likes HST |
| − | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 106, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 33-55 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152173 in JSTOR] | + | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "An American Democrat: A Reevaluation of the Personality of Harry S. Truman," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 106, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 33–55 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2152173 in JSTOR] |
| | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "Truman, Harry S."; [http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00307.html; ''American National Biography'' Online Feb. 2000] by a leading conservative historian | | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "Truman, Harry S."; [http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00307.html; ''American National Biography'' Online Feb. 2000] by a leading conservative historian |
| | * Kirkendall, Richard S. ''Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia'' (1990), very useful articles on people, events and policies in HST's career | | * Kirkendall, Richard S. ''Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia'' (1990), very useful articles on people, events and policies in HST's career |
| − | * Kirkendall Richard S. "Harry S Truman a Missouri Farmer in the Golden Age," ''Agricultural History,'' Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 467-483 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3741384 in JSTOR] | + | * Kirkendall Richard S. "Harry S Truman a Missouri Farmer in the Golden Age," ''Agricultural History,'' Vol. 48, No. 4 (Oct., 1974), pp. 467–483 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3741384 in JSTOR] |
| | * McCullough, David. ''Truman''. (1993), 1120 pp ISBN 0-671-86920-5 best-selling biography; moderate in tone; Pulitzer Prize [http://www.amazon.com/Truman-David-McCullough/dp/0671869205/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193347436&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * McCullough, David. ''Truman''. (1993), 1120 pp ISBN 0-671-86920-5 best-selling biography; moderate in tone; Pulitzer Prize [http://www.amazon.com/Truman-David-McCullough/dp/0671869205/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193347436&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * McCullough, David. ''Harry S. Truman'', short essay [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/essays/truman.html online edition] | | * McCullough, David. ''Harry S. Truman'', short essay [http://www.pbs.org/newshour/character/essays/truman.html online edition] |
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| | * Graff, Henry F., ed. ''The Presidents: A Reference History''. 2nd ed. 1996, 443–458. ISBN 0-684-80471-9 | | * Graff, Henry F., ed. ''The Presidents: A Reference History''. 2nd ed. 1996, 443–458. ISBN 0-684-80471-9 |
| | * Hamby, Alonzo L. ''Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman'' (1995), very well received scholarly biography [http://www.amazon.com/Man-People-Truman-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0195124979/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193438333&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search] | | * Hamby, Alonzo L. ''Man of the People: A Life of Harry S. Truman'' (1995), very well received scholarly biography [http://www.amazon.com/Man-People-Truman-Oxford-Paperbacks/dp/0195124979/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193438333&sr=1-1 excerpt and text search] |
| − | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "The Liberals, Truman, and the FDR as Symbol and Myth," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 56, No. 4 (Mar., 1970), pp. 859-867 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1917522 in JSTOR] | + | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "The Liberals, Truman, and the FDR as Symbol and Myth," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 56, No. 4 (Mar., 1970), pp. 859–867 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1917522 in JSTOR] |
| | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "Truman, Harry S."; [http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00307.html; ''American National Biography'' Online Feb. 2000] | | * Hamby, Alonzo L. "Truman, Harry S."; [http://www.anb.org/articles/07/07-00307.html; ''American National Biography'' Online Feb. 2000] |
| | * Kirkendall, Richard S. ''Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia'' (1990) | | * Kirkendall, Richard S. ''Harry S. Truman Encyclopedia'' (1990) |
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| | | | |
| | ===Foreign policy=== | | ===Foreign policy=== |
| − | * Appleman, Roy E. ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950)'' (United States Army in the Korean War) (1960); official U.S. Army history, [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm online version] | + | * Appleman, Roy E. ''South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June–November 1950)'' (United States Army in the Korean War) (1960); official U.S. Army history, [http://www.army.mil/cmh-pg/books/korea/20-2-1/toc.htm online version] |
| | * Beisner, Robert L. ''Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War'' (2006), 800pp; a standard scholarly biography; covers 1945-53 only | | * Beisner, Robert L. ''Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War'' (2006), 800pp; a standard scholarly biography; covers 1945-53 only |
| | * Benson, Michael T. ''Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/read/15103137 online edition] | | * Benson, Michael T. ''Harry S. Truman and the Founding of Israel'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/read/15103137 online edition] |
| − | * Berger, Henry. "Bipartisanship, Senator Taft, and the Truman Administration," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 90, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 221-237 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148235 in JSTOR] | + | * Berger, Henry. "Bipartisanship, Senator Taft, and the Truman Administration," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 90, No. 2 (Summer, 1975), pp. 221–237 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148235 in JSTOR] |
