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The problem of a two-front war occupied German military planners since the founding of the Second Reich in 1871. Schlieffen is recognized as the one who proposed a workable solution. In 1940, the German's used a modified Schlieffen plan based on bluff, decoy, and diversions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]} 19:58, 27 March 2017 (EDT)

The problem of a two-front war occupied German military planners since the founding of the Second Reich in 1871. Schlieffen is recognized as the one who proposed a workable solution. In 1940, the German's used a modified Schlieffen plan based on bluff, decoy, and diversions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]} 19:58, 27 March 2017 (EDT)

Schlieffen's exact words were to "strike Paris like hammer on an anvil" thru Belgium, and the movement of troops thru Belgium were to "brush the English Channel on the sleeze". Once these actions were completed, to rush troops East via rail, an advantage Russian military organizers did not have, to meet the overwhelming numbers of Russians, under equiped, travelling on foot. (Solzhenitsen. In ''August 1914'', says for this army of village farm boys travelling on foot they had only one gun for every three men. Troop strength: German professional military would should have been deployed to Belgium. 175,000; underequiped Russian farm boys, 400,000. It's further been hypothesized Hindenburg's and other members of Junker class decision ''not': to execute the Schlieffen plan is because they were large estate landowners in the East more concerned with self interest than attacking or defending the urbanized Western sector).

Schlieffen's exact words were to "strike Paris like hammer on an anvil" thru Belgium, and the movement of troops thru Belgium were to "brush the English Channel on the sleeze". Once these actions were completed, to rush troops East via rail, an advantage Russian military organizers did not have, to meet the overwhelming numbers of Russians, under equiped, travelling on foot. (Solzhenitsen. In ''August 1914'', says for this army of village farm boys travelling on foot they had only one gun for every three men. Troop strength: German professional military would should have been deployed to Belgium. 175,000; underequiped Russian farm boys, 400,000. It's further been hypothesized Hindenburg's and other members of Junker class decision ''not'' to execute the Schlieffen plan is because they were large estate landowners in the East more concerned with self interest than attacking or defending the urbanized Western sector).

The reason the Schlieffen planned failed is, because it wasn't implemented. Hindenburg & Ludendorf modified it by transferring troops for battles of Tannenburg & Masurian Lakes in the East, slowing the advance in Belgium, and allowing the Brits time to infiltrate troops across the channel. This is what caused the 4 years of trench warfare.

The reason the Schlieffen planned failed is, because it wasn't implemented. Hindenburg & Ludendorf modified it by transferring troops for battles of Tannenburg & Masurian Lakes in the East, slowing the advance in Belgium, and allowing the Brits time to infiltrate troops across the channel. This is what caused the 4 years of trench warfare.

:::::Craig was published back in 1955, you know. He's says the Schlieffen plan was developed "between 1897 and 1905." He also claims Schlieffen was inspired by the account of Cannae that Delbrück gives in ''History of the Art of War'', which was published in 1900. (p. 279) [[User:PeterKa|PeterKa]] ([[User talk:PeterKa|talk]]) 05:50, 29 March 2017 (EDT)

:::::Craig was published back in 1955, you know. He's says the Schlieffen plan was developed "between 1897 and 1905." He also claims Schlieffen was inspired by the account of Cannae that Delbrück gives in ''History of the Art of War'', which was published in 1900. (p. 279) [[User:PeterKa|PeterKa]] ([[User talk:PeterKa|talk]]) 05:50, 29 March 2017 (EDT)

::::::Much to be learned from the Schlieffen plans is, not just what it was, but ''how'' it came into existence. Schlieffen is known to, in a time of peace, give staff assignments to underlyings to produce detailed written contingencies for various aspects under a time constraint - like over the Christmas holiday while they were at home with their families - just to emphasize the constant vigilance military planners need. This is the Schlieffen plan. And this is the model of preoccupation, commitment, and staff coordination that has made the German General Staff the model of all the world's large, surving military establishments. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]}`

::::::Much to be learned from the Schlieffen plans is, not just what it was, but ''how'' it came into existence. Schlieffen is known to, in a time of peace, give staff assignments to underlyings to produce detailed written contingencies for various aspects under a time constraint - like over the Christmas holiday while they were at home with their families - just to emphasize the constant vigilance military planners need. This is the Schlieffen plan. And this is the model of preoccupation, commitment, and staff coordination that has made the German General Staff the model of all the world's large, surving military establishments. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]^{[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]}`