Changes

Truman began with very high popularity ratings, but they plunged to the lowest on record. Democrats were unable to stop his renomination in 1948, but the far left nominated FDR's vice president [[Henry A. Wallace]], and southern conservative Democrats nominated Dixiecrat [[J. Strom Thurmond]]. Observers almost unanimously expected victory for the Republican candidate, Governor [[Thomas E. Dewey]], liberal from New York.  Total astonishment greeted Truman's stunning election victory, as he reassembled the [[New Deal Coalition]] for the fifth consecutive victory, pulling in on his coattails a Democratic Congress.

Truman began with very high popularity ratings, but they plunged to the lowest on record. Democrats were unable to stop his renomination in 1948, but the far left nominated FDR's vice president [[Henry A. Wallace]], and southern conservative Democrats nominated Dixiecrat [[J. Strom Thurmond]]. Observers almost unanimously expected victory for the Republican candidate, Governor [[Thomas E. Dewey]], liberal from New York.  Total astonishment greeted Truman's stunning election victory, as he reassembled the [[New Deal Coalition]] for the fifth consecutive victory, pulling in on his coattails a Democratic Congress.

Although the Democrats organized Congress in 1949, the [[Conservative Coalition]] of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats was in control, and Truman was to pass any of his liberal [[Fair Deal|Fair Deal program]]. Nevertheless he he pursued civil rights through executive orders, especially a 1948 order to end racial discrimination in the military. Blacks remained in segregated units, but were to receive equal treatment. Truman's failures to deal with "Korea, Communism and Corruption" forced him to withdraw from reelection in 1952 and gave the Republicans an opportunity to crusade against him and elect [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] in 1952.

Although the Democrats organized Congress in 1949, the [[Conservative Coalition]] of Northern Republicans and Southern Democrats was in control, and Truman was to pass any of his liberal [[Fair Deal|Fair Deal program]]. Nevertheless, he pursued civil rights through executive orders, especially a 1948 order to end racial discrimination in the military. Blacks remained in segregated units, but were to receive equal treatment. Truman's failures to deal with "Korea, Communism and Corruption" forced him to withdraw from reelection in 1952 and gave the Republicans an opportunity to crusade against him and elect [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]] in 1952.

Overshadowed at first by his predecessor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], Truman established a reputation as a blunt, unsophisticated fighter for the common man, who took responsibility for his actions because, he said, "the buck stops here."  His stunning reelection victory in 1948 baffled the experts and has inspired underdogs ever since.  He is more popular in 2009 than ever.  His policy positions make him a heroic icon for liberals.

Overshadowed at first by his predecessor, [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]], Truman established a reputation as a blunt, unsophisticated fighter for the common man, who took responsibility for his actions because, he said, "the buck stops here."  His stunning reelection victory in 1948 baffled the experts and has inspired underdogs ever since.  He is more popular in 2009 than ever.  His policy positions make him a heroic icon for liberals.

====How the decision was made====

====How the decision was made====

The decision to drop the atomic bomb has been the focus of one of the most heated debates among both scholars and the public since 1945. After 1945 the debate was dominated by "traditionalist" scholars, who argued that the U.S. had no choice but to drop the bomb as a way to bring World War II to an end. The traditionalists were succeeded in the 1960s by "revisionists," who asserted that the dropping of the bomb was done to intimidate Stalin, not end the war. The leading revisionist historians emerged from the "new left" movement of the 1960s and rejected any notion of the moral superiority of America or capitalism to the Soviet Union.  They thought the Cold War and containment were poor policies and generally favored détente, along the lines proposed by Henry Wallace. They include Gar Alperovitz, Barton J. Bernstein, Kai Bird, Diane Shaver Clemens, Bruce Cumings, Richard Freeland, Lloyd Gardner, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber, Thomas Paterson, Harvard Sitkoff, Ronald Steel, Athan Theoharis, and William A. Williams (the leader of the "Wisconsin School"). The revisionists are not monolithic, but they usually agree that Truman and his advisers were wrong whether the issue is the Cold War, Korea, or the atomic bomb. Revisionists had argued that Truman's goal at Potsdam was to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the atomic bomb was used to scare them off. However in 1983 archivists discovered a letter Truman wrote to his wife from Potsdam on July 18, 1945: "I've gotten what I came for-- Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it . . . I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That's the important thing."<ref>''New York Times'' March 14, 1983.</ref>

The decision to drop the atomic bomb has been the focus of one of the most heated debates among both scholars and the public since 1945. After 1945 the debate was dominated by "traditionalist" scholars, who argued that the U.S. had no choice but to drop the bomb as a way to bring World War II to an end. The traditionalists were succeeded in the 1960s by "revisionists," who asserted that the dropping of the bomb was done to intimidate Stalin, not end the war. The leading revisionist historians emerged from the "new left" movement of the 1960s and rejected any notion of the moral superiority of America or capitalism to the Soviet Union.  They thought the Cold War and containment were poor policies and generally favored détente, along the lines proposed by Henry Wallace. They include Gar Alperovitz, Barton J. Bernstein, Kai Bird, Diane Shaver Clemens, Bruce Cumings, Richard Freeland, Lloyd Gardner, Gabriel Kolko, Walter LaFeber, Thomas Paterson, Harvard Sitkoff, Ronald Steel, Athan Theoharis, and William A. Williams (the leader of the "Wisconsin School"). The revisionists are not monolithic, but they usually agree that Truman and his advisers were wrong whether the issue is the Cold War, Korea, or the atomic bomb. Revisionists had argued that Truman's goal at Potsdam was to prevent Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the atomic bomb was used to scare them off. However, in 1983 archivists discovered a letter Truman wrote to his wife from Potsdam on July 18, 1945: "I've gotten what I came for-- Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it . . . I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That's the important thing."<ref>''New York Times'' March 14, 1983.</ref>

