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| | ===Details=== | | ===Details=== |
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| − | Time: April 15 - April 19, 1961 | + | Time: April 15–19, 1961 |
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| − | Place: [[Bay of Pigs]], South of Matanzas Province Cuba | + | Place: Bay of Pigs, South of Matanzas Province Cuba |
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| | Result: Victory for the Castro leadership of Cuba | | Result: Victory for the Castro leadership of Cuba |
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| − | Castro government commanders: [Fidel Castro]], [[Jose Ramon Fernandez]], and Hispano Soviet Francisco Ciutat de Miguel | + | Castro government commanders: [[Fidel Castro]], [[Jose Ramon Fernandez]], and Hispano Soviet Francisco Ciutat de Miguel |
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| | Invader leadership CIA: | | Invader leadership CIA: |
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| | Strength invading forces: 1,500 | | Strength invading forces: 1,500 |
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| − | Casualties Castro forces various estimates; over 1,600 dead (Triay p. 81) to 5,000 total estimated (Grayston) | + | Casualties Castro forces various estimates; over 1,600 dead (Triay p. 81) to 5,000 total estimated (Grayston) |
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| | Casualties Invading forces 115 dead and 1,189 captured | | Casualties Invading forces 115 dead and 1,189 captured |
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| | Tensions between the United States and Cuba had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy judged that Castro's policies, including the expropriation of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated. | | Tensions between the United States and Cuba had increased steadily since the [[Cuban Revolution]] of 1959. Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy judged that Castro's policies, including the expropriation of US assets on the island and Cuba's increasing ties with the [[Soviet Union]], could not be tolerated. |
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| − | On March 17, 1960, Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand"> ''A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965 </ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the ''Sierra Madre'' mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/> | + | On March 17, 1960, Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand">''A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965</ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the ''Sierra Madre'' mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/> |
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| − | The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran|Iranian]] prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. Richard Mervin Bissell Jr., one of Allen Dulles's three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata." | + | The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran]]ian prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. Richard Mervin Bissell Jr., one of Allen Dulles's three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata." |
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| − | The original plan called for landing the exile brigade in the vicinity of the old colonial city of Trinidad in the central province of Sancti Spiritus approximately 400 km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the Escambray mountains. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter. Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in [[Guatemala]] for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat. | + | The original plan called for landing the exile brigade in the vicinity of the old colonial city of Trinidad in the central province of Sancti Spiritus approximately 400 km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the Escambray mountains. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter. Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in [[Guatemala]] for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat. |
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| | On February 17, 1961, Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of B-26 medium bombers, Hawker Sea Furies (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven fighter-bomber) and T-33 jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref> | | On February 17, 1961, Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of B-26 medium bombers, Hawker Sea Furies (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven fighter-bomber) and T-33 jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref> |
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| − | As Washington's plans evolved, critical details were changed that were to hamper chances of a successful mission without direct U.S. help. These revised details included changing the landing area for Brigade 2506 to two points in Matanzas Province, 202 km southeast of [[Havana]] on the eastern edge of the Zapata peninsula at the [[Bay of Pigs|Bahía de Cochinos]] (Bay of Pigs). The landings would now take place on the Girón and Playa Larga beaches. This change effectively cut off contact with the rebels in the Escambray "[[War Against the Bandits]]". The Castro government also had been warned by senior [[KGB]] agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who respectively died violently before and after the invasion. <!--(Welch and Blight, p. 113)--> | + | As Washington's plans evolved, critical details were changed that were to hamper chances of a successful mission without direct U.S. help. These revised details included changing the landing area for Brigade 2506 to two points in Matanzas Province, 202 km southeast of [[Havana]] on the eastern edge of the Zapata peninsula at the Bahía de Cochinos (Bay of Pigs). The landings would now take place on the Girón and Playa Larga beaches. This change effectively cut off contact with the rebels in the Escambray "[[War Against the Bandits]]". The Castro government also had been warned by senior [[KGB]] agents Osvaldo Sánchez Cabrera and "Aragon", who respectively died violently before and after the invasion. <!--(Welch and Blight, p. 113)--> |
