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On March 17, 1960, Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand">''A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965</ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the ''Sierra Madre'' mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>  

On March 17, 1960, Eisenhower agreed to a recommendation from the CIA to equip and drill Cuban exiles for action against the new Castro government.<ref name="thousand">''A Thousand Days: John F Kennedy in the White House'' [[Arthur Schlesinger Jr]] 1965</ref> Eisenhower stated that it was the policy of the U.S. government to aid anti-Castro guerrilla forces. The [[Central Intelligence Agency|CIA]] began to recruit and train anti-Castro forces in the ''Sierra Madre'' mountains on the Pacific coast of [[Guatemala]].<ref name="thousand"/>  

The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran]]ian prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and [[Guatemala]]n president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954.  Richard Mervin Bissell Jr., one of Allen Dulles's three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."   

The CIA was initially confident that it was capable of overthrowing Castro, having experience assisting in the overthrow of other foreign governments such as [[Iran]]ian prime minister [[Mohammed Mossadegh]] in 1953 and Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954.  Richard Mervin Bissell Jr., one of Allen Dulles's three aides, was made director of "Operation Zapata."   

The original plan called for landing the exile brigade in the vicinity of the old colonial city of Trinidad in the central province of Sancti Spiritus approximately 400&nbsp;km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the Escambray mountains. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter.  Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in [[Guatemala]] for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat.

The original plan called for landing the exile brigade in the vicinity of the old colonial city of Trinidad in the central province of Sancti Spiritus approximately 400&nbsp;km southeast of Havana at the foothills of the Escambray mountains. The selection of the Trinidad site provided a number of options that the exile brigade could exploit during the invasion. The population of Trinidad was generally opposed to Castro and the rugged mountains outside the city provided an area into which the invasion force could retreat and establish a [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] campaign were the landing to falter.  Throughout 1960, the growing ranks of Brigade 2506 trained at locations throughout southern [[Florida]] and in Guatemala for the beach landing and possible mountain retreat.

On February 17, 1961, Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of B-26 medium bombers, Hawker Sea Furies (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven fighter-bomber) and T-33 jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref>

On February 17, 1961, Kennedy, the new U.S. president, asked his advisors whether the toppling of Castro might be related to weapon shipments and if it was possible to claim the real targets were modern fighter aircraft and rockets which endangered America's security. At the time, Cuba's army possessed Soviet tanks, artillery and small arms, and its air force consisted of B-26 medium bombers, Hawker Sea Furies (a fast and effective, though obsolete, propeller driven fighter-bomber) and T-33 jets left over from the Batista Air Force.<ref>http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/baypigs-airforce.htm</ref>

==Release of most captive prisoners==

==Release of most captive prisoners==

In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for five hundred bulldozers. The trade soon rose to $28 million [[United States dollars]].<ref name="thousand"/> Negotiations were non-productive until after the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]]. On December 21, 1962 Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for $53 million U.S. dollars in food and medicine, the money being raised by private donations.<ref>http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr60/fcuba1961.htm</ref> On December 29, 1962 Kennedy met with the returning brigade at [[Palm Beach]], [[Florida]].<ref name="thousand"/>

In May 1961 Castro proposed an exchange of the surviving members of the assault for five hundred bulldozers. The trade soon rose to $28 million [[United States dollars]].<ref name="thousand"/> Negotiations were non-productive until after the Cuban Missile Crisis. On December 21, 1962 Castro and James B. Donovan, a U.S. lawyer signed an agreement to exchange the 1,113 prisoners for $53 million U.S. dollars in food and medicine, the money being raised by private donations.<ref>http://onwar.com/aced/chrono/c1900s/yr60/fcuba1961.htm</ref> On December 29, 1962 Kennedy met with the returning brigade at [[Palm Beach]], [[Florida]].<ref name="thousand"/>

==Aftermath, Reaction, and Re-Evaluation==

==Aftermath, Reaction, and Re-Evaluation==

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, CIA director Allen Dulles, deputy CIA director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director of Operations Richard Mervin Bissell were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA.  Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The failed Bay of Pigs invasion severely embarrassed the Kennedy administration, and made Castro wary of future US intervention in Cuba. As a result of the failure, CIA director Allen Dulles, deputy CIA director Charles Cabell, and Deputy Director of Operations Richard Mervin Bissell were all forced to resign. All three were held responsible for the planning of the operation at the CIA.  Responsibility of the Kennedy Administration and the US State Department for modifications of the plans were not apparent until later.

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching the Cuban Project to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] of 1962.   

The Kennedy administration continued covert operations against Castro, later launching the Cuban Project to "help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". Tensions would again peak in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.   

The CIA, apparently under a Presidential directive, wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. No blame was placed where it probably belonged, President Kennedy's most trusted advisers.  Thus the report only mentions a number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

The CIA, apparently under a Presidential directive, wrote a detailed internal report that laid blame for the failure squarely on internal incompetence. No blame was placed where it probably belonged, President Kennedy's most trusted advisers.  Thus the report only mentions a number of grave errors by the CIA and other American analysts contributed to the debacle:

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated  most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated."  CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref>  [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28, 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.  

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated  most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated."  CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref>  [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28, 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.  

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full scale war and abandoned the exiles.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full-scale war and abandoned the exiles.

An April 29, 2000, ''[[Washington Post]]'' article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the [[Soviet Union]] knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. [[Radio Moscow]] actually broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961, predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister [[David Ormsby-Gore]], British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, showed that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion.<ref name="thousand"/>  

An April 29, 2000, ''[[Washington Post]]'' article, "Soviets Knew Date of Cuba Attack", reported that the CIA had information indicating that the [[Soviet Union]] knew the invasion was going to take place and did not inform Kennedy. [[Radio Moscow]] actually broadcast an English-language newscast on April 13, 1961, predicting the invasion "in a plot hatched by the CIA" using paid "criminals" within a week. The invasion took place four days later. According to British minister [[David Ormsby-Gore]], British intelligence estimates, which had been made available to the CIA, showed that the Cuban people were predominantly behind Castro and that there was no likelihood of mass defections or insurrections following the invasion.<ref name="thousand"/>  

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "[[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]]". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the [[Cuban Missile Crisis]] a year and a half later.

The invasion is often criticized as making Castro even more popular, adding nationalistic sentiments to the support for his economic policies. Following the initial B-26 bombings, he declared the revolution "[[Marxism-Leninism|Marxist-Leninist]]". After the invasion, he pursued closer relations with the Soviet Union, partly for protection, which helped pave the way for the Cuban Missile Crisis a year and a half later.

There are still yearly nation-wide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion.

There are still yearly nationwide drills in Cuba during the 'Dia de la Defensa' (defense day) to prepare the entire population for an invasion.

An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp.&nbsp;287–298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains.

An appendix to the Enrique Ros book pp.&nbsp;287–298 gives the names of Bay of Pigs veterans who became officers in the US Army in Vietnam, these names include 6 Colonels, 19 Lt Colonels, 9 Majors, and 29 Captains.