| − | * Bernstein Barton J. "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 90, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 23-69 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148698 in JSTOR], influential New left essay | + | * Bernstein Barton J. "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation," ''Political Science Quarterly,'' Vol. 90, No. 1 (Spring, 1975), pp. 23–69 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2148698 in JSTOR], influential New left essay |
| | * Blair, Clay ''The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953'', Naval Institute Press (2003) revisionist study that attacks Truman and top Army leaders for near-criminal incompetence | | * Blair, Clay ''The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-1953'', Naval Institute Press (2003) revisionist study that attacks Truman and top Army leaders for near-criminal incompetence |
| − | * Divine, Robert A. "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," ''The Journal of American History,'' Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jun., 1972), pp. 90-110 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8723%28197206%2959%3A1%3C90%3ATCWATE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C in JSTOR] | + | * Divine, Robert A. "The Cold War and the Election of 1948," ''The Journal of American History,'' Vol. 59, No. 1 (Jun., 1972), pp. 90–110 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0021-8723%28197206%2959%3A1%3C90%3ATCWATE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C in JSTOR] |
| − | * Frazier, Robert. "Acheson and the Formulation of the Truman Doctrine" ''Journal of Modern Greek Studies'' 17#2 (1999), pp. 229-251 online at [[Project Muse]] | + | * Frazier, Robert. "Acheson and the Formulation of the Truman Doctrine" ''Journal of Modern Greek Studies'' 17#2 (1999), pp. 229–251 online at [[Project Muse]] |
| | * Gaddis, John Lewis. "Reconsiderations: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" ''Foreign Affairs'' 1974 52(2): 386-402. ISSN 0015-7120 | | * Gaddis, John Lewis. "Reconsiderations: Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?" ''Foreign Affairs'' 1974 52(2): 386-402. ISSN 0015-7120 |
| − | * Giangreco, D. M. "'A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas': President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan," ''Pacific Historical Review,'' Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 93-132 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3642102 in JSTOR] shows Truman was indeed by very high invasion casualties | + | * Giangreco, D. M. "'A Score of Bloody Okinawas and Iwo Jimas': President Truman and Casualty Estimates for the Invasion of Japan," ''Pacific Historical Review,'' Vol. 72, No. 1 (Feb., 2003), pp. 93–132 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3642102 in JSTOR] shows Truman was indeed by very high invasion casualties |
| | * Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. ''Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.'' (2005). 382 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Racing-Enemy-Stalin-Truman-Surrender/dp/0674016939/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193349212&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. ''Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan.'' (2005). 382 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Racing-Enemy-Stalin-Truman-Surrender/dp/0674016939/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193349212&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Hogan, Michael J. ''A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954'' (2000) [http://www.amazon.com/Cross-Iron-National-Security-19451954/dp/0521795370/ref=sr_1_34/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193347927&sr=8-34 excerpt and text search] | | * Hogan, Michael J. ''A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954'' (2000) [http://www.amazon.com/Cross-Iron-National-Security-19451954/dp/0521795370/ref=sr_1_34/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193347927&sr=8-34 excerpt and text search] |
| | * Ivie, Robert L. "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1999 29(3): 570-591. ISSN 0360-4918 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001303753 online edition] | | * Ivie, Robert L. "Fire, Flood, and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech." ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 1999 29(3): 570-591. ISSN 0360-4918 [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5001303753 online edition] |
| | * Lacey, Michael J. ed. ''The Truman Presidency'' (1989), major essays by scholars | | * Lacey, Michael J. ed. ''The Truman Presidency'' (1989), major essays by scholars |
| − | * Matray, James I. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 66, No. 2 (Sep., 1979), pp. 314-333 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1900879 in JSTOR] Truman planned rollback of Communism in North Korea | + | * Matray, James I. "Truman's Plan for Victory: National Self-Determination and the Thirty-Eighth Parallel Decision in Korea," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 66, No. 2 (Sep., 1979), pp. 314–333 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1900879 in JSTOR] Truman planned rollback of Communism in North Korea |
| | * Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity" ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 27-37. ISSN 0360-4918 | | * Merrill, Dennis. "The Truman Doctrine: Containing Communism and Modernity" ''Presidential Studies Quarterly'' 2006 36(1): 27-37. ISSN 0360-4918 |
| | * Offner, Arnold A. "'Another Such Victory': President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War." ''Diplomatic History'' 1999 23(2): 127-155. ISSN 0145-2096 | | * Offner, Arnold A. "'Another Such Victory': President Truman, American Foreign Policy, and the Cold War." ''Diplomatic History'' 1999 23(2): 127-155. ISSN 0145-2096 |