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| | ==Soviet Advisers to Cuban Government Forces== | | ==Soviet Advisers to Cuban Government Forces== |
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| − | Cuban militia, artillery, and intelligence are necessary to field a regular army. Foreign advisors were brought from "Eastern Block" countries; the most senior of these were Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Alberto Bayo<ref>(Paz-Sanchez, 2001, pp 189-199) </ref>. Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pablovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as La Coubre explosion; he was wounded in the foot during the [[War Against the Bandits]], the type of wound that is common to senior officers observing combat at the edge of effective rifle range. Date of wound is not given in references cited [http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Personajes/Militares/Militares1.htm], [http://lateclaconcafe.blogia.com/2006/120501]. | + | Cuban militia, artillery, and intelligence are necessary to field a regular army. Foreign advisors were brought from "Eastern Block" countries; the most senior of these were Francisco Ciutat de Miguel, Enrique Lister, and Alberto Bayo.<ref>(Paz-Sanchez, 2001, pp 189-199)</ref> Ciutat de Miguel (Masonic name: Algazel; Russian name: Pavel Pablovich Stepanov; Cuban alias: Ángel Martínez Riosola, commonly referred to as Angelito) is said to have arrived the same day as La Coubre explosion; he was wounded in the foot during the [[War Against the Bandits]], the type of wound that is common to senior officers observing combat at the edge of effective rifle range. Date of wound is not given in references cited [http://www.sbhac.net/Republica/Personajes/Militares/Militares1.htm], [http://lateclaconcafe.blogia.com/2006/120501]. |
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| | ==Invasion== | | ==Invasion== |
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| | On April 17, four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the ''Houston'', ''Río Escondido'', ''Caribe'', and ''Atlántico'') transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the Southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI's), called the ''Blagar'' and ''Barbara J'', containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to [[Havana]]. The CIA assumed that the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the | | On April 17, four 2,400-ton chartered transports (named the ''Houston'', ''Río Escondido'', ''Caribe'', and ''Atlántico'') transported 1,511 Cuban exiles to the Bay of Pigs on the Southern coast of Cuba. They were accompanied by two CIA-owned infantry landing crafts (LCI's), called the ''Blagar'' and ''Barbara J'', containing supplies, ordnance, and equipment. The small army hoped to find support from the local population, intending to cross the island to [[Havana]]. The CIA assumed that the invasion would spark a popular uprising against Castro. However, the |
| − | Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel (see Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces above). By the time the Invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/morgan/Morgan-03-13-6]</ref><ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html</ref> Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano a catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundreds of thousands were imprisoned the others before, during and after the invasion (Priestland, 2003). | + | Escambray rebels had been contained by Cuban militia directed by Francisco Ciutat de Miguel (see Soviet Advisers to Cuban government forces above). By the time the Invasion began, Castro had already executed some who were suspected of colluding with the American campaign (notably two former "Comandantes" Humberto Sorí Marin and William Alexander Morgan<ref>[http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/morgan/Morgan-03-13-6]</ref><ref>http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/bayofpigs/chron.html</ref> Others executed included Alberto Tapia Ruano a catholic youth leader. April was a bloody month for the resistance. Several hundreds of thousands were imprisoned the others before, during and after the invasion (Priestland, 2003). |
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| | After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles (see much detail in printed references section below) involving heavy USSR equipment.<ref name="SPlister.htm">http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPlister.htm</ref> Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support (though four US pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban Air force, which might have crippled the Cuban Air force and given air superiority to the invaders. [[U.S. Marines]] were not sent in. | | After landing, it soon became evident that the exiles were not going to receive effective support at the site of the invasion and were likely to lose. Reports from both sides describe tank battles (see much detail in printed references section below) involving heavy USSR equipment.<ref name="SPlister.htm">http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/SPlister.htm</ref> Kennedy decided against giving the faltering invasion US air support (though four US pilots were killed in Cuba during the invasion) because of his opposition to overt intervention. Kennedy also canceled several sorties of bombings (only two took place) on the grounded Cuban Air force, which might have crippled the Cuban Air force and given air superiority to the invaders. [[U.S. Marines]] were not sent in. |
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| | The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for [[treason]]. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine. | | The 1,209 captured exiles were quickly put on trial. A few were executed and the rest sentenced to thirty years in prison for [[treason]]. After 20 months of negotiation with the United States, Cuba released the exiles in exchange for $53 million in food and medicine. |