In the 1990s, a more nuanced historical approach emerged searching for a middle ground, offering a number of more credible studies, essentially arguing that neither the traditional nor the revisionist interpretations were entirely satisfactory.<ref>J. Samuel Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: a Search for Middle Ground." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 311-334. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

In the 1990s, a more nuanced historical approach emerged searching for a middle ground, offering a number of more credible studies, essentially arguing that neither the traditional nor the revisionist interpretations were entirely satisfactory.<ref>J. Samuel Walker, "Recent Literature on Truman's Atomic Bomb Decision: a Search for Middle Ground." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(2): 311-334. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]</ref>

Truman won the farm vote in 1948 by charging the GOP shoved "a pitchfork in the farmer's back", but was unable to get new farm programs passed. His second secretary of agriculture, Charles F. Brannan promoted the Brannan Plan, intended to bring widespread changes to farm policy. Brannan proposed to replace market price supports with direct income payments to farmers. His plan set ceilings on the amount a farmer could receive and limited the program to farmers who did not exceed a set production mark. The Brannan Plan was supposed to foster the "family-sized farm" while providing affordable food for consumers. While Brannan could count on support from the left, especially the National Farmers Union (which was small), labor unions (which were powerful), and consumer groups (which were weak), he was opposed by leading farm economists and the national Farm Bureau (which was large) and the national Chamber of Commerce (representing business). The head of the Farm Bureau decried the plan as intrusive, a form of "creeping socialism," and expensive. The Farm Bureau, dominated by conservatives, resisted any curbs on full agricultural production. A bloc of Midwestern Republican and southern Democratic congressmen opposed replacing market mechanisms with outright government payments to farmers and setting limits on supports to individual farms. The Brannan Plan went nowhere and instead, the conservative farm bloc passed the Agricultural Act of 1949 with high price supports.<ref>See Dean (2006)</ref>

Truman won the farm vote in 1948 by charging the GOP shoved "a pitchfork in the farmer's back", but was unable to get new farm programs passed. His second secretary of agriculture, Charles F. Brannan promoted the Brannan Plan, intended to bring widespread changes to farm policy. Brannan proposed to replace market price supports with direct income payments to farmers. His plan set ceilings on the amount a farmer could receive and limited the program to farmers who did not exceed a set production mark. The Brannan Plan was supposed to foster the "family-sized farm" while providing affordable food for consumers. While Brannan could count on support from the left, especially the National Farmers Union (which was small), labor unions (which were powerful), and consumer groups (which were weak), he was opposed by leading farm economists and the national Farm Bureau (which was large) and the national Chamber of Commerce (representing business). The head of the Farm Bureau decried the plan as intrusive, a form of "creeping socialism," and expensive. The Farm Bureau, dominated by conservatives, resisted any curbs on full agricultural production. A bloc of Midwestern Republican and southern Democratic congressmen opposed replacing market mechanisms with outright government payments to farmers and setting limits on supports to individual farms. The Brannan Plan went nowhere and instead, the conservative farm bloc passed the Agricultural Act of 1949 with high price supports.<ref>See Dean (2006)</ref>

Brannan justified his plan of direct assistance to small farmers, by reasserting the importance of the small family farmer as the foundation of American democracy. However in the [[Grange]] small farmers opposed the plan because it too closely resembled welfare and would undermine their self image as independent [[yeomen]] and successful entrepreneurs. Brannan sought to protect the small farmer against competition from the large companies, but the plan was not accepted by Congress because farmers self-image would not allow for welfare.<ref>Karen J. Bradley, "Agrarian Ideology and Agricultural Policy: California Grangers and the Post-world War II Farm Policy Debate," ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(2): 240-256, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3744267  in JSTOR]</ref>

Brannan justified his plan of direct assistance to small farmers, by reasserting the importance of the small family farmer as the foundation of American democracy. However, in the [[Grange]] small farmers opposed the plan because it too closely resembled welfare and would undermine their self-image as independent [[yeomen]] and successful entrepreneurs. Brannan sought to protect the small farmer against competition from the large companies, but the plan was not accepted by Congress because farmers self-image would not allow for welfare.<ref>Karen J. Bradley, "Agrarian Ideology and Agricultural Policy: California Grangers and the Post-world War II Farm Policy Debate," ''Agricultural History'' 1995 69(2): 240-256, [http://www.jstor.org/stable/3744267  in JSTOR]</ref>

==National Security==

==National Security==