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| | * Wainstock, Dennis D. ''Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War'' (1999) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=23387043 online edition] | | * Wainstock, Dennis D. ''Truman, MacArthur, and the Korean War'' (1999) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=23387043 online edition] |
| | * Walker, J. Samuel. ''Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35245486 online complete edition]; [http://www.amazon.com/Prompt-Utter-Destruction-Truman-Against/dp/080785607X/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193348187&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] | | * Walker, J. Samuel. ''Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=35245486 online complete edition]; [http://www.amazon.com/Prompt-Utter-Destruction-Truman-Against/dp/080785607X/ref=sr_1_1/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193348187&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search] |
| − | * Walker, J. Samuel. "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground" ''Diplomatic History'' April 2005 - Vol. 29 Issue 2 Pp 311-334 fulltext in [[EBSCO]] | + | * Walker, J. Samuel. "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: A Search for Middle Ground" ''Diplomatic History'' April 2005 - Vol. 29 Issue 2 pp 311–334 fulltext in [[EBSCO]] |
| | | | |
| | ===Domestic policy and politics=== | | ===Domestic policy and politics=== |
| − | * Bernstein Barton J. "The Truman Administration and the Steel Strike of 1946," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 52, No. 4 (Mar., 1966), pp. 791-803 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1894347 in JSTOR] | + | * Bernstein Barton J. "The Truman Administration and the Steel Strike of 1946," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 52, No. 4 (Mar., 1966), pp. 791–803 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1894347 in JSTOR] |
| − | * Billington, Monroe. "Civil Rights, President Truman and the South," ''Journal of Negro History,'' Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 127-139 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2716825 in JSTOR] | + | * Billington, Monroe. "Civil Rights, President Truman and the South," ''Journal of Negro History,'' Vol. 58, No. 2 (Apr., 1973), pp. 127–139 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2716825 in JSTOR] |
| | * Dean, Virgil W. "Charles F. Brannan and the Rise and Fall of Truman's 'Fair Deal' for Farmers." ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(1): 28-53. Issn: 0002-1482 | | * Dean, Virgil W. "Charles F. Brannan and the Rise and Fall of Truman's 'Fair Deal' for Farmers." ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(1): 28-53. Issn: 0002-1482 |
| | * Dean, Virgil W. ''An Opportunity Lost: The Truman Administration and the Farm Policy Debate.'' 2006. 275 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Opportunity-Lost-Truman-Administration-Policy/dp/0826216501/ref=sr_1_10/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193434622&sr=1-10 excerpt and text search] | | * Dean, Virgil W. ''An Opportunity Lost: The Truman Administration and the Farm Policy Debate.'' 2006. 275 pp. [http://www.amazon.com/Opportunity-Lost-Truman-Administration-Policy/dp/0826216501/ref=sr_1_10/103-4827826-5463040?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1193434622&sr=1-10 excerpt and text search] |
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| | * Pietrusza, David ''1948: Harry Truman's Improbable Victory and the Year that Changed America'' (2011) | | * Pietrusza, David ''1948: Harry Truman's Improbable Victory and the Year that Changed America'' (2011) |
| | * Ryan, Halford R. ''Harry S. Truman: Presidential Rhetoric'' (1993) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=27994601 online edition] | | * Ryan, Halford R. ''Harry S. Truman: Presidential Rhetoric'' (1993) [http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=27994601 online edition] |
| − | * Sitkoff, Harvard. "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics," ''Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 37, No. 4 (Nov., 1971), pp. 597-616 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2206548 in JSTOR] | + | * Sitkoff, Harvard. "Harry Truman and the Election of 1948: The Coming of Age of Civil Rights in American Politics," ''Journal of Southern History,'' Vol. 37, No. 4 (Nov., 1971), pp. 597–616 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2206548 in JSTOR] |
| − | * Theoharis, Athan. "The Truman Administration and the Decline of Civil Liberties: The FBI's Success in Securing Authorization for a Preventive Detention Program," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 64, No. 4 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1010-1030 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890734 in JSTOR], leftwing attack on Truman for being too harsh on possible subversives | + | * Theoharis, Athan. "The Truman Administration and the Decline of Civil Liberties: The FBI's Success in Securing Authorization for a Preventive Detention Program," ''Journal of American History,'' Vol. 64, No. 4 (Mar., 1978), pp. 1010–1030 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1890734 in JSTOR], leftwing attack on Truman for being too harsh on possible subversives |
| | * Theoharis, Athan. ''The Truman Presidency: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the National Security State'' (1979), revisionist, New left attack on HST | | * Theoharis, Athan. ''The Truman Presidency: The Origins of the Imperial Presidency and the National Security State'' (1979), revisionist, New left attack on HST |
| | * Theoharis, Athan. ''Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism'' (1977), New Left attack on HST for being so hostile to domestic Communists | | * Theoharis, Athan. ''Seeds of Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of McCarthyism'' (1977), New Left attack on HST for being so hostile to domestic Communists |