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| − | It is generally assumed by some that during the Bay of Pigs Invasion Cuba's losses were high. Triay (2001 p. 110) mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch (p. 148) 50X or about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting. | + | It is generally assumed by some that during the Bay of Pigs Invasion Cuba's losses were high. Triay (2001 p. 110) mentions 4,000 casualties; Lynch (p. 148) 50X or about 5,000. Other sources indicate over 2,200 casualties. Unofficial reports list that seven Cuban army infantry battalions suffered significant losses during the fighting. |
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| | In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by [[napalm]].<ref>http://www.serendipity.li/cia/bay-of-pigs.htm</ref><ref>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/EJR.htm</ref><ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/articles/bayofpigs.htm</ref> | | In one air attack alone, Cuban forces suffered an estimated 1,800 casualties when a mixture of army troops, militia, and civilians were caught on an open causeway riding in civilian buses towards the battle scene in which several buses were hit by [[napalm]].<ref>http://www.serendipity.li/cia/bay-of-pigs.htm</ref><ref>http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1984/EJR.htm</ref><ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/articles/bayofpigs.htm</ref> |
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| | *They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000). | | *They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000). |
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| − | The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref> [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent. | + | The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated." CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref> [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28, 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent. |
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| | Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles. | | Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles. |
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| | There are still yearly nation-wide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion. | | There are still yearly nation-wide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion. |
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| − | An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp. 287-298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains. | + | An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp. 287–298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains. |
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| | ==Notes== | | ==Notes== |
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| | *Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7 | | *Anderson, Jon L. 1998 Che Guevara: A Revolutionary Life. Grove/Atlantic ISBN 0-8021-3558-7 |
| | *Corzo, Pedro 2003 Cuba Cronología de la lucha contra el totalitarismo. Ediciones Memorias, Miami. ISBN 1890829242 | | *Corzo, Pedro 2003 Cuba Cronología de la lucha contra el totalitarismo. Ediciones Memorias, Miami. ISBN 1890829242 |
| − | *Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111-128 | + | *Franqui, Carlos 1984 (foreword by G. Cabrera Infante and translated by Alfred MacAdam from Spanish 1981 version) Family portrait with Fidel. 1985 edition Random House First Vintage Books, New York. ISBN 0394726200 pp. 111–128 |
| | *Grayston, Lynch L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6 | | *Grayston, Lynch L. 2000 Decision for Disaster: Betrayal at the Bay of Pigs. Potomac Books Dulles Virginia ISBN 1-57488-237-6 |
| − | *Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN-10 0870002287 ISBN-13: 978-0870002281 | + | *Hunt, E. Howard 1973 Give us this day. Arlington House, New Rochelle, N.Y. ISBN-10 0870002287 ISBN 978-0870002281 |
| | *Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4 | | *Johnson, Haynes 1964 The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. W. W. Norton & Co Inc. New York. 1974 edition ISBN 0-393-04263-4 |
| | *Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile. | | *Lagas, Jacques 1964 Memorias de un capitán rebelde. Editorial del Pácifico. Santiago, Chile. |
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| | *de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960-1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644 | | *de Paz-Sánchez, Manuel 2001 Zona de Guerra, España y la revolución Cubana (1960-1962), Taller de Historia, Tenerife Gran Canaria ISBN 8479263644 |
| | *Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959-1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4 | | *Priestland, Jane (editor) 2003 British Archives on Cuba: Cuba under Castro 1959-1962. Archival Publications International Limited, 2003, London ISBN 1-903008-20-4 |
| − | *[[Jean Edward Smith]], "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," ''The Nation'', (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360-363. | + | *[[Jean Edward Smith]], "Bay of Pigs: The Unanswered Questions," ''The Nation'', (Apr. 13, 1964), p. 360-363. |
| − | *Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169-180 ISBN 088279235 | + | *Somoza-Debayle, Anastasio and Jack Cox 1980 Nicaragua Betrayed Western Islands Publishers, pp. 169–180 ISBN 088279235 |
| | *Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5 | | *Ros, Enrique 1994 (1998) Giron la verdadera historia. Ediciones Universales (Colección Cuba y sus jueces) third edition Miami ISBN 0-89729-738-5 |
| | *Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7 | | *Thomas, Hugh 1998 Cuba or The Pursuit of Freedom. Da Capo Press, New York Updated Ed. ISBN 0-306-80827-7 |